Airfield defence role for PRes? (From: "Re-Royalization")

[jollyjacktar]

Dad also said when they turned the Bofors against German ground troops, they had the biggest machine gun in the world.  Can't do that with a MANPAD when they're trying to breach your perimeter as they did at KAF.

 

[Bird_Gunner45]

I don't agree with that.  The Res have ample PYs.  What we don't have is the money to employ them. 

I do agree that a shooter could be trained pretty easily (any open source stats on Mujahideen successes?).  Also, shooting lumbering heavy helicopters may not be a good comparison for our potential problems.

Lastly, the planning, coordination, deconfliction, ROE and safety are whole other problems that aren't resolved on a 1 week operator course.

:cheers:

:goodpost:

No offense to reservists but the planning, coordination, deconfliction, and ROE are almost too much for a regular force AD unit. Plus add in the fact that if Canadians were going into an environment that required a GBAD capability (Cruise missile, aviation, UAV, etc) than it would be expected that the GBAD would be one of the first assets into theatre to establish a protected zone for the remainder of the task force to deploy into. AD needs to stay in the Regular force (and for the record I believe that the whole 4 GS Regt thing is a mistake) but having a small reserve force to augment it, particularly if the plan to only have 1 x regular force GBAD battery comes to pass, would be great to provide augmentation at the shooter level.

 

[McG]

So, Airfield GBAD is not a good fit for PRes but the defence force is. 
Like the NSE force protection company, the PRes could generate a base defence force starting on either roto 1 or 2 of a future mission.

 

[daftandbarmy]

Don't get me wrong, if a re-role is necessary, I'm good with it.  What I fear is that if we can't even get the basics right equipment wise, how would making a Unit re-role help?  Still not likely to get the proper equipment.

Boots would be nice for a start... and some LBE that doesn't suck ass  ;D

 

[FJAG]

:goodpost:

No offense to reservists but the planning, coordination, deconfliction, and ROE are almost too much for a regular force AD unit. Plus add in the fact that if Canadians were going into an environment that required a GBAD capability (Cruise missile, aviation, UAV, etc) than it would be expected that the GBAD would be one of the first assets into theatre to establish a protected zone for the remainder of the task force to deploy into. AD needs to stay in the Regular force (and for the record I believe that the whole 4 GS Regt thing is a mistake) but having a small reserve force to augment it, particularly if the plan to only have 1 x regular force GBAD battery comes to pass, would be great to provide augmentation at the shooter level.

Stop making up problems instead of finding solutions. If there are elements of the job that require more training and experience then make those positions regular force.

The point here is that in trades that are pure time-of-conflict roles, your salary and benefits overhead can be drastically reduced if some or many of the individuals who reservists who are trained and called up as needed rather than being there 24/7.

This was my earlier point about PYs. Reduce Reg F (and civil service) PYs by replacing positions with reservists where practical and appropriate and you'll free up cash for equipment. The trouble is rather than even considering such options, the Reg F tenaciously hangs on to every PY and keeps cash flowing for salaries to sustain pensionable military careers.

Guys, the writing is on the wall. We can't afford to sustain either the full-time force in the manner that we might like. Nor the existing model of P Res. We need to think outside the box and really get serious about creating a force that provides a small core of high-readiness/high-competence elements and a larger mobilizable force to cater for more long term operations.

We can all crank out numbers and make up org charts but in general I see JTF2/CSOR and one brigade/TF (less arty and armour) as that Reg F core. Two or three additional Bdes/TF, all armour and arty and a Div/TF HQ and Div troops (mixed Reg F and P Res) as the mobilizable component. And yes, I see all the P Res bde HQs and most of the bn/regt HQs with their glut of senior and redundant staff get eliminated. And yes, it won't happen overnight.

:stirpot:

:cheers:

 

[Bird_Gunner45]

Stop making up problems instead of finding solutions. If there are elements of the job that require more training and experience then make those positions regular force.

The point here is that in trades that are pure time-of-conflict roles, your salary and benefits overhead can be drastically reduced if some or many of the individuals who reservists who are trained and called up as needed rather than being there 24/7.

This was my earlier point about PYs. Reduce Reg F (and civil service) PYs by replacing positions with reservists where practical and appropriate and you'll free up cash for equipment. The trouble is rather than even considering such options, the Reg F tenaciously hangs on to every PY and keeps cash flowing for salaries to sustain pensionable military careers.

Guys, the writing is on the wall. We can't afford to sustain either the full-time force in the manner that we might like. Nor the existing model of P Res. We need to think outside the box and really get serious about creating a force that provides a small core of high-readiness/high-competence elements and a larger mobilizable force to cater for more long term operations.

We can all crank out numbers and make up org charts but in general I see JTF2/CSOR and one brigade/TF (less arty and armour) as that Reg F core. Two or three additional Bdes/TF, all armour and arty and a Div/TF HQ and Div troops (mixed Reg F and P Res) as the mobilizable component. And yes, I see all the P Res bde HQs and most of the bn/regt HQs with their glut of senior and redundant staff get eliminated. And yes, it won't happen overnight.

:stirpot:

:cheers:

The AD system requires that the shooters be linked to the AD sensor, coordination, and planning network, which in a major theatre would include Army, Air Force, and navy elements. A reserve unit just doesn't have the time to learn the intricacies of an Integrated Air Defence System with Link 16 capability and a sensor to shooter real time element. The old reserve AD units failed because of budget cuts AND because the reservists didn't have time to really learn the ADATS or twin 35 in enough detail to deploy them effectively. Thats why the Javelins went to the reserves. As noted, the reserves could easily be called upon to augment the shooter role. In reality, you can delink the ASCC and Corps/Div AD from the shooters as this would be akin to the regular force artillery units providing FOOs, FSCC, RCP, and BCPs and the reserves manning all the guns.

Offer a solution? Ok- we are tasked to provide 1 x full time Brigade with force multipliers for full scale operations. We could go to a system with regular force artillery regiments providing 1-2 x Howitzer batteries, 1 x STA Bty, 1 x Ground to ground battery, and 1 x AD Battery and divest 4 GSR. With newer arty systems such as the HIMARs, C-RAM, and PzH 2000 manning requirements are greatly reduced. But there would be no divisional level force multipliers. For the GBAD side, reservists could provide some augmentation on the "trigger puller" side, but they would likely be limited to that as there is little chance that the higher level officers/NCO could receive an adequate level of higher level training (ASCC, Data Links, integration into an IADS, etc) to deploy into the job on day 1. With the speed in which air engagements occur there really is no time for error and the strategic effects of a mistake are huge.

On an academic level, I think that warfare in the near future will be more akin to warfare seen in the 17th century than the 20th, with small regular armies fighting smaller pitched battles for limited gains with logistics serving as a key element of force projection vice an all out war. For this, we require a cadre of personnel capable of deploying at a moments notice and fighting on arrival. If you read ADO 2021 the real challenge is trying to get reservists to a level to fight networked, dispersed warfare so that they can integrate with the regular force IOT truly complement that force without a requirement for 6-9 months of work up training. On that, aside from making reserve training more extensive I dont see how in 1 night a week you can get there.

Higher level solution- all second line functions go civilian (base side support, etc), regular force army centralize into combat or CSS units ready to deploy (Svc Bn only military, ready to deploy), and reserve force be rationalized to provide roto 1-2 pers (ie- eliminate reserve armour, eliminate reserve arty outside of units close enough to use digitalized equipment, merge infantry units, merge reserve supply and transport functions, etc) and create a force focussed on what we can do. Cold war reserve AND regular force structures dont make sense for a quick deployment force, but SOME functions do need to remain regular force heavy, and I suggest GBAD is one of those.

 

[Loachman]

always has been, and always will be the case IMO, to few people who desire change actually are in positions to make change

This is balanced by having too many people who desire wrong/useless change in positions to make change.

 

[a_majoor]

Proper GBAD these days requires so much specialized manpower and equipment that it would indeed be a full time/rapid deployment tasking.

Of course proper GBAD in todays environment would have to include long range systems capable of neutralizing AA/AD systems (a good example would be "David's Sling", the IDF system), some medium range systems which have the ability to hit UAV and UCAV's and a short range system. IF you want a capable short range system which can double for airfield defense than a combined system like the "Blazer" (USMC system mounting 8 "Stinger" SAM's and a 25mm Gatling cannon on a LAV 25 chassis) would be needed. The 25mm cannon would be particularly useful in the ground defense of the airfield...

If we were in a situation like Israel, it might be possible to have Reservists train up and rotate in to man fixed systems like "Iron Dome", which cover a particular city or piece of important ground; the local Regiment could train one troop, have one troop "active" for 30 days and one troop in reconstitution (and continue this rotation for each battery, meaning reservists would not be out of their civilian jobs for long periods of time), but while this sort of territorial defense role would be suited for a local reserve in that particular situation, it has limited relevance for here.

 

[Kirkhill]

So, Airfield GBAD is not a good fit for PRes but the defence force is. 
Like the NSE force protection company, the PRes could generate a base defence force starting on either roto 1 or 2 of a future mission.

Well said.

When the GBAD troop is deployed who is going to protect the guns, missile launchers, radars and CPs from ground assault or sabotage? Especially with the tendency being to distribute them over a wide area. Or hold the perimeter? Or protect the aircraft and the mechanics on the ground?

 

[daftandbarmy]

I have spoken to many reservists who were deployed to AFG as gate guards.... for the whole tour.

They were not deployed outside the wire for months largely, they believed, because it was a lousy job that the Reg F didn't want to do. But it was the only way they could deploy into theatre to get operational experience.

It sucks to be part of that kind of 'inside vs. outside the wire' apartheid campaign.

In NI we rotated troops regularly through a variety of tasks such as field ops, base guard force and other duties. As a result, they got a good mix of experience, and a break, during the course of the tour. It also made sure that we were 'all in this together' and shared the crappy jobs with the cool stuff.

If you want to have available a well trained reserve that can augment the Reg F then the idea of giving them a lame, single role, tasking like base/ airfield defence is not a good one IMHO.

 

[Halifax Tar]

I have spoken to many reservists who were deployed to AFG as gate guards.... for the whole tour.

They were not deployed outside the wire for months largely, they believed, because it was a lousy job that the Reg F didn't want to do. But it was the only way they could deploy into theatre to get operational experience.

It sucks to be part of that kind of 'inside vs. outside the wire' apartheid campaign.

In NI we rotated troops regularly through a variety of tasks such as field ops, base guard force and other duties. As a result, they got a good mix of experience, and a break, during the course of the tour. It also made sure that we were 'all in this together' and shared the crappy jobs with the cool stuff.

If you want to have available a well trained reserve that can augment the Reg F then the idea of giving them a lame, single role, tasking like base/ airfield defence is not a good one IMHO.

I have often wondered if the NSE FP platoon wouldn't have been better employed being given to the "battle group" as a fighting asset and let the Log/REME folks stand up their own FP platoon made up of LOG/REME folks, who for the duration of the deployment would be solely FP. 

 

[dapaterson]

In NI we rotated troops regularly through a variety of tasks such as field ops, base guard force and other duties. As a result, they got a good mix of experience, and a break, during the course of the tour. It also made sure that we were 'all in this together' and shared the crappy jobs with the cool stuff.

Intelligent commanders rotate their troops to ensure a variety of roles and that stressors are shared.

If you want to have available a well trained reserve that can augment the Reg F then the idea of giving them a lame, single role, tasking like base/ airfield defence is not a good one IMHO.

That is a big assumption.

 

[Kirkhill]

Doesn't conducting an area defence imply the ability to do more than just manage check points?

How about siting the defence? Siting Claymores? Preparing a fire plan? Managing the OPs?  Conducting offensive patrols?  Providing a QRF capable of mounting a hasty attack? Relief in place? Preparation of defensive works (horizontal and vertical)?

The RAF Regiment seems to find enough to occupy themselves and find ways to employ WMIKs, ATGMs and even Mortars to assist them.

Perrin Beatty's Vital Point militia meant more than just standing outside Federal buildings checking ID. (Or at least it could have).

Frankly, when we (Calg Highrs -1981) were tasked with Defence and Duties for 1 PPCLI we could have much more effectively used that as a basis for training than we did.

 

[Blackadder1916]

In NI we rotated troops regularly through a variety of tasks such as field ops, base guard force and other duties. As a result, they got a good mix of experience, and a break, during the course of the tour. It also made sure that we were 'all in this together' and shared the crappy jobs with the cool stuff.

The local UDR reservists aside, was reserve augmentation (either with individuals or sub-sub units) of regular units a common practice?

 

[quadrapiper]

Doesn't conducting an area defence imply the ability to do more than just manage check points?

How about siting the defence? Siting Claymores? Preparing a fire plan? Managing the OPs?  Conducting offensive patrols?  Providing a QRF capable of mounting a hasty attack? Relief in place? Preparation of defensive works (horizontal and vertical)?

Feels like a good training task, too: plenty of opportunity for developing leadership, etc. in a meaningful and varied setting.

 

[daftandbarmy]

The local UDR reservists aside, was reserve augmentation (either with individuals or sub-sub units) of regular units a common practice?

Yes we had reservists with us, but not that many. About 5-10 individual augmentees per company I would think.

Our work up training for each deployment was only about 6-8 weeks long, which was forced by the high level arms plot for the army at that time, so it was tough to get reservists up to scratch in that short period. Some really suffered, some did well.

The longer on-ramps the CF used for AFG seemed much better in comparison.

 

[Calvillo]

Pardon to reactivate an old thread, but I am curious:

So I take it that the CF does not have ground units equivalent of RAF Regiment or USAF Security Forces? That is, units tasked for force protection of air assets and base defense.

If that is the case, how is base defense done daily in peaceful times for high-value air assets? More specifically perhaps, how is the guard and defense of CFB Cold Lake and CFB Bagotville?

 

[dapaterson]

Base defence is conducted IAW threat assessments using appropriately trained and equipped resources.  Anything beyond that veers into the realm of operational security, and should not be discussed on open forums.

 

[captloadie]

Pardon to reactivate an old thread, but I am curious:

So I take it that the CF does not have ground units equivalent of RAF Regiment or USAF Security Forces? That is, units tasked for force protection of air assets and base defense.

If that is the case, how is base defense done daily in peaceful times for high-value air assets? More specifically perhaps, how is the guard and defense of CFB Cold Lake and CFB Bagotville?

Does not have yet. But possibly coming to an Air Reserve Flight near you in the not to distant future.

 

[Colin Parkinson]

It would make sense to task Reserve units near major airbases with a airbase defense task. What that would allow is for RCAF and Reserve army to work together and cross educate. If I went up to a young reserve infantrymen and said “FOD is dangerous, don’t let FOD happen” He likely won’t have a clue what I am talking about. It does not have to be the only task, but it’s a easily defined task and if nearby very budget doable. Plus the Reserves can help teach basic fighting skills to the airmen. You end up with a ever refreshing cadre of people who have some corporate knowledge on both sides of the equation.