GK .Dundas
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Has anyone looked at the ability of the new Brazilian C 390 to carry them ? As I understand it the cargo compartment is slightly larger than the C 130 .
Stop taking Wikipedia data for the stats.It's a slow night. It's either this or find something else to dodge the election news.
View attachment 93067
FJAG or others might know more, but if this was the prototype put together at GDLS London in 2003-2004, the LAV suspension was modified to fit it into the Herc, and the gun system for some reason was not well supported without the standard suspension. Also, when they fired the gun the back doors flew open and a lot of other things on the LAV broke. If this was the same gun … but I thought it was actually a 155 (or maybe a different project altogether).They have a picture of the SPH fully inside the C130. It does physically fit.
If you scroll down you can see a picture of it fully inside the c130
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Denel G7 105mm - SPG | PDF | Shell (Projectile) | Artillery
The document discusses General Dynamics' 105mm LAV III Artillery Weapon System, which addresses the US Army's need for a highly mobile and lethal fire support system for Stryker Brigades. It summarizes the key advantages of the 105mm LEO howitzer developed by Denel over other options, such as...www.scribd.com
I have zero knowledge about this except what I've found doing research on the WAFG project. When this was going on I was long gone from the gunners and with JAG.FJAG or others might know more, but if this was the prototype put together at GDLS London in 2003-2004, the LAV suspension was modified to fit it into the Herc, and the gun system for some reason was not well supported without the standard suspension. Also, when they fired the gun the back doors flew open and a lot of other things on the LAV broke. If this was the same gun … but I thought it was actually a 155 (or maybe a different project altogether).
Stop taking Wikipedia data for the stats.
I already posted the USAF C-130 tech parameter that clearly shows the wiki table for at least the C-130 is incorrect
The pallet rails were not on earlier C-130’s.A couple of points.
As has been pointed out, the original design criterion for the Stryker was that it fit within the cabin of a C130 and that it not exceed the weight limits. The wiki numbers on the C130 I quoted are confirmed by USAF, RCAF and Lockheed Martin publications. All of the variants, including the MGS and the SPH were tested against that standard and verified as fitting within the cabin and leaving the aircraft flightworthy.
Agreed.The fact that the USAF saw fit to revise their flight criteria after the Stryker was fielded, and the Army saw fit to revise their vehicle designs after fielding the Stryker does not reflect on the original intent.
The largest issue with the Strykers is that when you cannot use Herc’s you end up needing to use the C-17 and C-5 fleet.With respect to the Rand Study on the deployability of the Stryker Brigade - the study's assumptions included that the Air Force would only commit a portion of the available lift to the deployment. That portion is variable. The USAF could have apportioned all available assets for 4 days or only supplied a trickle to the Army for an extended period. In either situation the Stryker Brigade could be deployed by air faster than a Heavy Brigade and with more assets than a Light Brigade. In either case it accedes to Bedford Forrest's idiom of "arriving fustest with the mostest". The SBCT is not an all singing all dancing solution to every problem. It is a specific solution to a specific problem. Other problems may require other solutions, like bigger and heavier MRAPs or MBT/IFV forces.
The Army was supposed to have been out of the fixed wing flight business much prior to the C-27.I would also note that the willingness of the USAF to cooperate with the Army in matters of this type are suspect given the C27J/C130 discussions that were contemporary with the changes in the C130 flight rules. And I could also point to the A10 nonsense with respect to a cooperative joint air force.
AgreedAll that said, the Army has its fair share of blame.
We agree that the LAVII/Piranha 8x8/Bison/Coyote/LAV-25 family is probably the optimal size vehicle for C130 lift. Dry they weigh half of the C130's payload max and combat ready something close to 80%.
When all you have is a hammer, everything looks like a nail.The Army (both Canadian and US) started with that basically sound solution and kept adding stuff until they exceeded the design limits.
Agreed.The basic Piranha (6x6 and 8x8) is built around a 6 foot high vehicle (1.85m to the hull top) That leaves roughly 30 inches to between the top deck of the LAV and the overhead of the C130.
The Bison was the LAV with a penthouse built on the passenger compartment. It was originally added to the USMC's LAVs to accommodate logistics and mortars. It raised the hull height from 1.85 to 2.21m (a bit more than a foot). That still left 18" of clearance between the upper deck and the overhead.
One can actually take off the turrets.The problem started with all the stuff stuck on top of the hull. The biggest problems were created by turrets because they are permanent features and can't be reduced for transport.
None of the AVGP, nor LAV 2.0 vehicles where amphibious in the way you mean. The prep work for float them took a significant period and really wasn’t ever practical.The Bison with a pintle mount would supply an air-transportable, armoured transport for an early entry force that was also amphibious and thus independent of bridging, boats and engineering.
Stryker is too wide to easily enter the C-130. You need a safety margin on the wheels, and the Stryker/LAV III doesn’t offer that. Taking an hour to load and unload a vehicle.The Stryker improved on the pintle mount with a foldable RWS that could be accommodated with in the height clearances of the C130.
The problem is if you are stuck carrying 2 Stryker or 2 Bradley, the Stryker has lost all its advantages.....
Other variants, especially turreted ones, simply exceeded the limits of the C130. The Canadian and the US Army's were both fortunate that they had access to C17s to carry supplementary, outsized loads to support the early deployment.
Those same assets could also trickle in heavy forces over time to augment or replace the early entry force.
SeenThe pallet rails were not on earlier C-130’s.
Seen.I agree that some of those vehicles may physically fit, the width revision appears to be designed to ensure that A/C damage doesn’t occur
Agreed.
Absolutely. I am firmly of the belief that half a loaf is better than none. Even if the lack of the other half of the loaf limits your choices.The largest issue with the Strykers is that when you cannot use Herc’s you end up needing to use the C-17 and C-5 fleet.
And it was also supposed to have been out of the marine transport business. That didn't stop it ordering the JHSV Spearheads as Intra-Theater Transports and retaining their Landing Ships (which the USMC seems to currently envy).The Army was supposed to have been out of the fixed wing flight business much prior to the C-27.
SeenThe C-130 weight for take off rules for take off on rough field, or non supported airfields isn’t new. The Army just tends to wish that away and use the standard airport data.
Agreed
YupWhen all you have is a hammer, everything looks like a nail.
Agreed.
Not exactly compatible with a rapid deployment early entry force, in my opinion.One can actually take off the turrets.
It just isn’t a quick job to do, and needs various cranes and other equipment that one doesn’t tend to find on a recently seized airfield, or forward area.
Again in my opinion, if you are fighting for inches you are working too close to your design tolerances.You can also deflate the tires - gaining IIRC 8” as well it had been proposed to have a lowering suspension to be able to ‘crawl’ a turreted LAV into a Herc. That seemed to go nowhere.
And yet they are bought and used for amphibious operations. I am not thinking of USMC surf line stuff. I am thinking of "Bridge too far" stuff.None of the AVGP, nor LAV 2.0 vehicles where amphibious in the way you mean. The prep work for float them took a significant period and really wasn’t ever practical.
Agreed.I think a LAV “2.5” with rear ramp (a la LAV III) adjustable RWS that could be lowered into the hull with quick attach up armor probably would have been the best choice for an upgrade to that fleet.
Agreed. Fighting for inches again.Stryker is too wide to easily enter the C-130. You need a safety margin on the wheels, and the Stryker/LAV III doesn’t offer that. Taking an hour to load and unload a vehicle.
Agreed.Looking at the width specs and side profile of the LSPH it is its own hull design - I notice they saw modified LAV III hull, and it appears to be about 3” thinner than the parent chassis.
And again.The problem is if you are stuck carrying 2 Stryker or 2 Bradley, the Stryker has lost all its advantages.
Seen. So don't put the LAV-25 in the rubble. Use it on the cordon around the town to contain the local vandals.In Fallujah it was readily apparent that the LAV-25 wasn’t nearly as effective as the tracked vehicles, often the USMC tanks had to clear paths in the rubble for the wheeled vehicles. Where the M113’s and Bradley’s just drove over it. Watching a tank do a series of pivots trying to clear rubble under fire and the issues with tire losses the LAV-25 had, left me with a serious appreciation for tracks in combat environments.
I see a number of roles for the wheeled vehicles for Mobile Protection in certain environments, but in a fairly high intensity battle near the front isn’t one of them.
This is some wicked tank talk lol
This - although some residual logistics advantage relating to the ongoing care and feeding of the vehicle remains.The problem is if you are stuck carrying 2 Stryker or 2 Bradley, the Stryker has lost all its advantages.
This is why I'm so firmly on the tracked side of the debate.In Fallujah it was readily apparent that the LAV-25 wasn’t nearly as effective as the tracked vehicles, often the USMC tanks had to clear paths in the rubble for the wheeled vehicles. Where the M113’s and Bradley’s just drove over it. Watching a tank do a series of pivots trying to clear rubble under fire and the issues with tire losses the LAV-25 had, left me with a serious appreciation for tracks in combat environments.
Probably for the best. The Booker was a solution looking for a problem.This - although some residual logistics advantage relating to the ongoing care and feeding of the vehicle remains.
This is why I'm so firmly on the tracked side of the debate.
I think those folks who tout the wheeled fleet for its strategic mobility see them careening down an autobahn from one country to another.
I tend to view things in the light of tactical mobility where snow, mud, plowed fields, cratered roads and rubble from destroyed buildings all need to be traversed. And yes, there is a logistics burden associated with tracked fleets but those can all be planned and compensated for by building a proper system for them in the first place (like Canada used to have)
I read a book once about the logistics burden imposed on the US Army in Normandy in keeping the wheeled fleets supplied in replacement tires which were shredded in humungous numbers by rubble and shrapnel littering the roads and fields. It would be interesting to see Iraq's numbers as well as Ukraine's.
As an aside - and strangely to get this back on the topic of tanks - I note an article (that I don't fully trust) that Hegseth is issuing a list of projects destined for the chopping block. Apparently the M10 Booker is on the list.
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Which is true in general, but not in the Canada's tanks forum page haha.Tanks are a piece of the puzzle. They only work with the rest of the bits.
Which is true in general, but not in the Canada's tanks forum page haha.
To get us back to tanks, I was curious how much it would cost to replace our fleets with minimum amount to recapitalize the MBT fleet. I assumed no extra units being stood up and no warstock, just rearming the three regf regts with three squadrons of 20 each and half squadron for training in Gagetown and a half squadron for RCEME training. 10 squadrons total. 200 tanks. I did not include supporters like AEVs, ARVs, etc, just MBTs.
Leo 2A8 - $7.5 billion CAD (insane cost inflation on Leos, upwards of 29 million euro a piece is being reported for the 2A8...Rheinmetall is making sure they gouge every penny of the current crisis) They will certainly get cheaper as the shutdown lines restart and start pumping out tanks.
K2 - Roughly $5 billion CAD. Poland just bought 180 for 3.4 billion USD, assuming a similar cost.
KF51 - Roughly $5 billion CAD. Rumored to be around 15 million Euro a piece.
Not going to include the Abrams because with the current climate, we're about as likely to buy Abrams as we are to buy some Minutemen.