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Justin Trudeau hints at boosting Canada’s military spending

Justin Trudeau hints at boosting Canada’s military spending

Canada says it will look at increasing its defence spending and tacked on 10 more Russian names to an ever growing sanctions list.

By Tonda MacCharles
Ottawa Bureau
Mon., March 7, 2022

Riga, LATVIA—On the 13th day of the brutal Russian bid to claim Ukraine as its own, Prime Minister Justin Trudeau is showing up at the Latvian battle group led by Canadian soldiers, waving the Maple Leaf and a vague hint at more money for the military.

Canada has been waving the NATO flag for nearly seven years in Latvia as a bulwark against Russia’s further incursions in Eastern Europe.

Canada stepped up to lead one of NATO’s four battle groups in 2015 — part of the defensive alliance’s display of strength and solidarity with weaker member states after Russia invaded Ukraine and seized the Crimean peninsula in 2014. Trudeau arrived in the Latvian capital late Monday after meetings in the U.K. with British Prime Minister Boris Johnson and Netherlands Prime Minister Mark Rutte.

Earlier Monday, faced with a seemingly unstoppable war in Ukraine, Trudeau said he will look at increasing Canada’s defence spending. Given world events, he said there are “certainly reflections to have.”

And Canada tacked on 10 more Russian names to an ever-growing sanctions list.

The latest round of sanctions includes names Trudeau said were identified by jailed Russian opposition leader and Putin nemesis Alexei Navalny.

However, on a day when Trudeau cited the new sanctions, and Johnson touted new measures meant to expose Russian property owners in his country, Rutte admitted sanctions are not working.

Yet they all called for more concerted international efforts over the long haul, including more economic measures and more humanitarian aid, with Johnson and Rutte divided over how quickly countries need to get off Russian oil and gas.

The 10 latest names on Canada’s target list do not include Roman Abramovich — a Russian billionaire Navalny has been flagging to Canada since at least 2017. Canada appears to have sanctioned about 20 of the 35 names on Navalny’s list.

The Conservative opposition says the Liberal government is not yet exerting maximum pressure on Putin, and should do more to bolster Canadian Forces, including by finally approving the purchase of fighter jets.

Foreign affairs critic Michael Chong said in an interview that Ottawa must still sanction “additional oligarchs close to President Putin who have significant assets in Canada.”

Abramovich owns more than a quarter of the public shares in steelmaking giant Evraz, which has operations in Alberta and Saskatchewan and has supplied most of the steel for the government-owned Trans Mountain pipeline project.

Evraz’s board of directors also includes two more Russians the U.S. government identified as “oligarchs” in 2019 — Aleksandr Abramov and Aleksandr Frolov — and its Canadian operations have received significant support from the federal government.

That includes at least $27 million in emergency wage subsidies during the pandemic, as well as $7 million through a fund meant to help heavy-polluters reduce emissions that cause climate change, according to the company’s most recent annual report.

In addition to upping defence spending, the Conservatives want NORAD’s early warning system upgraded, naval shipbuilding ramped up and Arctic security bolstered.

In London, Johnson sat down with Trudeau and Rutte at the Northolt airbase. Their morning meetings had a rushed feel, with Johnson starting to usher press out before Trudeau spoke. His office said later that the British PM couldn’t squeeze the full meeting in at 10 Downing Street because Johnson’s “diary” was so busy that day. The three leaders held an afternoon news conference at 10 Downing.

But before that Trudeau met with the Queen, saying she was “insightful” and they had a “useful, for me anyway, conversation about global affairs.”

Trudeau meets with NATO Secretary General Jens Stoltenberg Tuesday in Latvia.

The prime minister will also meet with three Baltic leaders, the prime ministers of Latvia, Lithuania and Estonia, in the Latvian capital of Riga.

The Liberals announced they would increase the 500 Canadian Forces in Latvia by another 460 troops. The Canadians are leading a multinational battle group, one of four that are part of NATO’s deployments in the region.

Another 3,400 Canadians could be deployed to the region in the months to come, on standby for NATO orders.

But Canada’s shipments of lethal aid to Ukraine were slow to come in the view of the Conservatives, and the Ukrainian Canadian community.

And suddenly Western allies are eyeing each other’s defence commitments.

At the Downing Street news conference, Rutte noted the Netherlands will increase its defence budget to close to two per cent of GDP. Germany has led the G7, and doubled its defence budget in the face of Putin’s invasion and threats. Johnson said the U.K. defence spending is about 2.4 per cent and declined to comment on Canada’s defence spending which is 1.4 per cent of GDP.

But Johnson didn’t hold back.

“What we can’t do, post the invasion of Ukraine is assume that we go back to a kind of status quo ante, a kind of new normalization in the way that we did after the … seizure of Crimea and the Donbas area,” Johnson said. “We’ve got to recognize that things have changed and that we need a new focus on security and I think that that is kind of increasingly understood by everybody.”

Trudeau stood by his British and Dutch counterparts and pledged Canada would do more.

He defended his government’s record, saying Ottawa is gradually increasing spending over the next decade by 70 per cent. Then Trudeau admitted more might be necessary.

“We also recognize that context is changing rapidly around the world and we need to make sure that women and men have certainty and our forces have all the equipment necessary to be able to stand strongly as we always have. As members of NATO. We will continue to look at what more we can do.”

The three leaders — Johnson, a conservative and Trudeau and Rutte, progressive liberals — in a joint statement said they “will continue to impose severe costs on Russia.”

Arriving for the news conference from Windsor Castle, Trudeau had to detour to enter Downing Street as loud so-called Freedom Convoy protesters bellowed from outside the gate. They carried signs marked “Tuck Frudeau” and “Free Tamara” (Lich).

Protester Jeff Wyatt who said he has no Canadian ties told the Star he came to stand up for Lich and others who were leading a “peaceful protest” worldwide against government “lies” about COVID-19 and what he called Trudeau’s “tyranny.”

Elsewhere in London, outside the Russian embassy, other protesters and passersby reflected on what they said was real tyranny — the Russian attack on Ukraine. “I think we should be as tough as possible to get this stopped, as tough as possible,” said protester Clive Martinez.
 
I don’t think the average Canadian understands any of the current or likely future dangers to Canada and our way of life.

The average Canadian doesn’t seem to understand the danger some of our own political parties and there spokespersons represent (I refrain from using the words “politics” and “leaders” in a joined manner) so it seems a stretch they understand anything related to the CCP as well.
I'm not so sure. I think there is a greater understanding. Maybe it's just more of a feeling. But something has changed.

Fyi just texting to my clueless sister just before type this. Her son is job hunting as he has just graduated Queens...she tells me he applied to Volvo to work in their advanced VR lab. So asked which one? Volvo Cars or Volvo AB.....she then just texted back "not cars they're Chinese! She didn't want her son to work for a Chinese company.

FYI....Ford sold Volvo Cars to Chinese maker Chery over 1o years ago. Volvo AB is still Swedish. They make trucks, busses and engines etc. They still have a manufacturing footprint in Canada.
 
I don’t think the average Canadian understands any of the current or likely future dangers to Canada and our way of life.

The average Canadian doesn’t seem to understand the danger some of our own political parties and there spokespersons represent (I refrain from using the words “politics” and “leaders” in a joined manner) so it seems a stretch they understand anything related to the CCP as well.
There's a bit of both for sure. Some Canadians are truly clueless and come out completely baffled when I brief them about the challenges ahead for the 21st century.

Others, light on details as they may be, still understand the threat that China represents. Seemingly better than our own government, as Spencer mentioned.

The fence that determines where individuals fall in this dichotomy seems to be whether or not they were alive during the Cold war. A corollary to that being that if they were communists/socialists then, they still don't see the threat today.
 
You underestimate Canada's ability to put its head in the sand and wail when they find out we have to spend money on killing machines.
Actually, I think we're at a tipping point. The right kind of information campaign could make a difference.

That said I'm sure that the current iteration of the LPC would decline to do that continuing to believe in fairies and unicorns. I'm not so sure if the current iteration of the CPC could do it either.

🍻
 
Except for the U-Boats in the Gulf of St Lawrence mid WWII. We were on our own (AFAIK) and the Germans had a good go at us. But NOBODY in Canada remembers this.
IIRC there was a Japanese submarine scare on the west coast, too.
Is it a case of the public being head of the government in this case? I do believe the "average" Canadian understands the danger of China/CCP more than official Ottawa.
Not sure if the CCP is yet registering as a Defence, versus Security/Intelligence/Influence problem for most people; however, Russia has provided a pointed reminder that invasions aren't purely a historical activity.

Whole different beast than opting in to US-led wars of questionable utility or fighting pirates with a CPF. The Ukrainians' pervasive drone and cell phone footage is the CAF's best friend right now: should be easy to make the public case for all things shoulder-launched. Lots of glimpses of the light and wheeled/medium/mech world.

Depending what the mooted offensive looks like, the tracked/heavy world might get the same visibility.
 
Canada was left out of key trilateral defence pact. That's a problem, says report from U.S. think-tank


And the laws of counter-will, as demonstrated by petulant, pampered children, will ensure that Trudeau keeps us out - for as long as he's there ;)

Sad Baby GIF
 
Here is the actual CSIS report mentioned in the CBC article:

Canadian Membership in AUKUS: A Time for Action

Commentary by Christopher Hernandez-Roy , Vincent Rigby , and Henry Ziemer
Published May 9, 2023

A Conspicuous Absence

On a sunny March day in San Diego, U.S. president Joe Biden, flanked by UK prime minister Rishi Sunak and Australian prime minister Anthony Albanese, announced next steps on AUKUS, the security partnership between the three countries. The tone among the three was celebratory, as they put the finishing touches on months of intensive planning and coordination and agreed upon a timeline for Australia’s acquisition and eventual construction of nuclear-powered submarines (SSNs). However, the conference was marked by a conspicuous absence. Canada—the country with the world’s longest coastline, bordering the Pacific, Arctic, and Atlantic Oceans, founding NATO ally, member of both the Five Eyes partnership and North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD)—has been nowhere to be found in AUKUS discussions.

In contrast to the grand atmosphere of the AUKUS summit, Biden’s visit to Ottawa the next week was a congenial, if hurried, attempt to check the right boxes with the United States’ northern neighbor. Security and defense announcements, including a timeline and budget for modernizing NORAD sensors (in particular critical over-the-horizon radar), weapons, and command and control infrastructure, seemed cobbled together by a reluctant Canadian government barely in time for the two leaders’ press conference. The glacial pace at which Canada appears to be adapting to the realities of modern great power competition has left it far behind the curve, with consequences for both Ottawa’s reputation among its allies, and its ability to protect Canadian territory, sovereignty, and contribute to global peace and stability.

While Canada is a member of storied and long-standing security partnerships, it has been loath to step up as a member of these alliances. Even Canada’s new Indo-Pacific Strategy is decidedly light on substance. The document commits to greater participation in joint exercises and training and the deployment of just one extra vessel for patrols in the region, adding up to a modest investment of less than $500 million over five years.

Canada’s minister of national defense, Anita Anand, explained that Canada was not interested in AUKUS given its central purpose of acquiring nuclear submarines, “which is not the route Canada is taking in terms of its marine capabilities.” Canada is indeed in dire need of replacing its aging submarine fleet and, despite the minister’s assertion, conventionally armed SSNs have been recognized in the past as “the only vessel able to exercise surveillance and control in northern Canadian ice-covered waters.” As such, they should not be taken off the table. Regardless, AUKUS is about much more than SSNs; it is a bold strategy to align member states’ defense and technology sectors to develop the next generation of military capabilities. It sends a message to potential challengers that the United States, United Kingdom, and Australia are serious about protecting their interests in the region and beyond.

A Lack of Commitment

Why is Canada missing from AUKUS? The simple answer is that Ottawa was apparently not invited. But even if it had been, Canada’s answer may have been driven by cost. AUKUS comes with a hefty price tag for Australia of between 268 and 368 billion AUD (179 and 245 billion USD) over a 30-year period. This type of large-scale, sustained commitment to overhaul a single defense capability would be unprecedented for Canada, which has struggled since the end of the Cold War to match its allies in defense spending. With a 2.20 trillion USD economy in 2022, Canada spent approximately 1.3 percent of its GDP on defense, well short of the NATO goal of 2 percent, which it has not met in over 35 years. Further, Canada’s capital acquisition budget represents only 18.7 percent of overall defense expenditures. Both figures put Canada at or near the bottom of NATO countries. According to leaked U.S. intelligence documents revealed recently in the Washington Post, Prime Minister Trudeau has told allies in private that Canada will never reach the 2 percent spending target.

In contrast, Australia, with a GDP of 1.75 trillion USD, spent 2.11 percent on defense (32.45 billion USD). Many other countries have also dramatically increased their defense spending to respond to resurgent great power competition and other threats. Japan has committed to more than double its expenditure on the Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) by 2027, and Germany has taken concrete steps to bring military spending up to the NATO threshold.

Given these developments, Canada’s defense posture appears increasingly exposed. Ottawa’s paucity of credible commitments to shore up defense will leave it increasingly on the sidelines when it comes to vital conversations around maritime security, integrated deterrence, and defense-industrial cooperation. The establishment of AUKUS has even led some analysts to speculate that the Five Eyes may evolve into a de facto “Three Eyes” partnership, as Australia, the United Kingdom, and United States become the indisputable Anglosphere leaders on security matters. Beyond reputational damage, Canada’s weak security stance in the face of growing challenges from revanchist and revisionist powers will compromise Canadian national interests, as can be seen with aggressive Russian moves in the Arctic and increasingly hostile Chinese activities in Canada, including electoral interference.

Despite this gloomy picture, recent announcements on AUKUS create an auspicious, if fleeting, opportunity for Canada to reengage with its Five Eyes partners, strengthen industrial bases, and signal a commitment to shoulder the responsibilities of responding to increased great power competition. While much attention has been paid to the submarine acquisition and development efforts which constitute Pillar 1 of the agreement, discussions are now underway with respect to Pillar 2, which deals with cooperation on other advanced technologies. This presents new opportunities for other countries to engage (fellow Five Eyes member New Zealand already making overtures). This potential for expansion is reflected in the April 2022 Leaders’ Statement in which the three countries commit to “seek opportunities to engage allies and close partners.”
To fully exploit this window of opportunity, Canada needs to make a forward-looking, resource-backed bid to join AUKUS now. Doing so will pay dividends not only for Canada’s security, but also for its technology and industrial sectors. It could also pave the way for renewed Canadian participation on the world stage before its absence from strategic partnerships ceases to be conspicuous and starts becoming routine.

More than Meets the Eye

The apparent indifference of Canada toward AUKUS seems to stem from a combination of sticker-shock and an inadequate understanding of the benefits to be derived from the agreement. These two concerns intersect most powerfully at the first pillar of the agreement focused on nuclear-powered submarines. That said, engaging with AUKUS on Pillar 1 represents one of the most effective ways for Canada to modernize a woefully out-of-date submarine fleet.

The four diesel-electric Victoria-class submarines that comprise Canada’s undersea capability are estimated to represent a quarter of the Royal Canadian Navy’s advanced warfighting abilities. However, these vessels, purchased from the United Kingdom in 1998, are deteriorating in part due to age, and even more so due to the wear and tear of extensive activity. The Victoria class have ranged far and wide, from Canada’s arctic waters monitoring Russian undersea activity to the coast of North Korea helping enforce international sanctions. The maintenance requirements for Canada’s SSNs have grown substantially to the detriment of fleet readiness. In 2019, for instance, the Department of National Defence reported that its submarine fleet “spent zero days at sea,” instead stuck in port undergoing repairs that are expected to surpass $3 billion in costs by 2025.

Canada only recently began a lengthy process of identifying replacements for its current submarine fleet. Estimated timelines for first delivery of new subs range between 15 and 25 years, at which point the Victoria-class boats will have become storied antiques. Joining Pillar 1 of AUKUS accordingly represents one method of jump starting this process and opens the door for Canada to potentially acquire conventionally armed nuclear-powered submarines of its own, taking advantage of economies of scale. This capability has been recognized by previous defense ministers as especially important for operations in Arctic waters.

However, even setting aside the question of submarines entirely, AUKUS membership brings three major advantages for Canada’s security and prosperity.
First, AUKUS is a technological accelerator, facilitating exchanges of information and expertise which have immediate applicability to defense and other sectors far beyond. Pillar 2 of AUKUS is geared towards placing advanced capabilities in the hands of member countries’ armed forces, especially with respect to “cyber capabilities, artificial intelligence, quantum technologies, additional undersea capabilities, hypersonic and counter-hypersonic.” These technologies will have a profound impact on the future battlespace, and Canada needs them to operate seamlessly under NORAD and NATO commands and ensure force projection and protection.

Second, AUKUS encourages greater integration among member states' industrial bases. As with cooperation on broader research and development, closer defense-industrial collaboration has benefits that extend far beyond Canada’s defense sector. In particular, increasing critical mineral cooperation through AUKUS would dovetail with existing North American initiatives, such as the Minerals Security Partnership and announcements made at the North American Leaders’ Summit and the Biden-Trudeau meeting. Not only will closer cooperation on mining and manufacturing help AUKUS develop the kinds of economies of scale necessary to defray the significant costs and time lag associated with high-tech military capabilities, it will strengthen commitments to North American integration set out under the United States-Mexico-Canada Agreement (USMCA). Additionally, while collaboration on technology and industrial policy will have important spillover effects, the framing of AUKUS as a defense partnership first and foremost may also prompt Canada to strengthen its supply chains and industrial security standards in response to malign foreign influence that puts Canada at risk of major economic disruption in times of crisis. Canada is already moving in this direction, as demonstrated by new measures aimed at strengthening the Investment Canada Act and the establishment of a Critical Minerals Strategy.

Finally, AUKUS helps promote strategic convergence on a deterrence-based response to rising Chinese aggression in the Indo-Pacific and Russian activity in the Arctic. Perhaps most importantly, AUKUS membership offers Canada a practical way to support emerging strategic priorities. Canada’s new Indo-Pacific strategy, for instance, finally identifies China as a “disruptive global power,” a long-overdue recognition of the realities of great power competition. However, the steps undertaken to this point to support a stronger stance against China do not match those set out in U.S. national security documents or those of key allies like Australia and Japan. While Canada is finally beginning to see eye to eye with allies on regional threats, it needs to move beyond half-measures on defense and accelerate modernization and procurement efforts.

Given the important benefits Canada could derive from joining AUKUS, what can the country bring to the table?

Looking to Canada

Canada has played an important role for decades supporting global security. At the close of the Second World War, Canada had the world’s fourth-largest navy, and into the early 1970s, Canadian defense spending consistently surpassed 2 percent of GDP. Canada today boasts competent and professional armed forces, ample natural resources, an advanced industrial economy, and an enviable geostrategic position from which it can serve as a force multiplier to the AUKUS agreement.

As the longest standing member of the U.S. National Technology and Industrial Base (NTIB), Canada has had nearly three decades to harmonize its defense industry with that of its southern neighbor. Furthermore, Canada falls under an exemption in the International Traffic in Arms Regulations (ITAR) unique among all U.S. treaty allies which “allows license-free permanent and temporary exports, retransfers and reexports of unclassified defense articles and defense services to the Canadian government.” Combined with the unprecedented degree of trade integration between the two countries fostered under the USMCA, the United States and Canada are already further along on military procurement cooperation than other AUKUS members.

Another vital sector where Canadian membership in AUKUS could have a considerable impact is on critical minerals and mining. Canada is home to some of the world’s largest deposits of rare earth elements and other resources critical in the manufacture of advanced technologies, including military-grade sensors, lasers, communications equipment and batteries. Furthermore, the Canadian government has invested nearly $4 billion CAD to develop these resources. Canada has also climbed to the number two spot on BloombergNEF’s global battery supply chain ranking. High-performance batteries are another emerging technology with profound implications for defense technology, especially uncrewed or autonomous vehicles. Canada could take a leading role in associated research and development under Pillar 2 of AUKUS.

With respect to technological cooperation, Canada could also play a vital role in accelerating AUKUS’s work on artificial intelligence and cybersecurity. Canada has the most highly educated workforce in the G7, and is home to a vibrant tech ecosystem which includes 800 artificial intelligence (AI) companies and hundreds of emerging startups. The ability to tap into this network of expertise will prove a boon to AUKUS members aiming to develop and refine technologies at the cutting edge of research and design.

Canada’s strategic geography offers yet another advantage to AUKUS. It provides important surveillance and domain awareness capabilities in the Arctic and the northern Pacific. To this end, AUKUS and NORAD modernization could feed into one another, with the latter’s focus on early warning offering a natural complement to the former’s Pillar 2 initiatives in countering Russian and Chinese hypersonic weapons.

Canada has much to offer AUKUS, and vice versa. But striking the right balance remains a challenge for both sides. For Australia, the United Kingdom, and the United States, opening the door to too many partners too soon risks making the agreement overly broad and unwieldly. From the Canadian perspective, joining AUKUS could lead to demands over the longer term for dramatic increases in defense spending which may not be easy for Ottawa and the public writ large to accept. It may therefore be necessary to adopt a gradual approach.

Now Is the Time to Act

The time is right for Canada to consider approaching its Five Eyes partners about AUKUS membership. Such a strategy should focus at least initially on Pillar 2 and on starting a conversation about aligning industrial and research policies to support the development of key defense capabilities. An emphasis on technological cooperation would provide a gentle glide path for Canada, eased in part by New Zealand’s statements of interest in joining Pillar 2 of the agreement, rather than plunging into the icy depths of SSN procurement.
Nevertheless, while Pillar 2 should be the initial focus of Canada’s membership in AUKUS, this should not slam the door on eventual cooperation on submarines. Joining Pillar 2 may allow Canada to consider Pillar 1 over the longer term, especially as the need for Canada to update its subsurface capabilities becomes increasingly pressing.

While accession to AUKUS would be a powerful symbol of a potential new security and defense posture, it would be only one step in helping Canada align with its allies in meeting the demands of a world dominated by renewed geostrategic rivalry. As the West navigates a period more dangerous and unpredictable than any since the Second World War, and as Canada completes a defense policy update in light of these changed global circumstances, it should make broader efforts to increase defense spending and modernize its forces. Recent announcements, such as the acquisition of F-35 aircraft and a NORAD modernization, were welcome but long overdue and should not mask serious deficiencies in Canada’s submarine fleet as well as its military personnel levels. Joining AUKUS would be good start, and perhaps set Canada on a path toward an appearance at the next sunny and celebratory conference to inaugurate the next phase of cooperation for the Western alliance.

Christopher Hernandez-Roy is the deputy director and senior fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) in Washington, D.C. Vincent Rigby is a non-resident senior adviser with the CSIS Americas Program. He is also a visiting professor with the Max Bell School of Public Policy at McGill University. Henry Ziemer is the program coordinator and research assistant with the CSIS Americas Program.

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Canada was left out of key trilateral defence pact. That's a problem, says report from U.S. think-tank

I know the media keeps this story alive here, but I honestly don't know why...it seems pretty cut & dry.

The US wants to take advantage of Australian basing locations, and with rotate or forward deploy forces to them. Part of these strategic interests include having American nuclear submarines supported at these bases, greatly reducing transit requirements & speeding up required work.

Turns out Australia is interested & willing to get into the nuclear submarine game, obviously due to having China not too far away. Also turns out, Australia & the US are extremely close allies...so naturally, ideas turn into tangible things.


Canada isn't Australia. The US has no need to forward deploy it's submarines to our naval bases, and we don't have the facilities to support their maintenance even if they did.

We also have no interest in acquiring nuclear submarines... kind of seems natural to leave us out of the trilateral nuclear submarine deal when we barely dare to speak the words 'nuclear submarines'...




We also don't need to be involved in every single defence related pact that developes. We think we do, but we don't...

Would it have it's benefits & advantages? Ofcourse...



But I don't own a Lamborghini...I can't get mad at the local Lamborghini club for not inviting me on their charity drives & car shows because I chose to buy a Honda Civic instead.
 
I know the media keeps this story alive here, but I honestly don't know why...it seems pretty cut & dry.

The US wants to take advantage of Australian basing locations, and with rotate or forward deploy forces to them. Part of these strategic interests include having American nuclear submarines supported at these bases, greatly reducing transit requirements & speeding up required work.

Turns out Australia is interested & willing to get into the nuclear submarine game, obviously due to having China not too far away. Also turns out, Australia & the US are extremely close allies...so naturally, ideas turn into tangible things.


Canada isn't Australia. The US has no need to forward deploy it's submarines to our naval bases, and we don't have the facilities to support their maintenance even if they did.

We also have no interest in acquiring nuclear submarines... kind of seems natural to leave us out of the trilateral nuclear submarine deal when we barely dare to speak the words 'nuclear submarines'...




We also don't need to be involved in every single defence related pact that developes. We think we do, but we don't...

Would it have it's benefits & advantages? Ofcourse...



But I don't own a Lamborghini...I can't get mad at the local Lamborghini club for not inviting me on their charity drives & car shows because I chose to buy a Honda Civic instead.
Canada could have been a contributing partner, even if it was in supporting technology vice nuclear technology, but either at our government's request, or because of our government's failure to act like responsible partners, we are on the outside looking in.

We are the "other" major Anglosphere country in the world, that we are on the outside is odd...
 
I know the media keeps this story alive here, but I honestly don't know why...it seems pretty cut & dry.

The US wants to take advantage of Australian basing locations, and with rotate or forward deploy forces to them. Part of these strategic interests include having American nuclear submarines supported at these bases, greatly reducing transit requirements & speeding up required work.
There is zero requirement to have the Australians have SSN’s if we just wanted to temp base at their ports.

They don’t need fuel, and any significant maintenance occurs back home.

We don’t plan on permanently basing Sub’s there as we don’t need or want to.
Turns out Australia is interested & willing to get into the nuclear submarine game, obviously due to having China not too far away. Also turns out, Australia & the US are extremely close allies...so naturally, ideas turn into tangible things.


Canada isn't Australia. The US has no need to forward deploy it's submarines to our naval bases, and we don't have the facilities to support their maintenance even if they did.

We also have no interest in acquiring nuclear submarines... kind of seems natural to leave us out of the trilateral nuclear submarine deal when we barely dare to speak the words 'nuclear submarines'...




We also don't need to be involved in every single defence related pact that developes. We think we do, but we don't...

Would it have it's benefits & advantages? Ofcourse...



But I don't own a Lamborghini...I can't get mad at the local Lamborghini club for not inviting me on their charity drives & car shows because I chose to buy a Honda Civic instead.
You can get mad that your parents who could easily have Lamborghini’s don’t get one, and instead chose to send you out to Lamborghini races in a Honda Civic…
 
You can get mad that your parents who could easily have Lamborghini’s don’t get one, and instead chose to send you out to Lamborghini races in a Honda Civic…
Hmmmmmm, well said. Good point.



Just to be clear, I’m not advocating our position. Being part of that is much better than not being part of it.

I was moreso commenting on the media bringing up the issue a few times lately with the general premise of “Why isn’t Canada involved?”
 
And while we conduct studies and evaluations and update our white paper Germany has initiated the purchase of 60 off the shelf chinooks. No signed deal yet but they have sought approval from government so it looks like we are all alone at the bottom of the pile
 
And while we conduct studies and evaluations and update our white paper Germany has initiated the purchase of 60 off the shelf chinooks. No signed deal yet but they have sought approval from government so it looks like we are all alone at the bottom of the pile
That deal has been being worked on for a tenth of a century…it didn’t happen overnight.
 
You know everything is fucked when it takes a decade to ink a deal on existing equipment.
In fairness to Germany they were heavily invested in the CH-53, so it took a while to pivot them to the CH-47, but they’re getting F Block II which are almost as nice as the CH-147F and MH-47G Block IIs.
 
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