Canada's tanks

[GK .Dundas]

Has anyone looked at the ability of the new Brazilian C 390 to carry them ? As I understand it the cargo compartment is slightly larger than the C 130 .

 

[Kirkhill]

Has anyone looked at the ability of the new Brazilian C 390 to carry them ? As I understand it the cargo compartment is slightly larger than the C 130 .

From available info.

 

[GR66]

Could definitely fit in an A400m. I believe a LAV6 would fit as well.

 

[Kirkhill]

Could definitely fit in an A400m. I believe a LAV6 would fit as well.

It's a slow night. It's either this or find something else to dodge the election news.

 

[KevinB]

It's a slow night. It's either this or find something else to dodge the election news.

View attachment 93067

Stop taking Wikipedia data for the stats.

I already posted the USAF C-130 tech parameter that clearly shows the wiki table for at least the C-130 is incorrect

 

[Cloud Cover]

They have a picture of the SPH fully inside the C130. It does physically fit.
If you scroll down you can see a picture of it fully inside the c130

Denel G7 105mm - SPG | PDF | Shell (Projectile) | Artillery

The document discusses General Dynamics' 105mm LAV III Artillery Weapon System, which addresses the US Army's need for a highly mobile and lethal fire support system for Stryker Brigades. It summarizes the key advantages of the 105mm LEO howitzer developed by Denel over other options, such as...

www.scribd.com

FJAG or others might know more, but if this was the prototype put together at GDLS London in 2003-2004, the LAV suspension was modified to fit it into the Herc, and the gun system for some reason was not well supported without the standard suspension. Also, when they fired the gun the back doors flew open and a lot of other things on the LAV broke. If this was the same gun … but I thought it was actually a 155 (or maybe a different project altogether).

 

[FJAG]

FJAG or others might know more, but if this was the prototype put together at GDLS London in 2003-2004, the LAV suspension was modified to fit it into the Herc, and the gun system for some reason was not well supported without the standard suspension. Also, when they fired the gun the back doors flew open and a lot of other things on the LAV broke. If this was the same gun … but I thought it was actually a 155 (or maybe a different project altogether).

I have zero knowledge about this except what I've found doing research on the WAFG project. When this was going on I was long gone from the gunners and with JAG.

I do know that pictures of it, and other representative systems, floated around at the time during DLR2 briefings as concepts for the "Future Indirect Fire Capability" project at the time that the M109s were withdrawn (2004-5). Those briefings emphasized that the project was unfunded and that with the M109s gone the artillery would have a ten-year capability gap.

Range and precision were the two major buzz words at the time. This was just when Excalibur was coming out (laser designated munitions - CLGP/Copperhead - had been out for some time). While the Denel product produced some decent range, precision generally fell to the 155mm calibre round. The M777 coupled with Excalibur offered both range and precision and quickly fell into favour as a result of Afghanistan field experience and in time went from a dozen UOR guns to 37 in-service guns.

There's almost always some form of indirect fire modernization project being handled by DLR 2 so they constantly stay on top of development. Serious funding for them is another issue entirely.

Incidentally, besides guns, the S Africans were doing some serious work on improving artillery ammunition to take both the 105mm and 155mm calibres out of the WW2 era.

@Petard is much more up on this than I am.

 

[Kirkhill]

Stop taking Wikipedia data for the stats.

I already posted the USAF C-130 tech parameter that clearly shows the wiki table for at least the C-130 is incorrect

A couple of points.

As has been pointed out, the original design criterion for the Stryker was that it fit within the cabin of a C130 and that it not exceed the weight limits. The wiki numbers on the C130 I quoted are confirmed by USAF, RCAF and Lockheed Martin publications. All of the variants, including the MGS and the SPH were tested against that standard and verified as fitting within the cabin and leaving the aircraft flightworthy.

The fact that the USAF saw fit to revise their flight criteria after the Stryker was fielded, and the Army saw fit to revise their vehicle designs after fielding the Stryker does not reflect on the original intent.

With respect to the Rand Study on the deployability of the Stryker Brigade - the study's assumptions included that the Air Force would only commit a portion of the available lift to the deployment. That portion is variable. The USAF could have apportioned all available assets for 4 days or only supplied a trickle to the Army for an extended period. In either situation the Stryker Brigade could be deployed by air faster than a Heavy Brigade and with more assets than a Light Brigade. In either case it accedes to Bedford Forrest's idiom of "arriving fustest with the mostest". The SBCT is not an all singing all dancing solution to every problem. It is a specific solution to a specific problem. Other problems may require other solutions, like bigger and heavier MRAPs or MBT/IFV forces.

I would also note that the willingness of the USAF to cooperate with the Army in matters of this type are suspect given the C27J/C130 discussions that were contemporary with the changes in the C130 flight rules. And I could also point to the A10 nonsense with respect to a cooperative joint air force.

All that said, the Army has its fair share of blame.

We agree that the LAVII/Piranha 8x8/Bison/Coyote/LAV-25 family is probably the optimal size vehicle for C130 lift. Dry they weigh half of the C130's payload max and combat ready something close to 80%.

The Army (both Canadian and US) started with that basically sound solution and kept adding stuff until they exceeded the design limits.

The basic Piranha (6x6 and 8x8) is built around a 6 foot high vehicle (1.85m to the hull top) That leaves roughly 30 inches to between the top deck of the LAV and the overhead of the C130.

The Bison was the LAV with a penthouse built on the passenger compartment. It was originally added to the USMC's LAVs to accommodate logistics and mortars. It raised the hull height from 1.85 to 2.21m (a bit more than a foot). That still left 18" of clearance between the upper deck and the overhead.

The problem started with all the stuff stuck on top of the hull. The biggest problems were created by turrets because they are permanent features and can't be reduced for transport.

The Bison with a pintle mount would supply an air-transportable, armoured transport for an early entry force that was also amphibious and thus independent of bridging, boats and engineering.

The Stryker improved on the pintle mount with a foldable RWS that could be accommodated with in the height clearances of the C130.

....

Other variants, especially turreted ones, simply exceeded the limits of the C130. The Canadian and the US Army's were both fortunate that they had access to C17s to carry supplementary, outsized loads to support the early deployment.

Those same assets could also trickle in heavy forces over time to augment or replace the early entry force.

 

[KevinB]

A couple of points.

As has been pointed out, the original design criterion for the Stryker was that it fit within the cabin of a C130 and that it not exceed the weight limits. The wiki numbers on the C130 I quoted are confirmed by USAF, RCAF and Lockheed Martin publications. All of the variants, including the MGS and the SPH were tested against that standard and verified as fitting within the cabin and leaving the aircraft flightworthy.

The pallet rails were not on earlier C-130’s.

I agree that some of those vehicles may physically fit, the width revision appears to be designed to ensure that A/C damage doesn’t occur

The fact that the USAF saw fit to revise their flight criteria after the Stryker was fielded, and the Army saw fit to revise their vehicle designs after fielding the Stryker does not reflect on the original intent.

Agreed.

With respect to the Rand Study on the deployability of the Stryker Brigade - the study's assumptions included that the Air Force would only commit a portion of the available lift to the deployment. That portion is variable. The USAF could have apportioned all available assets for 4 days or only supplied a trickle to the Army for an extended period. In either situation the Stryker Brigade could be deployed by air faster than a Heavy Brigade and with more assets than a Light Brigade. In either case it accedes to Bedford Forrest's idiom of "arriving fustest with the mostest". The SBCT is not an all singing all dancing solution to every problem. It is a specific solution to a specific problem. Other problems may require other solutions, like bigger and heavier MRAPs or MBT/IFV forces.

The largest issue with the Strykers is that when you cannot use Herc’s you end up needing to use the C-17 and C-5 fleet.

I would also note that the willingness of the USAF to cooperate with the Army in matters of this type are suspect given the C27J/C130 discussions that were contemporary with the changes in the C130 flight rules. And I could also point to the A10 nonsense with respect to a cooperative joint air force.

The Army was supposed to have been out of the fixed wing flight business much prior to the C-27.

The C-130 weight for take off rules for take off on rough field, or non supported airfields isn’t new. The Army just tends to wish that away and use the standard airport data.

All that said, the Army has its fair share of blame.

We agree that the LAVII/Piranha 8x8/Bison/Coyote/LAV-25 family is probably the optimal size vehicle for C130 lift. Dry they weigh half of the C130's payload max and combat ready something close to 80%.

Agreed

The Army (both Canadian and US) started with that basically sound solution and kept adding stuff until they exceeded the design limits.

When all you have is a hammer, everything looks like a nail.

The basic Piranha (6x6 and 8x8) is built around a 6 foot high vehicle (1.85m to the hull top) That leaves roughly 30 inches to between the top deck of the LAV and the overhead of the C130.

The Bison was the LAV with a penthouse built on the passenger compartment. It was originally added to the USMC's LAVs to accommodate logistics and mortars. It raised the hull height from 1.85 to 2.21m (a bit more than a foot). That still left 18" of clearance between the upper deck and the overhead.

Agreed.

The problem started with all the stuff stuck on top of the hull. The biggest problems were created by turrets because they are permanent features and can't be reduced for transport.

One can actually take off the turrets.
It just isn’t a quick job to do, and needs various cranes and other equipment that one doesn’t tend to find on a recently seized airfield, or forward area.

You can also deflate the tires - gaining IIRC 8” as well it had been proposed to have a lowering suspension to be able to ‘crawl’ a turreted LAV into a Herc. That seemed to go nowhere.

The Bison with a pintle mount would supply an air-transportable, armoured transport for an early entry force that was also amphibious and thus independent of bridging, boats and engineering.

None of the AVGP, nor LAV 2.0 vehicles where amphibious in the way you mean. The prep work for float them took a significant period and really wasn’t ever practical.

I think a LAV “2.5” with rear ramp (a la LAV III) adjustable RWS that could be lowered into the hull with quick attach up armor probably would have been the best choice for an upgrade to that fleet.

The Stryker improved on the pintle mount with a foldable RWS that could be accommodated with in the height clearances of the C130.

Stryker is too wide to easily enter the C-130. You need a safety margin on the wheels, and the Stryker/LAV III doesn’t offer that. Taking an hour to load and unload a vehicle.

Looking at the width specs and side profile of the LSPH it is its own hull design - I notice they saw modified LAV III hull, and it appears to be about 3” thinner than the parent chassis.

....

Other variants, especially turreted ones, simply exceeded the limits of the C130. The Canadian and the US Army's were both fortunate that they had access to C17s to carry supplementary, outsized loads to support the early deployment.

Those same assets could also trickle in heavy forces over time to augment or replace the early entry force.

The problem is if you are stuck carrying 2 Stryker or 2 Bradley, the Stryker has lost all its advantages.

In Fallujah it was readily apparent that the LAV-25 wasn’t nearly as effective as the tracked vehicles, often the USMC tanks had to clear paths in the rubble for the wheeled vehicles. Where the M113’s and Bradley’s just drove over it. Watching a tank do a series of pivots trying to clear rubble under fire and the issues with tire losses the LAV-25 had, left me with a serious appreciation for tracks in combat environments.

I see a number of roles for the wheeled vehicles for Mobile Protection in certain environments, but in a fairly high intensity battle near the front isn’t one of them.

 

[Kirkhill]

I wonder if the Airborne would prefer the ISV or the Bison? Or possibly even the something in the stripped down Piranha 6x6/8x8 range with a curb weight similar to the combat weight of the JLTV and the CVRT?

 

[PrairieFella]

This is some wicked tank talk lol

 

[Kirkhill]

The pallet rails were not on earlier C-130’s.

Seen

I agree that some of those vehicles may physically fit, the width revision appears to be designed to ensure that A/C damage doesn’t occur

Seen.

Agreed.

The largest issue with the Strykers is that when you cannot use Herc’s you end up needing to use the C-17 and C-5 fleet.

Absolutely. I am firmly of the belief that half a loaf is better than none. Even if the lack of the other half of the loaf limits your choices.
I would be inclined to retain some of the early model Strykers/LAVII-Bisons strictly for the early entry force. Follow on forces could have the heavier upgrades.

The Army was supposed to have been out of the fixed wing flight business much prior to the C-27.

And it was also supposed to have been out of the marine transport business. That didn't stop it ordering the JHSV Spearheads as Intra-Theater Transports and retaining their Landing Ships (which the USMC seems to currently envy).

The C-130 weight for take off rules for take off on rough field, or non supported airfields isn’t new. The Army just tends to wish that away and use the standard airport data.

Seen

Agreed

When all you have is a hammer, everything looks like a nail.

Yup

Agreed.

One can actually take off the turrets.
It just isn’t a quick job to do, and needs various cranes and other equipment that one doesn’t tend to find on a recently seized airfield, or forward area.

Not exactly compatible with a rapid deployment early entry force, in my opinion.

You can also deflate the tires - gaining IIRC 8” as well it had been proposed to have a lowering suspension to be able to ‘crawl’ a turreted LAV into a Herc. That seemed to go nowhere.

Again in my opinion, if you are fighting for inches you are working too close to your design tolerances.

None of the AVGP, nor LAV 2.0 vehicles where amphibious in the way you mean. The prep work for float them took a significant period and really wasn’t ever practical.

And yet they are bought and used for amphibious operations. I am not thinking of USMC surf line stuff. I am thinking of "Bridge too far" stuff.

I think a LAV “2.5” with rear ramp (a la LAV III) adjustable RWS that could be lowered into the hull with quick attach up armor probably would have been the best choice for an upgrade to that fleet.

Agreed.

Stryker is too wide to easily enter the C-130. You need a safety margin on the wheels, and the Stryker/LAV III doesn’t offer that. Taking an hour to load and unload a vehicle.

Agreed. Fighting for inches again.

Looking at the width specs and side profile of the LSPH it is its own hull design - I notice they saw modified LAV III hull, and it appears to be about 3” thinner than the parent chassis.

Agreed.

The problem is if you are stuck carrying 2 Stryker or 2 Bradley, the Stryker has lost all its advantages.

And again.

In Fallujah it was readily apparent that the LAV-25 wasn’t nearly as effective as the tracked vehicles, often the USMC tanks had to clear paths in the rubble for the wheeled vehicles. Where the M113’s and Bradley’s just drove over it. Watching a tank do a series of pivots trying to clear rubble under fire and the issues with tire losses the LAV-25 had, left me with a serious appreciation for tracks in combat environments.

Seen. So don't put the LAV-25 in the rubble. Use it on the cordon around the town to contain the local vandals.

The TLAVs/M113s are also C130 transportable. Bring them in with the Pioneers/Engineers as an augmentation to the LAV force.

I see a number of roles for the wheeled vehicles for Mobile Protection in certain environments, but in a fairly high intensity battle near the front isn’t one of them.

We agree.

My contention has always been that there is a lot of terrain that needs to be managed in order to contain the high intensity battle. That is where I see the wheels. Moving rapidly to cover large areas to maintain situational awareness and prevent the other guy's heavies squirting into your rear.

It is also the reason I see wheels for an early entry force. I wouldn't want to land such a force on top of a defended position. I would want the force to be deployed in a tactically secure location from which the force could sally forth and threaten/contain the opposition while establishing a bridgehead for follow on forces.

 

[Kirkhill]

This is some wicked tank talk lol

Tanks are a piece of the puzzle. They only work with the rest of the bits.

 

[FJAG]

The problem is if you are stuck carrying 2 Stryker or 2 Bradley, the Stryker has lost all its advantages.

This - although some residual logistics advantage relating to the ongoing care and feeding of the vehicle remains.

In Fallujah it was readily apparent that the LAV-25 wasn’t nearly as effective as the tracked vehicles, often the USMC tanks had to clear paths in the rubble for the wheeled vehicles. Where the M113’s and Bradley’s just drove over it. Watching a tank do a series of pivots trying to clear rubble under fire and the issues with tire losses the LAV-25 had, left me with a serious appreciation for tracks in combat environments.

This is why I'm so firmly on the tracked side of the debate.

I think those folks who tout the wheeled fleet for its strategic mobility see them careening down an autobahn from one country to another.

I tend to view things in the light of tactical mobility where snow, mud, plowed fields, cratered roads and rubble from destroyed buildings all need to be traversed. And yes, there is a logistics burden associated with tracked fleets but those can all be planned and compensated for by building a proper system for them in the first place (like Canada used to have)

I read a book once about the logistics burden imposed on the US Army in Normandy in keeping the wheeled fleets supplied in replacement tires which were shredded in humungous numbers by rubble and shrapnel littering the roads and fields. It would be interesting to see Iraq's numbers as well as Ukraine's.

As an aside - and strangely to get this back on the topic of tanks - I note an article (that I don't fully trust) that Hegseth is issuing a list of projects destined for the chopping block. Apparently the M10 Booker is on the list.

 

[PrairieFella]

This - although some residual logistics advantage relating to the ongoing care and feeding of the vehicle remains.

This is why I'm so firmly on the tracked side of the debate.

I think those folks who tout the wheeled fleet for its strategic mobility see them careening down an autobahn from one country to another.

I tend to view things in the light of tactical mobility where snow, mud, plowed fields, cratered roads and rubble from destroyed buildings all need to be traversed. And yes, there is a logistics burden associated with tracked fleets but those can all be planned and compensated for by building a proper system for them in the first place (like Canada used to have)

I read a book once about the logistics burden imposed on the US Army in Normandy in keeping the wheeled fleets supplied in replacement tires which were shredded in humungous numbers by rubble and shrapnel littering the roads and fields. It would be interesting to see Iraq's numbers as well as Ukraine's.

As an aside - and strangely to get this back on the topic of tanks - I note an article (that I don't fully trust) that Hegseth is issuing a list of projects destined for the chopping block. Apparently the M10 Booker is on the list.

Probably for the best. The Booker was a solution looking for a problem.

 

[FJAG]

One step further on the Booker and to add some credibility to the article - here's the SECDEF's direction which doesn't specifically mention the M10 but one can read between the lines:

 

[PrairieFella]

Tanks are a piece of the puzzle. They only work with the rest of the bits.

Which is true in general, but not in the Canada's tanks forum page haha.

To get us back to tanks, I was curious how much it would cost to replace our fleets with minimum amount to recapitalize the MBT fleet. I assumed no extra units being stood up and no warstock, just rearming the three regf regts with three squadrons of 20 each and half squadron for training in Gagetown and a half squadron for RCEME training. 10 squadrons total. 200 tanks. I did not include supporters like AEVs, ARVs, etc, just MBTs.

Leo 2A8 - $7.5 billion CAD (insane cost inflation on Leos, upwards of 29 million euro a piece is being reported for the 2A8...Rheinmetall is making sure they gouge every penny of the current crisis) They will certainly get cheaper as the shutdown lines restart and start pumping out tanks.

K2 - Roughly $5 billion CAD. Poland just bought 180 for 3.4 billion USD, assuming a similar cost.

KF51 - Roughly $5 billion CAD. Rumored to be around 15 million Euro a piece.

Not going to include the Abrams because with the current climate, we're about as likely to buy Abrams as we are to buy some Minutemen.

Also, as an aside, here's a link to a video showing the K2's active suspension being demonstrated. File:K2 Black Panther tank demonstrating the posture control function of the in-arm suspension unit at the Gyeryong Ground Forces Cultural Festival 2016.webm - Wikipedia

 

[Kirkhill]

Which is true in general, but not in the Canada's tanks forum page haha.

To get us back to tanks, I was curious how much it would cost to replace our fleets with minimum amount to recapitalize the MBT fleet. I assumed no extra units being stood up and no warstock, just rearming the three regf regts with three squadrons of 20 each and half squadron for training in Gagetown and a half squadron for RCEME training. 10 squadrons total. 200 tanks. I did not include supporters like AEVs, ARVs, etc, just MBTs.

Leo 2A8 - $7.5 billion CAD (insane cost inflation on Leos, upwards of 29 million euro a piece is being reported for the 2A8...Rheinmetall is making sure they gouge every penny of the current crisis) They will certainly get cheaper as the shutdown lines restart and start pumping out tanks.

K2 - Roughly $5 billion CAD. Poland just bought 180 for 3.4 billion USD, assuming a similar cost.

KF51 - Roughly $5 billion CAD. Rumored to be around 15 million Euro a piece.

Not going to include the Abrams because with the current climate, we're about as likely to buy Abrams as we are to buy some Minutemen.

Maybe not Minutemen but perhaps SM6s.

The new boss man is heading for the States to talk USMCA trade. Trump, like Reagan before him, has made it clear that the cost of security is part of his trade calculations.

If we want to build ships and cars for him, he wants to build something for us. An Abrams/Bradley force wouldn't be the worst starting point. Although I lean towards NORAD assets first.

 

[suffolkowner]

Which is true in general, but not in the Canada's tanks forum page haha.

To get us back to tanks, I was curious how much it would cost to replace our fleets with minimum amount to recapitalize the MBT fleet. I assumed no extra units being stood up and no warstock, just rearming the three regf regts with three squadrons of 20 each and half squadron for training in Gagetown and a half squadron for RCEME training. 10 squadrons total. 200 tanks. I did not include supporters like AEVs, ARVs, etc, just MBTs.

Leo 2A8 - $7.5 billion CAD (insane cost inflation on Leos, upwards of 29 million euro a piece is being reported for the 2A8...Rheinmetall is making sure they gouge every penny of the current crisis) They will certainly get cheaper as the shutdown lines restart and start pumping out tanks.

K2 - Roughly $5 billion CAD. Poland just bought 180 for 3.4 billion USD, assuming a similar cost.

KF51 - Roughly $5 billion CAD. Rumored to be around 15 million Euro a piece.

Not going to include the Abrams because with the current climate, we're about as likely to buy Abrams as we are to buy some Minutemen.

Also, as an aside, here's a link to a video showing the K2's active suspension being demonstrated. File:K2 Black Panther tank demonstrating the posture control function of the in-arm suspension unit at the Gyeryong Ground Forces Cultural Festival 2016.webm - Wikipedia

From 74 or 82 tanks to 200 is quite an expansion

 

[PrairieFella]

From 74 or 82 tanks to 200 is quite an expansion

It is but it's needed. We currently have two armoured regiments that bring no more firepower than a LAV mech battalion and we desperately need more tankers, the Strats cant keep up the op tempo for much longer. Further, in a real war, 4ish squadrons will not hack it for any period of time. The minimum for what is supposedly a symmetrical force would be equipping the three regiments the same way. I'm assuming no bde/div reform in the near future with 200 tanks as the minimum.