Adopting the regiment as a regular force formation & exploring other new regimental systems

[Infanteer]

The regimental family should be an all-arms unit that is based, trains, and fights together.   Since no Infantry unit has ever been fully self-sufficient (you need clerks, engineers, signallers, etc), it seems silly to tie the regiment to a branch pure formation.   I think the current CMBG provides a nice size for a regiment; big enough to allow mobility and assession while small enough to train together and be based in the same location (and most likely be deployed together).   Let soldiers wear their trade badges on their DEU sleeves - they will all be members of the same regiment though.

Moving to a regimental system at a combined arms, formation level should also require a reorientation of the Branches.   There is no point in simply swapping capbadges and changing the CO's pennant.   Col Banks gives a very good introduction to this notion in his article in the current Army Journal.   If we form regimental association around combined arms battalions (Armour, Engineers, Arty, Infantry, Support), then the lines between the Branches will start to blur (ie: difference between a LAV Gunner in the RCR and a Armoured Crewman, the difference between a mortarman and a gunner, Assault Trooper and a Sapper, etc, etc).

By merging branches (The best proposal I've seen suggests a "Combat Arms" branch, a "Combat Support" branch, and a "Technical" Branch) tactics, techniques and doctrine will come from a common foundation.   If we are going to put our arms together we may as well institutionalize it.   One goal will be to ensure that cross-arm training (ie: Infantry and Armour, etc) begins very early and more frequently in the Army.   Lance Wiebe commented that German Armour and Infantry commanders learn how to command the units of their opposites.   By the time Officers reach mid-level leadership positions, they should be fully capable of commanding combined-arms units and formations at the lowest possible level - rifleman should be at ease with a guy who started in Artillery commanding their battalion.

Anyways, all of this is a collection of various ideas and proposals that I've seen.   I think it is important to consider and address them because, as I said before, merging regiments must go beyond swapping a capbadge.

 

[McG]

It has been a few times now that I have come across people recommending the elimination of engineer regiments and the establishment of engineer squadrons in combined arms battalions.  As I've said before, we cannot become too focused on making our force generation structure look like our force employment structure.   To eliminate the CERs and push engineers into squadrons within all arms battalions, would destroy the engineers' ability to provide support beyond the scope of pioneers.   I suspect much of this lay in a lack of knowledge on engineer force structures and capabilities (I can attempt to address this in the Engineering Regiment Breakdown thread if anyone is interested).

Many of a brigade's elements exist to support the brigade if it were to mobilize for war or a PSO.   However, eliminating these with the intent of structuring as per recent deployments may have the unintended side effect of packeting capabilities in sizes below a critical mass required to sustain themselves.   I would be interested in hearing a gunners perspective on what effect this might have on being able to sustain the FSCC and ASCC capabilities.

I would prefer to see manoeuvre battalions (composed of rifle companies, surveillance companies, and a traditional combat support company).   The regimental identity would be transposed to the formation level (1 CMBG would become PPCLI, 2 CMBG would become RCR, etc) and each regiment would continue to have its own Engr Bn, Arty Bn, Svc Bn, etc.

 

[pbi]

Gents: now that the cat is out of the bag about my reply to LCol Bondy, and about my own concept letter that is in the most recent CAJ, I'd like to make a few comments:

comments by retired Lieutenant-Colonel David Banks

What? Retired? I've heard of swift vengeance, but that was a bit of a shocker......

LCol Bondy developed a concept paper, which proposes that the Army abandon its historical practice of maintaining separate Combat Arms pure-branch regiments and supporting units for a single Combat Branch

I was asked by the then-Editor of CAJ, Lt Col Shayne Schreiber (now COS 1 CMBG) to review Bondy's piece and offer my comments in letter form, for publication in the same issue. My comments were then passed to LCol Bondy, who responded to me (a bit indignantly....) but then made some changes in his article before it went to press. Most noticeable of these changes was the removal of his shockingly PC suggestion that soldiers be taught only that military history that did not "glorify unjust war" or words to that effect. I had to read the paragraph twice to be sure of what   he was actually saying. In my response I asked just who, and how, would determine what an "unjust war" was, since all wars have losers who view the outcome as unust. The South African War, I opined, could be characterized as nothing more than naked imperialist aggression: should the RCD, RCR and LdSH(RC) be stripped of those battle honours? What about Batoche?(Unjust to First Nations...) Medak?(unjust to Croatian Canadians...) I mention this to give some indication of that author's perspective. To his credit, he removed that very dishonourable suggestion.

"A set of opposing camps dug in holding on to traditional roles or worse, specific pieces of equipment," says LCol Bondy of the Land Personnel Concepts and Policies office.

Did he say that? Really? Then if he said that or wrote that and represented it as his own words he may be guilty of the ethical and professional sin of plagiarism. Those words are lifted almost directly from my article. I dearly hope that this line is a misquote by the author. If not.......

LCol Banks: Changes made since the 1960's must be rolled back to support force structure and professionalism. In order to achieve this goal, the CF needs to de-unify the forces and focus on operational jointness instead of administrative unification. LCol Banks supports exploring a single combat branch to replace the existing armour, artillery and infantry but through different approaches. If the Army cannot maintain armour and artillery branches that provide significant support that a modern and complete infantry unit could generate, these branches should be reduced to sub-military occupational classifications (MOCs) or employment streams within a single, centralized MOC.

OK-more or less true. But look at my: "If the Army cannot....." caveat. The reverse of this (which I stated in a footnote in the letter) is that if we had the will and resources to field a real Armoured Corps with MBTs, and a real Artillery with MLRS and modern SP Artillery, and modern CB/CM systems to complement them, and the ability to deploy and sustain these systems, then my idea would be redundant.   Instead, in my opinion the Armour and Artillery are engaged in a frantic job search in order to justify their very, very questionable separate existence as Branches. If they persist, then IMHO they are degenerating into nothing more than job-stealers. A cursory study of 20th and 21st century Infantry will immediately reveal that these two Branches, once all the "transformation" dust has settled, will very likely end up bringing nothing to the fight that has not already existed organically in Western Infantry since WWI, in various forms, and including in our own Infantry. Nothing. I cover this idea in more detail in the latest CAJ. I hope it kicks over a few apple carts.

This is the current situation â ” officers are too frequently extended or recycled and others serve in units for years due to a severe lack of personnel

The writer failed to give the context in which I placed all of these comments, and then misinterpreted the reason I gave for them. I was using some of the more lamentable personnel practices in the Army Reserve as a warning of what could happen in the kind of system Bondy proposes. I did NOT say it was the current situation in the entire Army:   how many RegForce battalion COs get recycled?

LCol Banks: This idea is flawed and is likely to contribute to an Army with little esprit de corps or cohesion. The proposal to only allow for mid-career transfer from one unit to another would produce a field army led by officers limited in experience and knowledge who are detached from the reality of operations.

OK-close enough.

LCol Banks: Based on my experience, says LCol Banks, supporters work best with and for the field army when they look, sound and act like the soldiers they are supporting. It is an excellent idea to have the supporters belong to the New Regiment but why not go further and ensure that those who serve in the Army are taught that they are a "soldier first, tradesman or support second."

Yep.

The New Regiment idea however is something that is worth exploring given the drawdown of the Armour and Artillery branches.

If you read my latest letter in CAJ, you will see that I generally agree with this too; in fact it is the underlying reason I wrote the latest letter. I do not make any pretense whatsoever in either letter to having all (or even most...) of the answers, and I identify several areas where I have not got any answers at all. The intent was not to present a turnkey solution (i'm not that smart) but rather to get the intellectual juices flowing.

Cheers.

 

[a_majoor]

I admit Engineers are in a strange position in this thread. Ideas like the Manoeuvre Battalion are predicted on bringing specific combat functions and capabilities down to very low levels (Infantry doing 8 Km+ direct fire engagements, Armour gaining very enhanced indirect fire capabilities and so on). These functions don't really translate into the Engineering world, nor do engineer functions tie back into combat arms units, however constituted.

Within a deployed Manouevre Battalion or the Joint Expeditionary Force package, Engineer support will be packeted out. Does it make more sense to have Engineers as a "trade" within the larger organization for unit cohesion and Esprit de Corps; or maintain Engineer regiments, accepting they will never operate as a formation, and sub units will be packeted out to the larger organization?

I think the real question here is "are Regiments required for force generation, or force employment?" A Regimental Depot system for force generation may be the answer for some of these questions (but this also ties into what is the purpose and organization of a Regiment).

 

[Edward Campbell]

Engineers and signals give us, I think, a baby vs. bath water dilemma.   There are some very distinct advantages to the 'corps' structure with its multitude of general and special-purpose units â “ all 'fed' from a commonly trained pool of people.   I think many of us were/are accustomed to bumping into former 'Prontos' in a variety of different field army functions as we worked our ways up through the system ... equally, I think we were/are accustomed to not seeing other signal officers because they disappeared into one of that corps' several technical and SIGINT/EW black holes.

While I have some sympathy for a 'revised' regimental system, bearing in mind Kirkhill's excellent comment about the origins of dragoons, I wonder how far the 'new' regiments should expand and at what cost to overall military effectiveness.

I am also a bit concerned about one, single combat arm.   I was wondering â “ not out loud, yet â “ if we shouldn't be going the other way:

o Infantry â “ light (air assault/air mobile/amphibious?), medium (motorized?), and heavy (mechanized/armoured?);

o Armoured Infantry (heavy infantry + heavy cavalry) â “ maybe we can call them dragoons or mounted rifles   ;

o Cavalry â “ light (attack helicopters + direct fire vehicles?) and heavy (main battle tanks?); and

o Recce â “ vehicular/shoot-and-scoot, vehicular/electronic/surveillance and target acquisition, and air (drones + helicopters).

It seems to me that the skill sets of the recce and the heavy armour/heavy infantry people might cross the current cap badge divide, but ...

This is a fascinating discussion and I have many, many more questions than answers.

 

[Infanteer]

It has been a few times now that I have come across people recommending the elimination of engineer regiments and the establishment of engineer squadrons in combined arms battalions.

I don't advocate doing this, just as I don't advocate rolling up all the artillery or service battalions.  A Regimenatally associated Brigade would have its supporting functions (CER, Artillery Battalion, Tac Air) - now they are all badged the same.  Whats more, the maneuver battalions would possess their own organic engineers (pioneers/assault troops) and artillery (mortarmen) - Sappers and Gunners will be able to move between the maneuver battalions and the artillery batteries of the Regimental artillery unit (a battalion now vice a regiment) or the Regimental Engineering battalion.

Of course, this would demand more PY - but I'm the King right now, so I'm making them up. 

 

[pbi]

In my thinking for both CAJ letters, I was wrestling with the role of the Sappers. IMHO the Sappers are by far the "healthiest" of Cbt A. They have not been savagely gutted like the Inf, nor are they in danger of losing a real job, as the Horsemen and Gunners are. IMHO they are the one Cbt A branch that could probably stand clear of this amalgamation into one Close Combat Branch.

I guess I see the Sappers much like EME is now: existing both integrally and separately. I imagine an integral element inside the Close Combat Unit, with a capability range approximating that of a Field Sqn now, but perhaps with a more robust Equipment Troop, and certainly with MCM and IED/RCIED/EOD capabilities. Then, under the control of the JFHQ (or something.....) would be one larger and more capable Engineer Unit, focused on GS tasks but perhaps with the ability to provide DS to cbt ops. That, plus a traning establishment, would represent the Regular Component. Heavier engineer assets, or assets unlkely to be called up except for prolonged or general conflicts, would be in the Reserve.

I do not foresee us engaging in the massive and complex Div and Corps Engineer plans so beloved of WWII-legacy thinking, and for which (IMHO) we have preserved the idea of separate Engr C2 and a range of specalized Engr units and fmns.

Cheers.

 

[McG]

Sir,
Trying to keep my arguments on the same topic in one place, I've raised some specific arguments about your engineer FG structure here:   http://army.ca/forums/threads/22585/post-124018.html#msg124018

I will raise one observation here.

IMHO the Sappers are by far the "healthiest" of Cbt A. They have not been savagely gutted like the Inf, nor are they in danger of losing a real job, as the Horsemen and Gunners are.

I suppose this is relative to how you are measuring â Å“healthy.â ?   Is it a measurement of past vs. present strength and glories, or is it a measurement of current capabilities vs. current tasks.   An inability to meet roles/tasks is not healthy or a surplus of capability is not healthy.  

The loss of the fourth rifle company was a terrible shot to the health of the infantry.   The loss of pioneers, mortars, TOW, and Coyote surveillance was not really a loss to the health of the infantry (though this did reduce the independence of the battalion, and may have impacted on moral).   When this cbt sp functions were stripped from the battalions, the tasks were given to other arms (or the infantry pers just put into new units).   This would have impacted on the health of the arm that received the task.   The artillery, due to its limited role on operations and the pending loss of the M109, saw its other tasks diminishing and the addition of the mortar task has stabilised their health.   With the loss of the Leopards, the additional role of manning all the surveillance platforms has stabilised the health of the armoured.   The engineers on the other hand have absorbed the tasks of the pioneers without a parallel increase in numbers and without a reduction of the other roles it was expected to fill.

On this, I would say the infantry and the engineers are the worse off.   One has seen decreasing size without decreasing roles and the other has seen increasing roles without an increase in size.   If anyone is healthy, it may be the armour.   However, if the juggling of any of the tasks has reduced the capabilities of the Army, then it is the health of the Army that has suffered (and not of any particular cbt arm).   In the end, it is the health of the Army that matters.

 

[pbi]

The "health" of the Armour and Artillery is, IMHO, artificial health that has been secured at the expense of the Infantry, by usurping functions that have evolved logically and effectively within the Infantry in most Western armies including our own. The shell game of moving the cbt functions around was done to provide job insurance for two branches who IMHO are facing somewhat uncertain futures in our Army. We are so fixated on the idea of maintaining separate branches, whether they represent any real value added by a separate status or not, that we ripped integral functions out of the Infantry and shunted them. This was not done for any truly operational reason, but purely for institutional reasons, including freeing up some PYs for the Institutional Army. We seem to have forgotten that the basis of ground combat is an effective Infantry: the branch most in demand in most types of operations (other than Engineers). Armour and Artillery on their own are of limited utility, especially in today's ops. Look at the fate of most USMC Arty batteries in the last few years: they have landed as rifle coys if they landed at all. (I use the USMC as a force slightly more similar to us than the US Army)
The result of all of this, and of our recent equipment decisions, is to have the three traditional Cbt A reduced to a state in which no one one them is really going to be capable of doing its job properly. Hence my thinking that what we really need is MOCs instead of separate branches, all grouped into a single Close Combat Branch. I still, however, remain uncertain about the Sappers: I could see leaving them as "stand alone" because IMHO their function is "unique" enough that it could justify a separate Branch. Cheers.

 

[McG]

If logistics can group so many MOCs and functions into one branch, why couldn't the cbt arms?   In fact, a manoeuvre branch would be a compliment to the proposed regimental formations.

 

[pbi]

If logistics can group so many MOCs and functions into one branch, why couldn't the cbt arms?  In fact, a manoeuvre branch would be a compliment to the proposed regimental formations.

That is exactly what I am driving at. I do not question the need for certain generic skill sets (MOCs) directly related to close combat: I question the need for all the trappings and nausea of separate branches to deliver them. I do not extend this thinking willy-nilly, as Unification stupidly tried to do: there needs to be moderation and reason in all things. I do not, for example, propose that CSS types be in the same branch as Close Combat functions. I think the uniqueness (or "Ubiqueness....") of the Sappers is that in a way they have a foot in all three camps: Cbt A, Cbt Sp, and CSS.

To me, regimental groupings or identities will evolve naturally with the Army structure, as they have and should. We should stop regarding the Regtl system an inviolate end state: it is a support system to leadership and cohesion, not a replacement for it. We could have an excellent army with no "Regimental System" at all, and a shyte one with it. It's about leadership. Cheers.

 

[McG]

On the note of MOCs, do you see the infantry and armour officer MOCs remaining separate or merging
(as suggested in this thread: http://army.ca/forums/threads/17788.0/all.html)

 

[pbi]

I see one Officer MOC: Close Combat Officer. His training would be be grounded in Infantry initially, but just as the Inf officer has traditionally done, he would master suffiicient understanding of how to use all the combat systems in the branch. Note that I do not say 'use of the other Arms" because they would no longer exist as separate arms. Instead, a Close Combat unit would be like a tool box: we would train officers to select and employ the right tools to get the required effect. The "nuts and bolts" knowledge would be in the hands of the WO grades and NCOs.(If you are interested, see my letter in the latest issue of the Canadian Army Journal, in which I laid this concept out). Cheers.

 

[Edward Campbell]

It appears to me that this discussion starts from the wholly erroneous premise that the current structures of the Department of National Defence and the Canadian Forces make any kind of operational, bureaucratic or 'business' sense; they do not; they are, top to bottom, nonsense.

Thirty years ago I was and I remain, now, shocked at the degree to which the senior 'leadership' of the Canadian Forces were/are able and willing to sell out for the cause of empire building.

The structure of the CF is nonsense; we must be the only military force in the world organized around means of locomotion.   There is not and never was a single shred of operational reason for putting all air units in the Air Force.   The only compelling logic was that it was 100% necessary to ensure that the pilot MOC remained the biggest in the forces and that a wholly unofficial but sacrosanct ratio remained intact: 5:5:2 - which says that, despite changes in technology, organization and even strategic requirements, the army and air force should remain roughly equal in size and the navy should be less than half the size of either â “ the ratio derives from the 1960ish strength of the armed forces which was 120,000, all ranks, in the regular force with 50,000+ in the air force, 50,000- in the army and 20,000 in the navy.   There was, when I retired, still a gentlemen's agreement that the ratio should be maintained.   Thus, many years ago, the army willingly sold operational requirements and organizational sense down the river for the sake of the all important permissive manning levels and the consequential culture of empire maintenance (which is, I guess a better term in the era of steady cuts).   That perverse culture remains strong: how else to explain the rubbish of giving infantry mortars to the artillery?   That decision had nothing at all to do with 'streamlining' operations or training â “ it was 99% about 'saving' the artillery cap badge.   (This is not just the grumbling of one old soldier; see also, for example: Granatstein's   1997 paper in which he deals at length with the corrosive effects of the PMLs and the regimental system's 'defensive' but destructive response to it, and Winslow, 2003.)

We need cohesive, complete and combat capable ships, army units and air force squadrons organized into single service or, more often, joint formations, task forces and commands - all under the operational control of a single, national joint staff.   (There may be some room to argue the need for a 'Commander Canadian Forces (Canada)' who commands the armed forces on behalf of the Governor General/Commander-in-Chief and is distinct from the Chief of (the Joint or Defence) Staff.   Some allies have wrestled with this concept which tries to separate commanders from chiefs of staff â “ it gives me a headache.)

Within the army we need to restore and maintain unit cohesion â “ there are ongoing arguments within these army.ca fora about how best to do that; I suggest that assigning core infantry combat functions to other arms is wrong and destructive to unit cohesion. That means that it lowers operational effectiveness in order to guarantee a certain minimum number of colonel positions for e.g. the Artillery.   Ditto for the navy â “ there are neither operational nor training (nor, even personnel management and logistics) benefits in having foreign (air force) helicopter 'detachments' in HMC Ships.

Within the army we need to have our own all arms teams â “ including army aviation â “ which we can structure (group for battle) to meet our own operational needs.   There are no operational benefits and no measurable administrative benefits to making army aviation part of the air force.

When we have combat effective ships, regiments/battalions and squadrons we can group them into the appropriate single service formations and combined (NORAD, mostly, now) and, mainly, joint task forces, formations and commands.

I will leave arguments re: tanks vs. Strykers and Strykers vs. attack helicopters to experts; I will simply argue for a basic organization which makes military operational sense â “ which is to say something quite different from today.

</rant>

 

[ArmyRick]

Rusty Old Joint,
Well said and sounds like someone who has expirience and thinks logically. IMO the CF can be its own enemy at times..

 

[Jungle]

I will leave arguments re: tanks vs. Strykers and Strykers vs. attack helicopters to experts; I will simply argue for a basic organization which makes military operational sense â “ which is to say something quite different from today.

Agreed. The CF should be configured to maximize operational effectiveness. We can argue about kit until we're blue in the face, but it's not going to change the eqpt we have to work with...
The Army is about Soldiers first, and without people the machines don't work.
The CF, and especially the Army, are about to enter a very difficult period. 2005 will see a large number of people leave the CF, more than we can handle. Some in the C of C refer to it as The Exodus. I have been hearing about this for years, yet very little was done about retention.
We are a decade late with changes to the Regt'l system. When 4CMBG was shut down, Regt'l authorities IN ALL ARMS acted like teenagers. Everybody wanted tanks, everybody wanted M-109s, everybody wanted tracks... and we ended up with 3 identical Bdes that made no operational sense. Inter-Regt jealousies prevented the use of common sense. The Army Leadership should have told them to "suck it up" and form a true mech Brigade in Canada.
So before we change the structure of the Army, we probably need to change our attitude towards the Regimental system, especially in the Infantry

 

[Kirkhill]

Nicely ranted Rusty Old Joint.

Does anyone think that the choice of the next CDS might have an impact on this debate? And if so who and how?  For instance would Hillier result in a different outcome than Buck?

 

[Infanteer]

The Army is about Soldiers first, and without people the machines don't work.

Agree 100%

The three quotes in my sigline to me represent simple universal truths about war.   Your statement covers to of them:

"one should always endeavor to regulate one's dispositions according to the enemy's methods."   Scharnhorst

"Machines don't fight wars. People do, and they use their minds." Col John R. Boyd

The CF, and especially the Army, are about to enter a very difficult period. 2005 will see a large number of people leave the CF, more than we can handle. Some in the C of C refer to it as The Exodus. I have been hearing about this for years, yet very little was done about retention.

Difficult, yes.   Insurmountable, I don't think so (I am not implying that you meant this, Jungle, I just wanted to point out my own opinion on the matter).  

The Canadian military has lived through a few "Exodus's" in the past; post-war demobilization in 1919 and 1945 come to mind, as well as the peace dividend that, when combined with Martin's lean budgets, pared the Forces down from 100,000 to about 60,000.

As well, PBI has pointed out before that the current crop of low and mid level soldiers (say, the 5 - 15 year range) are very experienced, more so then their contemporaries of 15-20 years ago (who may have seen the sunny shores of Cyprus.}   Most levels of the Army, from Private to the Top Brass, have extensive operational experience which in my opinion sets us up for some interesting developments in the future in the realm of Human Affairs.

Thoughts?   Am I just dreaming here?

So before we change the structure of the Army, we probably need to change our attitude towards the Regimental system, especially in the Infantry

Again, I agree 100%.

I think the fact that we've tied the regiments to the branches has only served to exacerbate the parochialism.   As well, functions tend to be more or less permanent - as opposed to the British system which rotates regiments through tasks - leading to different regiments to ensure that they all get a piece of their pie.

If I had it my way I'd relegate Regimental Senates and Regimental Colonels to the dustbin of history and see the functions of the regimental system brought more in line with operational realities of the 21st as opposed to the 19th century.

 

[McG]

So before we change the structure of the Army, we probably need to change our attitude towards the Regimental system, especially in the Infantry

I don't know.  I think the structural change may have to come before people are willing to change attitudes.  Right now, everyone is in their comfort zone and some will be unwilling to think of any other possible arrangement for the regimental system (because that would upset the comfort zone).

 

[Infanteer]

I am seeing two separate arguments for transformation.

1)  "Structural" - how we orient our forces in terms of "Human Affairs"; ie: PYs, taskings, career management, etc.

2)  "Organizational" - how we orient our forces in terms of "Military Affairs; ie: TO&E, Command and Control, Technology, etc.

I feel that change in either of these areas must be complementary.  Transformation that is truly lasting and effective requires pushes in both areas or else it faces irrelevance from older "paradigms" from the other area.

Case in Point:  Canada, following Afghanistan, recognized that changes were occurring in the realm of Light Forces and began to transform accordingly.  Such change is represented in notions that rather then look at the light infantry battalions simply as battalions without LAVs, a true LIB TO&E is being formulated.

However, it is being forced into a military that has a system of "Human Affairs" that does not accommodate the new paradigm; old styles of regimental parochialism has prevented truly transformational changes in realms of "Military Affairs".  Rather then consolidate Light Forces assets to further refine and expand on capabilities and doctrine (meaning that some regiments lose out while others profit), the old structures have offered up lame half-measures (and in my opinion, wrong) like giving Light Infantry Battalions a uniquely coloured hat.

That example may seem a little difficult and long-winded, but I hope it underscores my belief that true transformation (as opposed to reform, which is just "tinkering") needs to involve change on both levels - the "structural" and the "organizational".