TKMS Type 212CD (Victoria class replacement megathread)

[FSTO]

To improve inshore visability for the Navy ?

To keep the lights on.

After the "War to End All Wars" the GoC took to heart the idea of swords into plowshares and the RCN was a prime target. We were damn lucky to keep the two dockyards and two small destroyers. Everything and I mean EVERYTHING else was on the chopping block. The Reserves were the one thing that could keep some sort of visibility with Canadians.

I don't know if it was foresight or just blind ass luck, but when the world started to ramp up in the late 30's, the RCN had ready recruit and training depots across the country to funnel the new sailors to HMCS Cornwallis to fill out the wartime navy.

 

[Stoker]

One aspect of, how shall I say it (?) , for me, is what I perceive as a lack of more detailed exploration and a lack of debate of operational implementation aspects surrounding an agreed approved procurement of 12 conventional (AIP-Lithium battery propulsion) submarines.

I suspect part of the reason for such is there is no contract yet for the new submarines, and part of the reason might be because Defence policy/international liaisons are potentially affected, and such has yet to be decided at senior Defence nor decided at government levels. Aspects that come to my mind are:

• deployment plans of East Coast submarines to co-ordinate with NATO (does this mean monitoring GIUK gap in coordination with other navies)? What does it mean in regards to regular NATO exercise support ?
• deployment plans of West Coast submarines with Asean country navies? strategic placement/patrols in any particular spots?
• how Arctic Ocean deployment is to be done? Do East and West coast yearly (bi-yearly?) alternate in responsibility to provide a Canadian submarine to the Arctic ocean (presumably only (? - or mostly) during summer months).
• will there be a mobile Arctic base ship (submarine tender capable) to support an Arctic deployed Canadian submarine, so to increase its duration time and increase its Arctic presence?
• and if an Arctic mobile base ship approach decided, will a selected few northern Canadian civilian airports have a small amount of defence infrastructure added, so to be able to accept incoming transport military aircraft from southern Canada, and able to support helicopters that transit to/from a northern airfield to any potential mobile Arctic base ship (again to better support Arctic deployed submarine and crew)
• more in depth/classified liaison with both RN and USN submarine forces in regards to co-ordinating Arctic deployments (and more sharing of intelligence), so to avoid any conflicting or needless risky overlap of Arctic submarine deployment. In this regards, maybe even liaison with Norwegian/German navies and their Type-212CD may be a factor

The elephant in the room, of course, is how will the RCN man the submarines? I appreciate the 'Field of Dreams' ( 'If you build it, they will come' ) logic, but I can't help shake the view point that more than that is needed. What I see as a "Crisis of Invisibility" of the Canadian Armed Forces, and in particular the 'RCN' need to overcome, such that the public better understands and appreciates the RCN, such that both recruitment and retention of sailors will have more support from the public.

Perhaps the other elephant in the room, is how will the RCN command structure be changed to address having 12 submarines? or does the command structure need be changed? I can only assume and hope, the RCN is giving this serious thought, and hope that a well thought approach has been decided upon, with implementation (if any desired) planned.

Some of the above could take years to sort and hence I do not believe one should wait for the first boat delivery, before plans both decided, and put into place. There could be long lead procurements associated with plans, and hence the need to sort some of this sooner rather than later.

You can perceive and speculate all you want on the operational details, that stuff will never be released to the public nor should it be. Just as the crewing won't be either. I can safely say that everything concerning those submarines are being looked at has been for some time.

 

[GK .Dundas]

Apparently Andrew McNaughton tried more then once tried to abolish the Navy at least once between the wars . Because aircraft made the Navy redundant.

 

[Oldgateboatdriver]

Apparently Andrew McNaughton tried more then once tried to abolish the Navy at least once between the wars . Because aircraft made the Navy redundant.

Oh! Wait! He was serious?

 

[Swampbuggy]

RCN invisibility is and always will be an issue. Even though our largest cities are on the water and see ocean going ships daily, the idea that we need a navy to ensure these ships safely reach their destinations is lost on most Canadians, (especially the ones in Government).

Every time I try to explain why we have and need a strong navy, I ask them to take off a shoe, place it next to their cell phone and lunchbox. I ask them what all 3 have in common and then explain how they all arrived in a sea container. It drives it home in a more relatable sense.

 

[GK .Dundas]

Oh! Wait! He was serious?

As a heart attack.

 

[GK .Dundas]

A lot of people in the 1930s who were considered to be part of the smartest people in room set.
Many of them with the development of aircraft like the B17. Considered that a naval force would now be unable to approach a shore line without being detected and destroyed

 

[RangerRay]

During that time, many brilliant cavalry officers were convinced that tanks were a passing fad and the cavalry charge would have it’s day again!

 

[Underway]

• deployment plans of East Coast submarines to co-ordinate with NATO (does this mean monitoring GIUK gap in coordination with other navies)? What does it mean in regards to regular NATO exercise support ?
• deployment plans of West Coast submarines with Asean country navies? strategic placement/patrols in any particular spots?
• how Arctic Ocean deployment is to be done? Do East and West coast yearly (bi-yearly?) alternate in responsibility to provide a Canadian submarine to the Arctic ocean (presumably only (? - or mostly) during summer months).

These will never ever be public knowledge. Submarine deployments are very secret. However it's clear from open source documentation that one east coast, one west coast and one submarine on each entrance to the NWP (east and west) is the ideal availability.

• will there be a mobile Arctic base ship (submarine tender capable) to support an Arctic deployed Canadian submarine, so to increase its duration time and increase its Arctic presence?

JSS were designed to be submarine tenders for the German navy. They are quite capable to do that role with the RCN especially as we are getting German subs. They have a number of features like pumping out waste water (oily, grey and black) and then treating it onboard. As well they can refuel, resupply and replace crew as needed. Submarine tenders take a lot of forms.

• more in depth/classified liaison with both RN and USN submarine forces in regards to co-ordinating Arctic deployments (and more sharing of intelligence), so to avoid any conflicting or needless risky overlap of Arctic submarine deployment. In this regards, maybe even liaison with Norwegian/German navies and their Type-212CD may be a factor

Again you'll never know, but one of the important NATO functions is to coordinate all submarine movements to avoid undersea collisions. Underwaterspace management.

The elephant in the room, of course, is how will the RCN man the submarines? I appreciate the 'Field of Dreams' ( 'If you build it, they will come' ) logic, but I can't help shake the view point that more than that is needed. What I see as a "Crisis of Invisibility" of the Canadian Armed Forces, and in particular the 'RCN' need to overcome, such that the public better understands and appreciates the RCN, such that both recruitment and retention of sailors will have more support from the public.

Direct recruiting for the RCN as a submariner will start next year.

Perhaps the other elephant in the room, is how will the RCN command structure be changed to address having 12 submarines? or does the command structure need be changed? I can only assume and hope, the RCN is giving this serious thought, and hope that a well thought approach has been decided upon, with implementation (if any desired) planned.

We'll find out. This will evolve as time goes on.

 

[Oldgateboatdriver]

Again you'll never know, but one of the important NATO functions is to coordinate all submarine movements to avoid undersea collisions. Underwaterspace management.

To be even more precise, NATO coordinates all the hunting areas (air, surface, underwater) so as to avoid interference and accident involving the underwater hunters (i.e. accidentally killing a friendly submarine).

 

[oldcpu]

These will never ever be public knowledge. Submarine deployments are very secret. However it's clear from open source documentation that one east coast, one west coast and one submarine on each entrance to the NWP (east and west) is the ideal availability.

I don't think anyone claimed precise submarine deployment timing nor precise submarine location should be public. The 'secrecy' argument IMHO falls short thou, when discussing generic top level considerations, especially if such considerations will lead to long lead item additional expensive procurements.

Rather as you note from opensource, there can be expectations as to the submarine's nominal bases (Esquimalt/Halifax) and speculations as to potential deployment strategies. This need not be secret, and in fact keeping such too confidential, could be detrimental to obtaining the funds and budgets necessary to approve.

The duration of the deployments, and length of time needed to reach the Arctic and return (at the end of a deployment) does raise questions whether more is needed in regards to northern support facilities to increase on station time - and hence the concept of a mobile base for the north (such as either dedicated Arctic capable submarine tenders and or other larger class of ship (supply ship or modified G-LAAM) with submarine tender additional capability).

Most articles (dare I say ALL) that talk of G-LAAM or supply ships for the Arctic have stated nothing about such also including a submarine tender functionality. Extra equipment is needed to make any supply ship submarine support capable.

Further having northern airfield(s) infrastructure improved (as/if required) to support urgent air-supply/med-evac to a mobile base ship (where such a mobile- base ship has designed submarine support functionality) is, frankly, is also something I have seen NO discussion on.

The same is true (lack of discussion) on a global capable submarine rescue and diving support vessel. Not just a coastal support rescue vessel. This is important, because one does not buy new rescue or support ships overnight, nor does one upgrade land infrastructure overnight - it takes time, planning, and funds allocated to do such.

To emphasize, no one is giving away specific secret submarine locations, and I think keeping such concepts and requirements secret, does the RCN a massive amount of more harm than good.

I seriously do hope the RCN has all this planned - and I hope the RCN obtains the funds to do what the RCN assesses is prudent. I'm a big RCN fan.

JSS were designed to be submarine tenders for the German navy. They are quite capable to do that role with the RCN especially as we are getting German subs. They have a number of features like pumping out waste water (oily, grey and black) and then treating it onboard. As well they can refuel, resupply and replace crew as needed. Submarine tenders take a lot of forms.

I'm all for a global capable, and in particular Arctic capable submarine tender. A question may be, is some degree of polar class necessary for such? If it is, then that may limit the JSS to non-Arctic geographic submarine support - and hence not useful for the Arctic. I think the JSS may feature a strengthened bow for minor debris and moderate cold-weather operational capabilities (typical of naval auxiliaries), I believe they lack the structural framing, shell thickness, bow form, and power configuration required to obtain an International Association of Classification Societies (IACS) Polar Class rating.

So that begs the question, could they support Type-212CDs that are deployed in the Arctic? I fear the answer to that question may be NO.

Hence given long lead times to build ships (such as an Arctic capable submarine tender), I think considerations for Type-212CD support in Arctic, really should be thrashed about soon, debated soon and decided upon now, as to what is the appropriate approach - in order to get the ball rolling for any long term support procurement(s).

Again you'll never know, but one of the important NATO functions is to coordinate all submarine movements to avoid undersea collisions. Underwaterspace management.

One can hope. I suspect thou, given national priorities of nations with SSNs, that even NATO may be limited in the extent of its knowledge here.

Direct recruiting for the RCN as a submariner will start next year.

I hope so. And I hope the RCN is very successful here in both the recruritment, and in the retention of the current submariner trained core.

 

[oldcpu]

To be even more precise, NATO coordinates all the hunting areas (air, surface, underwater) so as to avoid interference and accident involving the underwater hunters (i.e. accidentally killing a friendly submarine).

I suspect this is only for exercises, where such coordination takes place.

I believe the US, UK, and France fiercely protect the operational locations of their nuclear submarines (for both SSNs and SSBNs) from all, including alliance visibility, to preserve the operational security and strategic ambiguity of these submarines.

I don't believe for a second that NATO maintains a comprehensive underwater management (ie mostly real-time tracking register nor coordination grid) for all allied submarines operating globally nor for SSN/SSBNs in northern waters, outside of NATO specific exercises where exceptions are made for SSNs.

 

[oldcpu]

For the skeptical - if i may point out:

The February 2009 collision between HMS Vanguard and the French Le Triomphant—two SSBNs from NATO member states — collided in the Atlantic while conducting independent deterrent patrols under strict operational secrecy. The incident is often cited as illustrating the tension between preserving SSBN stealth and coordinating submarine operations, although the precise operational circumstances and any deconfliction arrangements remain classified.

So much for NATO underwater management.

I note the details remain classified, it would be unsurprising if the incident led to refinements in how allied navies deconflict sensitive submarine operations. No public evidence, however, confirms the nature or extent of any such changes.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

I am assuming that we will be buying, hopefully before 2034 212CD simulators, so crews can be trained up on them?