This paper analyzes the relationship between the Taliban and violent jihadi extremist (VJE) organizations present and/or operating in Afghanistan. Jihadi relations are examined within the analytical frameworks of cooperation, and competition. By conducting an in-depth analysis of the Taliban’s interactions with other violent extremist groups – such as Al-Qaeda, Islamic State-Khorasan Province, and Tehrik-e-Taliban Pakistan – we highlight the nuanced dynamics of old ties forged through years of jihad and their continuation under the Taliban’s regime. We argue that the Taliban’s relationships with these VJEs are shaped by a shared experience of jihad and sustained primarily through ideological, tactical, and strategic cooperation. However, the Taliban’s rise to power and subsequent focus on consolidating control have altered these relationships. While old ties remain resilient – due to personal connections and organizational-level cooperation – new relationships are characterized by economic links, reciprocity, and the Taliban’s efforts to maintain a delicate balance of power as the de facto government. Challenging the Taliban within the network has led to violent conflicts despite ideological commonalities with other VJEs.
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