Adopting the regiment as a regular force formation & exploring other new regimental systems
- Reaction score
- 10,498
- Points
- 1,160
In some respects it's back to the future. I think the author of the 1885 reforms (Cardswell??) would have approved.
The Regimental Recruiting Areas have been enlarged to reflect the change in transport from foot and horse to cars. The Regiment will have a fixed and permanent depot for all battalions. Each Regiment will have one Regular Battalion at home, one or more attached Territorial Battalions collocated, and one Regular Battalion up the Khyber Pass (plus ca change plus c'est la meme chose).
Each Battalion gets a fixed role.
Troublesome for history buffs, old soldiers and to some degree or other the Terry soldiers, but less of a problem, I would think, for the Regular Soldier more concerned with raising a family and paying for a mortgage than the name on his capbadge.
The British Army has gone through this exercise every 20-50 years, and, no doubt, the outcry has always been the same.
I'm with Bossi on this one. It does make sense....Which also suggests that the Canadian system ain't such a bad balance. At least for the Infantry.
The Regimental Recruiting Areas have been enlarged to reflect the change in transport from foot and horse to cars. The Regiment will have a fixed and permanent depot for all battalions. Each Regiment will have one Regular Battalion at home, one or more attached Territorial Battalions collocated, and one Regular Battalion up the Khyber Pass (plus ca change plus c'est la meme chose).
Each Battalion gets a fixed role.
Troublesome for history buffs, old soldiers and to some degree or other the Terry soldiers, but less of a problem, I would think, for the Regular Soldier more concerned with raising a family and paying for a mortgage than the name on his capbadge.
The British Army has gone through this exercise every 20-50 years, and, no doubt, the outcry has always been the same.
I'm with Bossi on this one. It does make sense....Which also suggests that the Canadian system ain't such a bad balance. At least for the Infantry.
- Reaction score
- 2
- Points
- 410
Interesting to ask (yet again...) why the Brits seem to be able to amalgamate Regts with some kicking and spitting but no long term bad effects, yet when we raise the issue for Res units we get "Shock and Horror" even though in some ways it makes sense. What is the basis of the objection? After all, if the Mother Country of the Regtl system can do it, why can't we? Cheers.
- Reaction score
- 11,950
- Points
- 1,260
pbi said:
I'd venture that Regimental politics has been in our blood since day 1. None of the history I read seems to look favorably on the Regimental contribution to operational efficiency in the past.
To me, it's a toss up. The change is definitely needed - it allows fragmented units to combine training assets and recruiting areas. However, amalgamation seems to balance the bad (eliminating historic units) with the good (the lineage of the units will carry on). Our path has been to put units to zero strength, which also balances the good (the units with their unique heritage still "exist") with the bad (the zero-strength units exist in stasis).
Either way, the imperative of matching the Regimental system to operational realities should be the overarching consideration - kudos to the Brits for having the institutional fortitude to do so.
- Reaction score
- 0
- Points
- 210
This appearedon the official British Army website:
CGS's PRESS STATEMENT â “ 16 DEC 04
For now, I will speak about the broad principles lying behind FAS. After the Secretary of state has left, I will go into greater detail. It is important to set the Future Army Structure (FAS) firmly in context. FAS is about the whole Army â “ Regular, and TA. It is not about perceived winners or losers; it is about setting the Army on the right track to meet the challenges of the future. The Army has never stood still. It has always evolved to meet new challenges. It must again. Let me make a few general points to set the scene:
- We have spent more than two years looking extremely hard at what capabilities and structure we need in the future to provide a truly robust and expeditionary Army. Of course, we have had to make some tough choices to keep within the resources allocated to us and, while some areas will grow; some will contract; and a few will remain broadly the same. The under-pinning rationale for restructuring however is based on an operational need for a more agile, deployable and flexible force, and to build a medium-weight capability. This re-balancing â “ the shift in emphasis from a heavy / light mix to heavy / medium / light mix â “ and a greater emphasis on combat support and logistics at brigade level is essential to ensure that we are structured to provide the most powerful capability possible from the resources available. You will be aware that the end-state is 2 armoured brigades, 3 medium brigades and 2 light brigades.
- There are some changes that we will seek to take forward quickly, 19 Mechanised Brigade for example, starts its conversion to an all-arms light brigade in the New Year, but not all changes will happen overnight. Although the majority of the re-balancing is planned to be carried out over the next 4 years, it could be up to 12 years before we see FAS in its fully developed form.
- Let me just touch on three background issues:
+ Progress towards normalisation in Northern Ireland has provided a welcome opportunity to reduce the permanently committed forces . This has been key to enabling us to release manpower â “ some 3,000 posts â “ for reinvestment in areas that are more hard-pressed in today's and tomorrow's operating environment than the infantry: engineers, logisticians and intelligence operators being prime examples.
+ Units are currently not established for war-fighting without considerable augmentation. Furthermore their deployment often requires them to be reinforced to bring them up to the required strength. This approach is inefficient and incoherent â “ not least of all from the perspective of pre-deployment training, and the disruption to follow-on deployments.
+ I have heard people question why we are taking forward these changes when we are so busy. People talk about 'overstretch' â “ something that is impossible to judge without a benchmark. The benchmark the Army uses is a 24 month interval between operational tours, or, put another way, 20% of the Field Army deployed. Right now, across the board, that is where we are. But it is of course an average figure, and some capabilities are in short supply, with tour intervals significantly below the target of 24 months. This can properly be said to be overstretch and highlights one compelling reason why we need to rebalance to reduce that stretch. This is powerful evidence that FAS and the rebalancing that it entails is the proper and necessary thing to do.
You have the detail of the changes by Arm and Service for the Regular Army and the TA. This highlights the scale and the benefit of FAS to the whole. If we had the time, I would go through each Arm and Service in detail. However, I know that it is the changes to the Infantry â “ about which there has been much in the Media over recent months â “ that you are keen to hear about. I will turn to these later. When I do, I would ask you to look at what FAS means for the Army and to bear this in mind. Thank you.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
First (short) Q & A followed by a break (SofS departs)
CGS returns to complete his statement and take questions
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
You have a copy of my letter to the Army, which gives you the detail, but I will now speak of the restructuring of the Infantry. Please remember that whilst nothing can be done without the Infantry, it represents only one quarter of the Army.
The changes to the Infantry have been a highly emotive issue and they have been the subject, rightly, of rigorous debate. The reduction of 4 infantry battalions, as a result of the improvements in Northern Ireland, is a step that we must make if â “ within the Army manpower ceiling of around 102,000 - we are to structure the rest of the Army properly. Whilst the Infantry have been very heavily committed over the last few years, the level of routine commitment is now beginning to flatten. Operational tour intervals for the Infantry have now improved from around 15 months last year to about 21 months now and I expect them to continue to improve towards our ideal target of 24 months. Further progress in Northern Ireland will assist this.
The ending of the current Arms Plot system is a logical change that is broadly supported by the infantry, both serving and retired.
The inherent re-roling was inefficient and costly in terms of time, hard-won capability and money. It also adversely affected family stability â “ always a compromise in a mobile profession such as ours, but an area that we, for the sake of our soldiers and their families, have to improve. In simple terms, the Arms Plot rendered some 7 to 8 battalions unavailable at any one time: we did not have, therefore, 40 battalions in the effective Order of Battle, but rather some 32. In the future, the 36 battalions will all be available. By fixing infantry battalions by role and largely by location, we will have a new Infantry structure that will involve individual postings rather than unit moves â “ an approach that is already widely used across the Army to good effect and will provide challenge, variety and experience whilst improving continuity of role, operational capability and family stability.
The Army Board, and indeed the Army, is convinced of the need to develop a new regimental system for the challenges ahead. We want to get on with the job. The ending of the Arms Plot means that the current existence of single battalion regiments has run its course. The whole Infantry must now move to a large Regimental structure. It is significant that this was the intent of previous Army Boards in 1961/62, 1966/67 and to some extent in 1992. This Board has had the opportunity to grasp the nettle.
Before I cover the detail, we must not lose sight of the enhancements FAS makes to infantry capability:
- There will be an increase from 19 to 23 infantry battalions in All Arms Brigades; the 9th platoon in Armoured Infantry battalions will exist in fact and not just on paper; Reconnaissance platoons will be enhanced as will integral infantry firepower. All in all some 550 posts will be reinvested throughout the infantry.
The Regimental System is at the core of the British infantry. As a system, it has wisely and sensibly adapted as circumstances have changed â “ it has had many models. Circumstances are changing again, and the Infantry and the Regimental System are adapting again. The new Regiments and Battalions will continue to enshrine the history, traditions and ethos of their antecedents. This along with the leadership, training, esprit de corps and the values and standards that epitomise the Army will ensure that they and the Army continue to deliver operational success.
What of the detail. My message to the Army, which you have, explains some of the background and how decisions were reached. I will not go into all the detail just now, but I want to touch on the key criteria upon which the Army Board based its decisions.
The Board decided that the only truly objective criteria upon which to determine from where the Infantry would reduce 4 battalions were those which led to a judgement as to the sustainability of future recruitment balanced against the pragmatic factors of regional representation and future structural and regional coherence. The Board had before it the historic manning performance of every infantry battalion over the last 10 years, recruiting, retention, manning trends and regional demographic data. The Board:
- Considered the Brigade of Gurkhas and, noting their almost limitless recruiting ability and that the Brunei garrison commitment would continue, concluded that there should be no change;
- Exempted The Royal Irish Regiment from further consideration on the representational grounds of retaining a line infantry footprint in Northern Ireland;
- Whilst it was clear that no battalions of the Foot Guards or Parachute Regiment would be taken against the manning criteria, the Army Board also concluded that there were additional specific operational, organisational and state ceremonial reasons not to include these battalions.
On this basis the Army Board decided to make the reductions by taking one battalion from Scotland and 3 from England.
Let me highlight some of the most significant changes.
- The Scottish Division will reduce by one battalion. This will be achieved by the union of the Royal Scots and the King's Own Scottish Borderers. The new battalion will be one of the five battalions of a new large, single-cap badge regiment provisionally called 'The Royal Regiment of Scotland'. The battalions will retain their antecedent names.
The move to a single large regiment is a bold move by the Scottish Division, reflecting their determination to move forward grasping the opportunity that FAS offers and meeting tomorrow's challenges.
- The Prince of Wales's Division will reduce by one battalion and it will form two larger regiments. This will be achieved by:
+ The Royal Welch Fusiliers and The Royal Regiment of Wales will come together in a new 2 battalion regiment called The Royal Welsh.
+ The Cheshire Regiment, The Worcestershire and Sherwood Foresters and The Staffordshire Regiment will come together in a new 3 battalion regiment called the Mercian Regiment.
+ The Gloster element of the Royal Gloucestershire, Berkshire and Wiltshire Regiment merging with the Devonshire and Dorset Regiment and the Light Infantry within the Light Division. It will be known as 1st Battalion the Light Infantry. The current battalions of the Light Infantry will renumber as the 2nd and 3rd battalions in accordance with seniority.
+ The remaining elements of the RGBW, previously the Duke of Edinburgh's Royal Regiment, will merge into the Princess of Wales's Royal Regiment within the Queen's Division.
- The King's Divison will reduce by one battalion.
+ The King's Own Royal Border Regiment, the King's Regiment and the Queen's Lancashire Regiment will amalgamate to form a new 2 battalion Regiment on the west of the Pennines called The King's, Lancashire and Border Regiment.
+ On the east of the Pennines, the Duke of Wellington's Regiment, the Prince of Wales's Own Regiment and the Green Howards will come together to form the new 3 battalion Yorkshire Regiment.
+ The Foot Guards will continue to serve on Public Duties, a task that whilst prestigious can become somewhat repetitive over time and therefore demands greater movement between this and other roles to provide variety for our Guardsmen. The Army Board also decided that maintaining the national identities of the individual battalions was critical in representing the whole nation â “ this would therefore make a system of individual postings unworkable as, over time, the national makeup of the battalions would become blurred (for example the Scots Guards would not be largely manned by Scotsmen). We have therefore decided that any restructuring into a larger regiment serves no practical purpose and would be entirely cosmetic, The Foot Guards will therefore retain their current organisation and Regimental names and will commit 2 battalions to Public Duties and 2 battalions to the light role which will conduct some limited relocation between each other to provide variety. One battalion will be fixed in the Armoured role.
These battalions will retain their antecedent names.
- You will have heard the Secretary of State's comments regarding the identification of the 4th battalion reduction. There is a clear operational requirement to establish a dedicated direct support battalion to our special forces, thereby making a very significant improvement to our prosecution of global counter terrorism amongst other important tasks. We need to do a little more work to completely define the construct and role of such a battalion and this will be done in the New Year. However, given this capability requires a unit of particular skills and experience the fourth reduction will now be found by the removal of the 1st Battalion The Parachute Regiment from the line Infantry, using its highly trained manpower and structure as the core of this new 'ranger' battalion. As the Secretary of State has said, this capability sits alongside the other much needed enhancements to specialist elements of the Army and will be developed over the coming few years.
- Within the TA we will reorganise into 14 battalions, each one will be more closely integrated with a regular regiment, with one TA battalion in each regiment of 2 or 3 regular battalions and 2 TA battalions for the 5-regular battalion Royal Regiment of Scotland. The only exception to this will be the TA battalion affiliated to the Guards Division. The details of this reorganisation will be confirmed in the New Year after further consultation with the reserves.
These decisions have not been taken lightly. They are, as I have said before, the result of significant work and they represent, emotions aside, the right answer for the Army.
Leaving the infantry aside for the moment, I should like to now touch upon two other areas that have been the subject of much speculation; The Corps of Army Music and the Territorial Army.
â “ Firstly the Corps of Army Music. The number of musicians in the Army is predicated on their operational role as NBC Specialists and medics. The studies that led up to the July White Paper reduced the numbers required. There must therefore be a reduction in the number of Army bands, to a considerable extent reflecting the reality of undermanning. The new structure gives primacy to the requirement to undertake their musical role, not their operational duties. It aligns bands to FAS and addresses the vagaries that exist in the current structure. In essence it will see a reduction of 2 Royal Armoured Corps and 4 Infantry bands. The reorganisation ensures: that the Army retains effective bands with every Arm and Service; that they have the opportunity and ability to train for their operational role; that their career management is properly addressed; and that the Army's rich musical tradition is maintained.
The reductions in the Infantry and the Corps of Army Music require a small targeted redundancy programme in order to ensure the right age and rank balance.
This will involve about 400 people. We will do our utmost to support those affected to ensure that they are looked after and well prepared for the transition to civilian employment.
This should not be interpreted as implying a scaling down of recruiting. It is not. The Army is still recruiting. We require highly motivated men and women and we will still need to recruit approximately 11,000 young people each year for the Regular Army and about 10,000 for the Territorial Army.
Turning now to the TA and Regular Reserve. They have been used significantly during all recent operations, and they have done a splendid job. The planned changes to the TA complement those to the regular structure building on the TA's success on operations. I might take this opportunity to pay special tribute to all those reservists who have contributed so much on operations alongside their regular counterparts. In broad terms, the TA will remain the same size as it is today at some 42,000. The change involves rebalancing â “ growth in some areas and reductions in others â “ that will enhance the TA's ability to provide specialist support. In addition, and for the first time, the TA's structure will be robust enough to cater for those who are unable to be mobilised or who are not fully trained. The final structure will be validated following a period of consultation with the reserves over the next six months. The changes ensure that the TA and Reserves are better integrated so that they can be used more effectively. As the Army's reserve of first choice we intend that they will be more relevant, capable and useable.
Let me conclude.
FAS is good news for the Army. Its implementation has already started and, while full implementation will extend over a number of years, its delivery is being taken forward positively. It represents where we want to go and what we need to deliver.
CGS's PRESS STATEMENT â “ 16 DEC 04
For now, I will speak about the broad principles lying behind FAS. After the Secretary of state has left, I will go into greater detail. It is important to set the Future Army Structure (FAS) firmly in context. FAS is about the whole Army â “ Regular, and TA. It is not about perceived winners or losers; it is about setting the Army on the right track to meet the challenges of the future. The Army has never stood still. It has always evolved to meet new challenges. It must again. Let me make a few general points to set the scene:
- We have spent more than two years looking extremely hard at what capabilities and structure we need in the future to provide a truly robust and expeditionary Army. Of course, we have had to make some tough choices to keep within the resources allocated to us and, while some areas will grow; some will contract; and a few will remain broadly the same. The under-pinning rationale for restructuring however is based on an operational need for a more agile, deployable and flexible force, and to build a medium-weight capability. This re-balancing â “ the shift in emphasis from a heavy / light mix to heavy / medium / light mix â “ and a greater emphasis on combat support and logistics at brigade level is essential to ensure that we are structured to provide the most powerful capability possible from the resources available. You will be aware that the end-state is 2 armoured brigades, 3 medium brigades and 2 light brigades.
- There are some changes that we will seek to take forward quickly, 19 Mechanised Brigade for example, starts its conversion to an all-arms light brigade in the New Year, but not all changes will happen overnight. Although the majority of the re-balancing is planned to be carried out over the next 4 years, it could be up to 12 years before we see FAS in its fully developed form.
- Let me just touch on three background issues:
+ Progress towards normalisation in Northern Ireland has provided a welcome opportunity to reduce the permanently committed forces . This has been key to enabling us to release manpower â “ some 3,000 posts â “ for reinvestment in areas that are more hard-pressed in today's and tomorrow's operating environment than the infantry: engineers, logisticians and intelligence operators being prime examples.
+ Units are currently not established for war-fighting without considerable augmentation. Furthermore their deployment often requires them to be reinforced to bring them up to the required strength. This approach is inefficient and incoherent â “ not least of all from the perspective of pre-deployment training, and the disruption to follow-on deployments.
+ I have heard people question why we are taking forward these changes when we are so busy. People talk about 'overstretch' â “ something that is impossible to judge without a benchmark. The benchmark the Army uses is a 24 month interval between operational tours, or, put another way, 20% of the Field Army deployed. Right now, across the board, that is where we are. But it is of course an average figure, and some capabilities are in short supply, with tour intervals significantly below the target of 24 months. This can properly be said to be overstretch and highlights one compelling reason why we need to rebalance to reduce that stretch. This is powerful evidence that FAS and the rebalancing that it entails is the proper and necessary thing to do.
You have the detail of the changes by Arm and Service for the Regular Army and the TA. This highlights the scale and the benefit of FAS to the whole. If we had the time, I would go through each Arm and Service in detail. However, I know that it is the changes to the Infantry â “ about which there has been much in the Media over recent months â “ that you are keen to hear about. I will turn to these later. When I do, I would ask you to look at what FAS means for the Army and to bear this in mind. Thank you.
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
First (short) Q & A followed by a break (SofS departs)
CGS returns to complete his statement and take questions
------------------------------------------------------------------------------------------
You have a copy of my letter to the Army, which gives you the detail, but I will now speak of the restructuring of the Infantry. Please remember that whilst nothing can be done without the Infantry, it represents only one quarter of the Army.
The changes to the Infantry have been a highly emotive issue and they have been the subject, rightly, of rigorous debate. The reduction of 4 infantry battalions, as a result of the improvements in Northern Ireland, is a step that we must make if â “ within the Army manpower ceiling of around 102,000 - we are to structure the rest of the Army properly. Whilst the Infantry have been very heavily committed over the last few years, the level of routine commitment is now beginning to flatten. Operational tour intervals for the Infantry have now improved from around 15 months last year to about 21 months now and I expect them to continue to improve towards our ideal target of 24 months. Further progress in Northern Ireland will assist this.
The ending of the current Arms Plot system is a logical change that is broadly supported by the infantry, both serving and retired.
The inherent re-roling was inefficient and costly in terms of time, hard-won capability and money. It also adversely affected family stability â “ always a compromise in a mobile profession such as ours, but an area that we, for the sake of our soldiers and their families, have to improve. In simple terms, the Arms Plot rendered some 7 to 8 battalions unavailable at any one time: we did not have, therefore, 40 battalions in the effective Order of Battle, but rather some 32. In the future, the 36 battalions will all be available. By fixing infantry battalions by role and largely by location, we will have a new Infantry structure that will involve individual postings rather than unit moves â “ an approach that is already widely used across the Army to good effect and will provide challenge, variety and experience whilst improving continuity of role, operational capability and family stability.
The Army Board, and indeed the Army, is convinced of the need to develop a new regimental system for the challenges ahead. We want to get on with the job. The ending of the Arms Plot means that the current existence of single battalion regiments has run its course. The whole Infantry must now move to a large Regimental structure. It is significant that this was the intent of previous Army Boards in 1961/62, 1966/67 and to some extent in 1992. This Board has had the opportunity to grasp the nettle.
Before I cover the detail, we must not lose sight of the enhancements FAS makes to infantry capability:
- There will be an increase from 19 to 23 infantry battalions in All Arms Brigades; the 9th platoon in Armoured Infantry battalions will exist in fact and not just on paper; Reconnaissance platoons will be enhanced as will integral infantry firepower. All in all some 550 posts will be reinvested throughout the infantry.
The Regimental System is at the core of the British infantry. As a system, it has wisely and sensibly adapted as circumstances have changed â “ it has had many models. Circumstances are changing again, and the Infantry and the Regimental System are adapting again. The new Regiments and Battalions will continue to enshrine the history, traditions and ethos of their antecedents. This along with the leadership, training, esprit de corps and the values and standards that epitomise the Army will ensure that they and the Army continue to deliver operational success.
What of the detail. My message to the Army, which you have, explains some of the background and how decisions were reached. I will not go into all the detail just now, but I want to touch on the key criteria upon which the Army Board based its decisions.
The Board decided that the only truly objective criteria upon which to determine from where the Infantry would reduce 4 battalions were those which led to a judgement as to the sustainability of future recruitment balanced against the pragmatic factors of regional representation and future structural and regional coherence. The Board had before it the historic manning performance of every infantry battalion over the last 10 years, recruiting, retention, manning trends and regional demographic data. The Board:
- Considered the Brigade of Gurkhas and, noting their almost limitless recruiting ability and that the Brunei garrison commitment would continue, concluded that there should be no change;
- Exempted The Royal Irish Regiment from further consideration on the representational grounds of retaining a line infantry footprint in Northern Ireland;
- Whilst it was clear that no battalions of the Foot Guards or Parachute Regiment would be taken against the manning criteria, the Army Board also concluded that there were additional specific operational, organisational and state ceremonial reasons not to include these battalions.
On this basis the Army Board decided to make the reductions by taking one battalion from Scotland and 3 from England.
Let me highlight some of the most significant changes.
- The Scottish Division will reduce by one battalion. This will be achieved by the union of the Royal Scots and the King's Own Scottish Borderers. The new battalion will be one of the five battalions of a new large, single-cap badge regiment provisionally called 'The Royal Regiment of Scotland'. The battalions will retain their antecedent names.
The move to a single large regiment is a bold move by the Scottish Division, reflecting their determination to move forward grasping the opportunity that FAS offers and meeting tomorrow's challenges.
- The Prince of Wales's Division will reduce by one battalion and it will form two larger regiments. This will be achieved by:
+ The Royal Welch Fusiliers and The Royal Regiment of Wales will come together in a new 2 battalion regiment called The Royal Welsh.
+ The Cheshire Regiment, The Worcestershire and Sherwood Foresters and The Staffordshire Regiment will come together in a new 3 battalion regiment called the Mercian Regiment.
+ The Gloster element of the Royal Gloucestershire, Berkshire and Wiltshire Regiment merging with the Devonshire and Dorset Regiment and the Light Infantry within the Light Division. It will be known as 1st Battalion the Light Infantry. The current battalions of the Light Infantry will renumber as the 2nd and 3rd battalions in accordance with seniority.
+ The remaining elements of the RGBW, previously the Duke of Edinburgh's Royal Regiment, will merge into the Princess of Wales's Royal Regiment within the Queen's Division.
- The King's Divison will reduce by one battalion.
+ The King's Own Royal Border Regiment, the King's Regiment and the Queen's Lancashire Regiment will amalgamate to form a new 2 battalion Regiment on the west of the Pennines called The King's, Lancashire and Border Regiment.
+ On the east of the Pennines, the Duke of Wellington's Regiment, the Prince of Wales's Own Regiment and the Green Howards will come together to form the new 3 battalion Yorkshire Regiment.
+ The Foot Guards will continue to serve on Public Duties, a task that whilst prestigious can become somewhat repetitive over time and therefore demands greater movement between this and other roles to provide variety for our Guardsmen. The Army Board also decided that maintaining the national identities of the individual battalions was critical in representing the whole nation â “ this would therefore make a system of individual postings unworkable as, over time, the national makeup of the battalions would become blurred (for example the Scots Guards would not be largely manned by Scotsmen). We have therefore decided that any restructuring into a larger regiment serves no practical purpose and would be entirely cosmetic, The Foot Guards will therefore retain their current organisation and Regimental names and will commit 2 battalions to Public Duties and 2 battalions to the light role which will conduct some limited relocation between each other to provide variety. One battalion will be fixed in the Armoured role.
These battalions will retain their antecedent names.
- You will have heard the Secretary of State's comments regarding the identification of the 4th battalion reduction. There is a clear operational requirement to establish a dedicated direct support battalion to our special forces, thereby making a very significant improvement to our prosecution of global counter terrorism amongst other important tasks. We need to do a little more work to completely define the construct and role of such a battalion and this will be done in the New Year. However, given this capability requires a unit of particular skills and experience the fourth reduction will now be found by the removal of the 1st Battalion The Parachute Regiment from the line Infantry, using its highly trained manpower and structure as the core of this new 'ranger' battalion. As the Secretary of State has said, this capability sits alongside the other much needed enhancements to specialist elements of the Army and will be developed over the coming few years.
- Within the TA we will reorganise into 14 battalions, each one will be more closely integrated with a regular regiment, with one TA battalion in each regiment of 2 or 3 regular battalions and 2 TA battalions for the 5-regular battalion Royal Regiment of Scotland. The only exception to this will be the TA battalion affiliated to the Guards Division. The details of this reorganisation will be confirmed in the New Year after further consultation with the reserves.
These decisions have not been taken lightly. They are, as I have said before, the result of significant work and they represent, emotions aside, the right answer for the Army.
Leaving the infantry aside for the moment, I should like to now touch upon two other areas that have been the subject of much speculation; The Corps of Army Music and the Territorial Army.
â “ Firstly the Corps of Army Music. The number of musicians in the Army is predicated on their operational role as NBC Specialists and medics. The studies that led up to the July White Paper reduced the numbers required. There must therefore be a reduction in the number of Army bands, to a considerable extent reflecting the reality of undermanning. The new structure gives primacy to the requirement to undertake their musical role, not their operational duties. It aligns bands to FAS and addresses the vagaries that exist in the current structure. In essence it will see a reduction of 2 Royal Armoured Corps and 4 Infantry bands. The reorganisation ensures: that the Army retains effective bands with every Arm and Service; that they have the opportunity and ability to train for their operational role; that their career management is properly addressed; and that the Army's rich musical tradition is maintained.
The reductions in the Infantry and the Corps of Army Music require a small targeted redundancy programme in order to ensure the right age and rank balance.
This will involve about 400 people. We will do our utmost to support those affected to ensure that they are looked after and well prepared for the transition to civilian employment.
This should not be interpreted as implying a scaling down of recruiting. It is not. The Army is still recruiting. We require highly motivated men and women and we will still need to recruit approximately 11,000 young people each year for the Regular Army and about 10,000 for the Territorial Army.
Turning now to the TA and Regular Reserve. They have been used significantly during all recent operations, and they have done a splendid job. The planned changes to the TA complement those to the regular structure building on the TA's success on operations. I might take this opportunity to pay special tribute to all those reservists who have contributed so much on operations alongside their regular counterparts. In broad terms, the TA will remain the same size as it is today at some 42,000. The change involves rebalancing â “ growth in some areas and reductions in others â “ that will enhance the TA's ability to provide specialist support. In addition, and for the first time, the TA's structure will be robust enough to cater for those who are unable to be mobilised or who are not fully trained. The final structure will be validated following a period of consultation with the reserves over the next six months. The changes ensure that the TA and Reserves are better integrated so that they can be used more effectively. As the Army's reserve of first choice we intend that they will be more relevant, capable and useable.
Let me conclude.
FAS is good news for the Army. Its implementation has already started and, while full implementation will extend over a number of years, its delivery is being taken forward positively. It represents where we want to go and what we need to deliver.
Michael Dorosh
Army.ca Veteran
- Reaction score
- 1
- Points
- 410
Not sure I see the point of merging 6 Scottish regiments into a single 5-battalion regiment. The report talks about combat capabilities, lesser need for troops in Northern Ireland, etc. None of that explains the move; sounds like six of one and a half dozen of the other. The battalions will keep their former names, so what is the point?
I was lucky to get the chance to parade in 1990 with the massed bands of the Scottish Division; a lot of pride and history there - this was before the amalgamation of the Gordons into the Queen's Own Highlanders (itself an amalgamation of the Seaforths and Camerons).
Will this new Royal Regiment of Scotland ever deploy as a formation (ie Regiment)? If the individual battalions will just be brigaded with battalions of the King's, the Welsh, etc. as before, then again, there is no point to this.
Does it provide a framework for expansion in time of full-intensity conflict?
I was lucky to get the chance to parade in 1990 with the massed bands of the Scottish Division; a lot of pride and history there - this was before the amalgamation of the Gordons into the Queen's Own Highlanders (itself an amalgamation of the Seaforths and Camerons).
Will this new Royal Regiment of Scotland ever deploy as a formation (ie Regiment)? If the individual battalions will just be brigaded with battalions of the King's, the Welsh, etc. as before, then again, there is no point to this.
Does it provide a framework for expansion in time of full-intensity conflict?
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Michael:
The way I read the "6 comes 5" option starts from this premise: There isn't enough money to keep 6.
At the same time, while the Army would love to keep all 6 it isn't able to fully recruit the positions it has across the board, and part of that is due to quality of life issues. As well the tasking and training regime that is being employed, which contributes to that quality of life, isn't as efficient or effective as it might be. The Army needs more "specialists", unfortunately because specialization is the enemy of flexibility, but not only in high-tech terms it needs people specialized in crewing Warriors and fighting the Heavy battle, just as much as it needs Light and Medium specializations.
That's the rationale, and for me it makes sense.
As far as the fight over Names and Regiments I think one thing that may be missing from your information may be how blood, tradition and position play out in British political life. The ancient families that raised these Regiments are still well represented politically and militarily as well as being mainstays of the local community. There is a commonality with those people protesting bans on the Hunt and Freedom to Roam as well as graduates of Sandhurst.
What this amalgamation does is it dilutes further the "control?" that those families have via the senates.
It leaves MoD and CGS with more ability to breathe, to expand and contract the Regiments by adding or subtracting battalions as the need requires while at the same time creating a Regiment with a distinct political/tribal/racial/geographic identity (which is a good thing IMHO).
It is in effect reverting to the multi-battalion Regiments formed under the 1881 reforms which sustained Britain through the height of her colonial policing era (1881 - 1947) as well as putting her on the winning side in WW1 and 2.
The carping about cap-badges started in the modern era after WW2 when old Regiments were reduced to single battalions to maintain family/county/badge affiliation.
pbi: I take your point and understand it having commuted from Lethbridge to Calgary on Wednesday's to maintain my affiliation rather than become a Gunner (no offence to Air Gunners).
Cheers, Chris.
The way I read the "6 comes 5" option starts from this premise: There isn't enough money to keep 6.
At the same time, while the Army would love to keep all 6 it isn't able to fully recruit the positions it has across the board, and part of that is due to quality of life issues. As well the tasking and training regime that is being employed, which contributes to that quality of life, isn't as efficient or effective as it might be. The Army needs more "specialists", unfortunately because specialization is the enemy of flexibility, but not only in high-tech terms it needs people specialized in crewing Warriors and fighting the Heavy battle, just as much as it needs Light and Medium specializations.
That's the rationale, and for me it makes sense.
As far as the fight over Names and Regiments I think one thing that may be missing from your information may be how blood, tradition and position play out in British political life. The ancient families that raised these Regiments are still well represented politically and militarily as well as being mainstays of the local community. There is a commonality with those people protesting bans on the Hunt and Freedom to Roam as well as graduates of Sandhurst.
What this amalgamation does is it dilutes further the "control?" that those families have via the senates.
It leaves MoD and CGS with more ability to breathe, to expand and contract the Regiments by adding or subtracting battalions as the need requires while at the same time creating a Regiment with a distinct political/tribal/racial/geographic identity (which is a good thing IMHO).
It is in effect reverting to the multi-battalion Regiments formed under the 1881 reforms which sustained Britain through the height of her colonial policing era (1881 - 1947) as well as putting her on the winning side in WW1 and 2.
The carping about cap-badges started in the modern era after WW2 when old Regiments were reduced to single battalions to maintain family/county/badge affiliation.
pbi: I take your point and understand it having commuted from Lethbridge to Calgary on Wednesday's to maintain my affiliation rather than become a Gunner (no offence to Air Gunners).
Cheers, Chris.
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pbi said:
*Sigh*,, yes,, shock and horror,, for the very reason it raises "shock and horror" when it is proposed that the regulars regiments combine as well,, like merging the PPCLI and RCR into a "super regiment",, like the old "Canadian Guards". Easy enough to contemplate as long as your Regiment isn't involved.
Cheers.
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Michael, when I worked with the Royal Scots, every company of theirs was understrength. The way I understand it is that the units now will all have common access to a wider range of recruiting grounds, specialists, and training assets. When the regiments were seperate identities, this was all individual "turf" - that's how I interpreted it.
Will this affect the ability of soldiers to their job?
Primary loyalty doesn't go much higher then the platoon or company. Considering my experience was with a company composed of soldiers from 11 different regiments, I don't think the badge is very significant in the operational setting - given that the small unit has time and experience to forge itself into a team.
The only ones who will scream bloody murder for any sustained period of time will be the regimental senates and the associations.
Cold Warrior said:
Will this affect the ability of soldiers to their job?
Primary loyalty doesn't go much higher then the platoon or company. Considering my experience was with a company composed of soldiers from 11 different regiments, I don't think the badge is very significant in the operational setting - given that the small unit has time and experience to forge itself into a team.
The only ones who will scream bloody murder for any sustained period of time will be the regimental senates and the associations.
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I was just discussing this merger today with one of the Brit officers who is a part of the CJTF76 staff here. It seems that what drove the recent amalgamations in the British Infantry was the fact that there was no real connection between the structure of the Inf in the Regular Army, and the Army's operational needs. Almost every Regiment in the Regular Army consisted of a single battalion (the TA battalions were not figured in this equation, apparently, as they are not considered to be part of the operational force structure). The problems they had run into included (besides the operational mismatch), not enough depth in a single battalion to produce adequate flow of suitable senior officers (especially COs) and difficulty in recruiting for so many battalions. He told me that the Army had four Inf battalions that it simply could not keep up to strength at all: I believe these positions were taken and used to create the other organizations the Army is building.
This is much closer to the situation faced by our Reserve units than that faced by our Regular Regts, each of which maintains three battalions and is supplied with officers by a central system. We have no single battalion RegF Inf Regt. That is why amalgamation presents itself as a more useful solution to the problem faced by some Res units, than it does to the Regular Infantry. Unless, of course, we are talking about an even more significant change such as Regt=Bde, or the Combat Branch idea.
Apparently each of the UK Inf battalions will be permanently assigned a role within the Regt (Warrior mech, light, etc), which will end the somewhat disruptive re-roling that used to occur in the British Army at regular intervals. Cheers.
This is much closer to the situation faced by our Reserve units than that faced by our Regular Regts, each of which maintains three battalions and is supplied with officers by a central system. We have no single battalion RegF Inf Regt. That is why amalgamation presents itself as a more useful solution to the problem faced by some Res units, than it does to the Regular Infantry. Unless, of course, we are talking about an even more significant change such as Regt=Bde, or the Combat Branch idea.
Apparently each of the UK Inf battalions will be permanently assigned a role within the Regt (Warrior mech, light, etc), which will end the somewhat disruptive re-roling that used to occur in the British Army at regular intervals. Cheers.
McG
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I've long had doubts about our single unit Armd Regts having enough depth in their gene pools (no intention to slag any armd guys as every branch has someone that comes from the shallow end). A pan-Canadian armoured regiment would resolve this. However, a merged infantry/cavalry regimental system & branch combined with a single manoeuvre officer MOC would also achieve the same results (while simultaneously improving our FG combined arms structure).
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MCG said:
Sure, but I think the identification is different. You see a sort of kinship bond develop very strongly after a long time in a unit - for example, look at US Marines who are a generation apart and have no problem quickly slapping backs when they recognize a ring, a bumper-sticker, or a tee-shirt.
However, I was referring primarily to small-unit cohesion, which tends to fade as you go up to larger groups. It is this type of identification, the oft-cited "loyalty to the guy next to you" that is important to us operationally. People can get over belonging to a different Regiment or organization, put constant turmoil in small group dynamics is fatal (as the US Individual Rotation System in Vietnam so clearly demonstrates).
George Wallace
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MCG said:
I might beg to differ on that one. The Armd Regiments in Canada have strong identities. The only lack in gene pools is exterior to the Regiments in the supporting arms. ;D
Just because an Armd Regt doesn't have the manpower base of an Infantry Regt, doesn't mean that the will and devotion isn't there. Were the will and devotion to the Corps seems to fail is in those dark corridors of NDHQ, where some officers have been promoted to their level of incompetence banished from a Regt, and are justifying their existence day-dreaming and reinventing the wheel. They are hurting all Corps and Branches equally.
GW
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I don't think it is a matter of will and devotion George - no one doubts that. As McG alluded to (going on PBI's Brit example), the Armoured Regiments are stuck between two methods:
1) The Infantry Regiments, which each have three battalions and thus a deep pool.
2) The Artillery and the Engineers, which are "Corps" Regiments - all Gunners are members of the Artillery and all Pioneers members of the CME - with 3 regiments of each (across the Brigades) the same flexibility the Infantry Regiments have is there.
As I'm interpreting it, the Armoured regiments have neither. McG's proposal of a pan-Canadian Armoured Regiment would put it in the "deep part of the pool" with 3 battalions (Maybe the Mounted Rifles, as proposed by A Majoor that would fit in 2Bravo's model?).
1) The Infantry Regiments, which each have three battalions and thus a deep pool.
2) The Artillery and the Engineers, which are "Corps" Regiments - all Gunners are members of the Artillery and all Pioneers members of the CME - with 3 regiments of each (across the Brigades) the same flexibility the Infantry Regiments have is there.
As I'm interpreting it, the Armoured regiments have neither. McG's proposal of a pan-Canadian Armoured Regiment would put it in the "deep part of the pool" with 3 battalions (Maybe the Mounted Rifles, as proposed by A Majoor that would fit in 2Bravo's model?).
TangoTwoBravo
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In my opinion, the Armoured Corps is different from the other Corps (or Branches) in that we have strong ties to both our distinct Regiments and the Corps. There are subtle differences between the Regiments, but I think that we do have a Corps identity that even transcends the regular/reserve divide. I don't see this so much as being "stuck" between the Infantry and other Branches but simply another manifestation of our having a somewhat unique outlook. We do have some movement between capbadges and we all recruit from the same national base, although there are regional tendencies. Perhaps I am just being a reactionary, but I do not think that there is much to be gained by forming one "Armoured Regiment." The realities of limited postings and the geographical dispersion of the army would result in each numbered unit of that Regiment having a distinct culture of its own.
The regimental system has some flaws but I'm not sure that there is much to be gained by altering it. I served in a very composite unit overseas (ISTAR Company) where the component Tps were cohesive entities that came from different Regiments. "Plug and play" can work as long as we respect the value of cohesive sub-units and platoons/Tps. I think that our Canadian regimental system builds these components quite well.
Cheers,
2B
The regimental system has some flaws but I'm not sure that there is much to be gained by altering it. I served in a very composite unit overseas (ISTAR Company) where the component Tps were cohesive entities that came from different Regiments. "Plug and play" can work as long as we respect the value of cohesive sub-units and platoons/Tps. I think that our Canadian regimental system builds these components quite well.
Cheers,
2B
