Was there any cunning reason for this? Avoiding having to figure out progression for too many aircrew?Old Sweat said:...there was a built in steady state of attrition in the RCAF back then. A large number of aircrew had short service commissions, and would be released after about five years commissioned service.
quadrapiper said:Was there any cunning reason for this? Avoiding having to figure out progression for too many aircrew?
Old Sweat said:I think that it was picked up from the RAF, which apparently was doing this in the 1930s and later, to build up a pool of trained pilots available off the street in the even of war. Not 100% sure, but I developed this impression from reading credible histories.
That makes sense; haven't done any significant reading, but picked up the impression that growing the national civil pilot supply was seen as a good thing post WWI, even without the "in case of war" motivation.Old Sweat said:I think that it was picked up from the RAF, which apparently was doing this in the 1930s and later, to build up a pool of trained pilots available off the street in the even of war. Not 100% sure, but I developed this impression from reading credible histories.
quadrapiper said:That makes sense; haven't done any significant reading, but picked up the impression that growing the national civil pilot supply was seen as a good thing post WWI, even without the "in case of war" motivation.
quadrapiper said:That makes sense; haven't done any significant reading, but picked up the impression that growing the national civil pilot supply was seen as a good thing post WWI, even without the "in case of war" motivation.
Current AAC Manning Situation
11. Pilot risk cohorts. Analysis identifies five key AAC pilot cohorts that currently pose a
significant manning risk and require immediate measures to improve retention. These are, in
manning priority order:
a. Qualified Helicopter Instructor (QH1)14/Qualified Flying Instructor (QFI). OHI/QFIs
train new pilots, maintain flying standards throughout the organisation and fulfil operational
roles. They are crucial for maintaining force generation, safety assurance and operational
effectiveness. The 18% deficit (see Table 3) in the instructional cadre already places force
generation at significant risk, limiting the ability to stabilise, build or sustain the current pilot
under-manning.
Table 3: QHI/QFI Manning — Source APC / HQ AAC Jun 15 (this table removed from this post due to formatting)
b. ORs. OR pilots are 28% under-manned. This cohort should form 60% of the front line
AAC pilot liability and the more senior ranks provide much of the depth of organisational
KSE. This shortfall places operational outputs at significant safety and capacity risk by
placing additional pressure upon the remaining pilots and, in some cases, forcing officers to
fill OR front line flying roles.
c. LE officers. LE officers are the long term corporate knowledge and expertise of the AAC
due to the longevity and skill set of their flying and military experience. Of this cohort, 90% are
also instructors (37 of 41). (LE officers would be the equivalent of CFRs in the CAF)
d. DE OF2-3 officers. OF2-3 are employed both in cockpit and in critical aviation staff
roles (as well as fulfilling wider Army career requirements such as staff training). Gapping in
the OR cohort means that operational output cannot be maintained without misemploying
OF2s and OF3s in OR posts. This creates a manning risk in aviation staff and force
generation roles and places pressure on the wider Army to backfill previously held AAC E2
posts.
e. DE OF4 officers. OF4 VO has increased 6 fold over the last three years' and now
averages 5 times the DM(A) predicted steady state outflow. Promoting OF3s to counter this
outflow is not a viable solution primarily because they lack the necessary experience but also due
to the second order effect on the OF3 deficit.
I read the report and it is very shallow and only skims the surface without addressing any issues beside saving a few bucks. You have to remember the context of the 90s (aviation industry, FRPs, trying to save every buck, demographics, etc).Here's a interesting report from 1997 that looked into this very issue.
There is no chance in hell you’ll retain pilots on a WO salary in today’s world. Remember: we’re having a retention issue.
That doesn’t solve any problems though, we have tons of applicants but not enough training bandwidth the replace the much more experienced people who are leaving.The NCM perspective on that might be different, though. Many NCMs might love to be pilots if they had that option to pursue "in a NCM trade", which would be different than competing for Commissioning and the pilot trade via that avenue. Some who apply for Pilot via UTPNCM might not be selected for Commissioning, but show aptitude towards pilot and get an offer for the WO flying trade. They'll never fly fighter or Globemasters, but they'd still fly.
And...for most if not all...it would be a pay/pension boost. I'm a WO locked into Spec 1 by trade; if WO Pilot was "Spec 4" or a different table altogether like it is for Officers, I might be one of those who gave it a whirl (well, if I was younger...).
It's a bit apples and oranges. In the US, flying WOs are all in the Army and they fly helicopters while the Air Force and Marines are all flying officers (and the Navy too these days although I think they had flying WOs in the past for aviation as well)Is that going to solve anything? Why would a NCM have any less civilian career ambition than an Officer pilot? If that NCM pilot had a CPL, multi-engine rating and other quals desired by Big Red, why wouldn't they try to poach him or her just as much as an Officer?
When I was OUTCAN with the USCG two of my coworkers had learned to fly with the US Army, they had only ever flown helicopters, zero fixed wing time. One guy got a job with a commuter airline and they gave him $50,000 to go get his fixed wing licenses. Then they gave him another $10,000 for convincing his buddy to work for them.It's a bit apples and oranges. In the US, flying WOs are all in the Army and they fly helicopters while the Air Force and Marines are all flying officers (and the Navy too these days although I think they had flying WOs in the past for aviation as well)
Civvy jobs for helicopter pilots are far from lucrative.
But RN and other naval forces also use commissioned officers as pilots. The USN hasn't had WOs in those positions for over 50 years - I'm not sure the RN, RCN, etc ever had NCMs as pilots.I think that's important to state, FJAG. If we're talking about NCM pilots for the CAF are we talking about all airframes, or certain airframes? Does that mean we move TACHEL to CA and Martime Hel to RCN as there's less requirement for that shiny Big Red contracts?