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New Canadian Shipbuilding Strategy

  • Thread starter Thread starter GAP
  • Start date Start date
I think it's the other way around.
seems likely that they are all derivatives

 
Not how it works.

While you have plans that guide the work, fitting, which include pipes, trunking, wire ways and a lot of pre-wiring, remains an art. Unlike the hulls sections that are made to very narrow tolerances so that when welded together, they basically marry to one another smoothly, the fitters work from the plan, but in practice, have to work in the space they are given in reality and make sure that everything fits in there as close as possible to plan, yet it is never quite perfect.

Add to that the fact that in modern shipbuilding, the sub assembly modules are assembled upside down (so that the fitters work at their feet instead of on a ladder and above their head, which is a lot easier and makes for less mistakes and injuries) and, to ensure that sub assemblies will match the fitted systems of one another, there is an order to the work: Each module starts from a given point (say the forward bulkhead) and as it works towards the other end, gets the exact locations of fitted system in the next module to which it will connect so that they end up lined properly.

If one or two such sub assemblies are made in the wrong order for any reasons, or the same thing happens for a whole major block, then you only discover they don't quite match after they are put together and it has to be redone, but now the ship is right side up and you have to re-fit likely at both ends while working in confine space above you head.

Another type of order of work mistake could be something like having fitters come to install a pump somewhere, only to realize that the pipes it should connect to have not yet been fitted. etc. etc.

There are some sophisticated software programs out there to manage work-order in large projects, but they ultimately rely on human input, at least at the beginning in the building of the management plan, and errors can occur or one discovers after the fact that a step was missed, or two things should have occurred in a different order to maintain work flow, etc. That's one reason, amongst others, why first of class take more time to build, as you are learning all of those errors or work-flow corrections that improve production. It's also why efficiency of production and cost reductions occur on and on with each new vessel being built to the same plans.
 
The French Navy breaking the 3, 4 and 5 to 1 model.

3,4 and 5 to 1 implies to me readiness of 33%, 25% and 20% respectively.
The French Navy is targeting a readiness of 80%.
That suggests that if they own 5 ships 4 of them are operational at any given time.



....

This caught my eye.

"One interesting SSF approach highlighted here by the spokesperson is the navy’s “maintenance of major equipment by carousel”. To optimise the duration of AT/ATM work, major equipment can be taken off the ship and maintained ashore, before being reinstalled on the next ship entering AT/ATM."

To my mind this ties in directly with the Danish Stanflex system. You may not need or want to change vessel roles by rapidly swapping guns for missiles or torpedoes but there is considerable advantage to being able to pull out a damaged 76mm and dropping in a working one at any dockside in 30 minutes. Or pulling an empty missile pack and dropping in a preloaded one.

 
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Not how it works.



There are some sophisticated software programs out there to manage work-order in large projects, but they ultimately rely on human input, at least at the beginning in the building of the management plan, and errors can occur or one discovers after the fact that a step was missed, or two things should have occurred in a different order to maintain work flow, etc. That's one reason, amongst others, why first of class take more time to build, as you are learning all of those errors or work-flow corrections that improve production. It's also why efficiency of production and cost reductions occur on and on with each new vessel being built to the same plans.
Hopefully the Scots have learned those lessons and are a Laptop away for on the site guidance for the Irving workforce
 
Interesting, I never heard about this event, just saw a mention of it in a CCG FB page

This harrowing account describes a major engine room explosion and fire in the late 1970s or early 1980s involving the Canadian Coast Guard Ship (CCGS) Louis S. St-Laurent. [1]
A breakdown of the event details mentioned in your story:

  • The Incident: A severe onboard explosion caused a massive fireball that completely gutted the bridge and upper decks. The blast incinerated electrical wiring, which instantly disabled primary steering, bridge controls, and radios.
  • The Response: The engineers displayed immense bravery, manually steering the vessel and maneuvering the propeller shafts locally from the engine room.
  • The Rescue: CCGS Labrador (a fellow icebreaker) was monitoring the ship via radio from over the horizon. When the ship lost contact and they saw the smoke, they diverted to investigate, eventually evacuating all non-essential crew members off the Louis.
  • The Casualties: Tragically, a crew member succumbed to the fireball’s direct impact, with the intense heat melting their uniform. [1, 2]
 
Interesting, I never heard about this event, just saw a mention of it in a CCG FB page

This harrowing account describes a major engine room explosion and fire in the late 1970s or early 1980s involving the Canadian Coast Guard Ship (CCGS) Louis S. St-Laurent. [1]
A breakdown of the event details mentioned in your story:

  • The Incident: A severe onboard explosion caused a massive fireball that completely gutted the bridge and upper decks. The blast incinerated electrical wiring, which instantly disabled primary steering, bridge controls, and radios.
  • The Response: The engineers displayed immense bravery, manually steering the vessel and maneuvering the propeller shafts locally from the engine room.
  • The Rescue: CCGS Labrador (a fellow icebreaker) was monitoring the ship via radio from over the horizon. When the ship lost contact and they saw the smoke, they diverted to investigate, eventually evacuating all non-essential crew members off the Louis.
  • The Casualties: Tragically, a crew member succumbed to the fireball’s direct impact, with the intense heat melting their uniform. [1, 2]
Also see this article for details on the March 1982 fire:
 
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