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TKMS Type 212CD (Victoria class replacement megathread)

Doesn’t have the tonnage or the power for true under ice operations.

"True under ice operations" .... Indeed if one is talking many weeks under ice with adequate reserve remaining for many weeks more under the ice.

The RCN laid out their requirements in the "High Level Mandatory Requirements" (HLMR) where I posted what I believe to be some of those HLMR directly related to Arctic operations for the Canadian Patrol Submarine.

Several others posters have already pointed out that the main role of the CPS is choke points, the USN and UK SSN’s can do the under ice thing for weeks at a time as needed) the conventional boats aren’t.

Indeed they have posted that as a role.

Having typed that, I prefer not to stay only chatting about current technology absolutes, if absolutes not guaranteed essential.

I have (likely an isolated view) that if the RCN has an Arctic mobile base ship, with AIP reactant replenishment capability, pre-positioned in the Arctic, that would be a game changer for AIP submarine Arctic operation, and it could change this entire limitation.

There has been mention by at least one senior RCN officer, as to the desirability of an Arctic mobile base ship. It has me curious if the CPSP moving forward with TKMS identified as the 'preferred supplier', if that might have the RCN also re-considering applicability of AIP submarine support provided by any hypothetical Arctic mobile base ship.
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Canada has a large capability to deal with Cryogenic products. The Medical field, Manufacturing, Mining, Oil and Gas industries all deal with same and or similar products on a daily bases. Shipping in quantity's by rail, aircraft, boat or truck is already figured out. Transferring from each of these modes of transport is also already figured out.
Setting up a ship to sub transfer set up SHOULD not take trying to reinvent the wheel. It is already in place and can be set up on Canadian military ships.
I actually think the AOPS and or the New Destroyers with their Mission bays could easily be set up to transport the product and pumps to perform the job.
I am not sure I want to be on a Military ship carrying large quantity's of LOX and Hydrogen.
I doubt AOPS will be carrying any explosives like that. They can't even carry propane.
 
Doesn’t have the tonnage or the power for true under ice operations.
The Nuke boats that have been posted multiple times on this thread surfacing through the ice are bigger and badder in that respect.

Several others posters have already pointed out that the main role of the CPS is choke points, the USN and UK SSN’s can do the under ice thing for weeks at a time as needed) the conventional boats aren’t.

Further to this, there is a recent comment a bit far down ( @ 5 August 2026, 5:05 am ) on the CNR New Submarines for Canada post, that summarizes pretty much my take on this. This is all conceptually fairly new - and dependent on the capability to replenish AIP reactants in the Artic , could have a major impact on the potential scope of AIP equipped submarine potential operation in Arctic waters.
 
I doubt AOPS will be carrying any explosives like that. They can't even carry propane.

Agreed. I am thinking more to have containers (which I believe commercially exist) embarked on a larger suitable ship (larger than an AOPS) so to generate the reactants and replenish from such. Very hypothetical - and given safety aspects plus Arctic cold complexities, it may not be viable. But given the scope of the Canadian Patrol Submarine Project, and given the game-changer aspect if such is viable, i believe it should be thoroughly investigated to assess if feasible.
 
"True under ice operations" .... Indeed if one is talking many weeks under ice with adequate reserve remaining for many weeks more under the ice.

The RCN laid out their requirements in the "High Level Mandatory Requirements" (HLMR) where I posted what I believe to be some of those HLMR directly related to Arctic operations for the Canadian Patrol Submarine.



Indeed they have posted that as a role.

Having typed that, I prefer not to stay only chatting about current technology absolutes, if absolutes not guaranteed essential.

I have (likely an isolated view) that if the RCN has an Arctic mobile base ship, with AIP reactant replenishment capability, pre-positioned in the Arctic, that would be a game changer for AIP submarine Arctic operation, and it could change this entire limitation.

There has been mention by at least one senior RCN officer, as to the desirability of an Arctic mobile base ship. It has me curious if the CPSP moving forward with TKMS identified as the 'preferred supplier', if that might have the RCN also re-considering applicability of AIP submarine support provided by any hypothetical Arctic mobile base ship.
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Selecting TKMS as the preferred supplier means Canada has entered negotiations for up to 12 Type 212CD submarines. It does not mean every speculative support concept associated with Arctic operations has suddenly become part of the Canadian Patrol Submarine Project. The government’s announcement says nothing about an Arctic mobile base, submarine tender or at sea AIP reactant replenishment capability.

The Arctic mobile base idea was floated by then Commander RCN Vice Admiral Angus Topshee as a broader ice capable amphibious and logistics ship. It was not announced as a funded project, much less as a submarine support vessel. Topshee is also no longer Commander RCN. Vice Admiral Dan Charlebois assumed command on June 16, 2026. Everything I have heard indicates that the mobile base concept has not progressed into the formal planning stage whatsoever.

Even supposing such a ship were eventually built, AIP replenishment would not be a simple matter of adding another hose reel. As you already know, it would require specialized storage, transfer equipment, safety systems, trained personnel and submarine compatible support facilities for hydrogen and oxygen reactants. A genuine submarine tender would also need repair shops, spares, weapons handling, medical facilities, communications and some form of submarine rescue support. Fuel cell AIP provides extended submerged endurance, but the reactants remain finite and the system does not turn a conventional submarine into an SSN as you might exspect.

The mobile base would also remain a surface ship limited by its own ice classification and by where it could safely operate. The submarine would still have to leave the deeper under ice operating area to meet it. That does not eliminate the fundamental issues surrounding speed, battery and energy management, emergency surfacing and rescue beneath heavy ice.

The more likely solution is considerably less exotic. The submarine leaves the patrol area and returns to an established support facility, or perhaps uses a closer forward logistics port such as St. John’s when suitable arrangements are in place. That is far more realistic than Canada designing and purchasing an enormously expensive Arctic submarine tender solely to replenish AIP consumables.
 
Selecting TKMS as the preferred supplier means Canada has entered negotiations for up to 12 Type 212CD submarines. It does not mean every speculative support concept associated with Arctic operations has suddenly become part of the Canadian Patrol Submarine Project. The government’s announcement says nothing about an Arctic mobile base, submarine tender or at sea AIP reactant replenishment capability.

The Arctic mobile base idea was floated by then Commander RCN Vice Admiral Angus Topshee as a broader ice capable amphibious and logistics ship. It was not announced as a funded project, much less as a submarine support vessel. Topshee is also no longer Commander RCN. Vice Admiral Dan Charlebois assumed command on June 16, 2026. Everything I have heard indicates that the mobile base concept has not progressed into the formal planning stage whatsoever.

Even supposing such a ship were eventually built, AIP replenishment would not be a simple matter of adding another hose reel. As you already know, it would require specialized storage, transfer equipment, safety systems, trained personnel and submarine compatible support facilities for hydrogen and oxygen reactants. A genuine submarine tender would also need repair shops, spares, weapons handling, medical facilities, communications and some form of submarine rescue support. Fuel cell AIP provides extended submerged endurance, but the reactants remain finite and the system does not turn a conventional submarine into an SSN as you might exspect.

The mobile base would also remain a surface ship limited by its own ice classification and by where it could safely operate. The submarine would still have to leave the deeper under ice operating area to meet it. That does not eliminate the fundamental issues surrounding speed, battery and energy management, emergency surfacing and rescue beneath heavy ice.

All good points.

There is though, the other side of the assessment.

The RCN attempted to set up a fixed Arctic base at Nanisivik that did not work out so well . It was that which prompted the staff (?) of then Commander RCN Vice Admiral Angus Topshee to propose an Arctic capable mobile base be considered. From my recollection it was independent of ANY consideration in regards to submarines. So this was a proposed idea, and it is not to the best of my knowledge a project/program. Whether consideration of submarine support might give it added emphasis is not something I have any insight into official defence thinking.

It is clear in my view, that AIP equipped submarines, if they wish to dwell at in the Arctic and still have AIP reserves for contingencies , can not do so with the submarine's on-board embarked AIP reactants. They don't have enough.

Simply put, AIP equipped submarines can not, without replenishment venture far into the Arctic. Having a distant base such as St.John's, in my view, does not cut it.

If AIP equipped submarines could replenish their reactants while in the Arctic, it would be a game changer. Dare I say a massive game changer.

But as you note, this is not easy from a Mobile base. Frankly, IMHO it is very difficult. Yes. There are major safety concerns re: AIP reactant generation, AIP reactant transportation & stowage, and even AIP replenishment. Do such in the Arctic adds an even further layer of complexity and difficulty.

So that does beg the question. Is it worthwhile to investigate further?

I think that question should be asked, assessed, and debated, much like we are doing now.

Some press articles claim, that over the Canadian Patrol Submarine project lifetime, the Canadian public could in effect be spending $80-billion to $100 billion Canadian dollars. The justification in part is Canada has a massive coastline with 3 oceans. 3 Oceans. Not 2. THREE. ...

Yet ... yet at the same time, after 'selling' the government on such, we go and then say, .. but ... but ... but ... we won't send the submarine into one of those 3 oceans, despite spending all of that money. We will only monitor Canadian east/west coast Arctic access from Canada/Alaska vicinity (and ignore any Russian access from the other side of the pole which is, frankly, viable). We will ONLY go for 2 ocean operations for the subs, despite using the 3 ocean argument to justify the expenditure.

Well - $80 billion to $100 billion is a lot of money, to then turn around and, only now, claim: "the 3rd ocean is not allowed for our new submarines. It was only a selling point". ???

Again, my view? I think that question should be asked, assessed, and debated, much like we are doing now.

I think the RCN is letting down the Canadian government and the Canadian tax payer, if the RCN does not take a hard look as to what would be involved to go beyond only monitoring the choke point entrances on the Canadian side of the Arctic.

My view is the RCN is letting down the Canadian government and the Canadian tax payer if the RCN does not consider an Arctic base, such as a mobile Arctic base ship (or even a new design of an Arctic (polar class) capable supply ship that can replenish submarine's reactants in the Arctic).

My view? Study the risks of the stowage requirements. Study the risks of the in-situ (on site) reactant generation, and study the difficulty/feasibility/risk of Arctic AIP replenishment. If possible, even dream up some smaller scale tests to assess viability.

To reject out of hand because it is clearly seen as difficult? Again, my (probably isolated) view, is if we right now, reject such, we are letting down the Canadian taxpayer in terms of them not getting full money for their expenditure for the submarines, and we are not adequately doing the appropriate job to assess what is viable, and what is not viable, without first looking into such in depth.

So - for the 3rd time, I think it is important that the viability of Arctic AIP replenishment question is asked, assessed, and debated, much like we are doing now.
 
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Why not just snap a new battery pack on to the rear deck?



An AUV with a hydrogen fuel cell power pack navigates its way to a refuelling point where it meets the sub. The sub discards the existing exhausted power pack which makes its way back to the maintenance base. The new pack docks with the sub and starts recharging the sub's batteries inductively. The AUV stays mated until it too is exhausted and needs replacing.

Other AUVs are laying fibre, carring mines, torpedoes and missiles as well as towing and deploying sensors and power stations.

2035 is a long way away. Especially given currently available technology.

 
All good points.

There is though, the other side of the assessment.

The RCN attempted to set up a fixed Arctic base at Nanisivik that did not work out so well . It was that which prompted the staff (?) of then Commander RCN Vice Admiral Angus Topshee to propose an Arctic capable mobile base be considered. From my recollection it was independent of ANY consideration in regards to submarines. So this was a proposed idea, and it is not to the best of my knowledge a project/program. Whether consideration of submarine support might give it added emphasis is not something I have any insight into official defence thinking.

It is clear in my view, that AIP equipped submarines, if they wish to dwell at in the Arctic and still have AIP reserves for contingencies , can not do so with the submarine's on-board embarked AIP reactants. They don't have enough.

Simply put, AIP equipped submarines can not, without replenishment venture far into the Arctic. Having a distant base such as St.John's, in my view, does not cut it.

If AIP equipped submarines could replenish their reactants while in the Arctic, it would be a game changer. Dare I say a massive game changer.

But as you note, this is not easy from a Mobile base. Frankly, IMHO it is very difficult. Yes. There are major safety concerns re: AIP reactant generation, AIP reactant transportation & stowage, and even AIP replenishment. Do such in the Arctic adds an even further layer of complexity and difficulty.

So that does beg the question. Is it worthwhile to investigate further?

I think that question should be asked, assessed, and debated, much like we are doing now.

Some press articles claim, that over the Canadian Patrol Submarine project lifetime, the Canadian public could in effect be spending $80-billion to $100 billion Canadian dollars. The justification in part is Canada has a massive coastline with 3 oceans. 3 Oceans. Not 2. THREE. ...

Yet ... yet at the same time, after 'selling' the government on such, we go and then say, .. but ... but ... but ... we won't send the submarine into one of those 3 oceans, despite spending all of that money. We will only monitor Canadian east/west coast Arctic access from Canada/Alaska vicinity (and ignore any Russian access from the other side of the pole which is, frankly, viable). We will ONLY go for 2 ocean operations for the subs, despite using the 3 ocean argument to justify the expenditure.

Well - $80 billion to $100 billion is a lot of money, to then turn around and, only now, claim: "the 3rd ocean is not allowed for our new submarines. It was only a selling point". ???

Again, my view? I think that question should be asked, assessed, and debated, much like we are doing now.

I think the RCN is letting down the Canadian government and the Canadian tax payer, if the RCN does not take a hard look as to what would be involved to go beyond only monitoring the choke point entrances on the Canadian side of the Arctic.

My view is the RCN is letting down the Canadian government and the Canadian tax payer if the RCN does not consider an Arctic base, such as a mobile Arctic base ship (or even a new design of an Arctic (polar class) capable supply ship that can replenish submarine's reactants in the Arctic).

My view? Study the risks of the stowage requirements. Study the risks of the in-situ (on site) reactant generation, and study the difficulty/feasibility/risk of Arctic AIP replenishment. If possible, even dream up some smaller scale tests to assess viability.

To reject out of hand because it is clearly seen as difficult? Again, my (probably isolated) view, is if we right now, reject such, we are letting down the Canadian taxpayer in terms of them not getting full money for their expenditure for the submarines, and we are not adequately doing the appropriate job to assess what is viable, and what is not viable, without first looking into such in depth.

So - for the 3rd time, I think it is important that the viability of Arctic AIP replenishment question is asked, assessed, and debated, much like we are doing now.
or re-visit the need for some form of arctic base for all 3 services.
 
All good points.

There is though, the other side of the assessment.

The RCN attempted to set up a fixed Arctic base at Nanisivik that did not work out so well . It was that which prompted the staff (?) of then Commander RCN Vice Admiral Angus Topshee to propose an Arctic capable mobile base be considered. From my recollection it was independent of ANY consideration in regards to submarines. So this was a proposed idea, and it is not to the best of my knowledge a project/program. Whether consideration of submarine support might give it added emphasis is not something I have any insight into official defence thinking.

It is clear in my view, that AIP equipped submarines, if they wish to dwell at in the Arctic and still have AIP reserves for contingencies , can not do so with the submarine's on-board embarked AIP reactants. They don't have enough.

Simply put, AIP equipped submarines can not, without replenishment venture far into the Arctic. Having a distant base such as St.John's, in my view, does not cut it.

If AIP equipped submarines could replenish their reactants while in the Arctic, it would be a game changer. Dare I say a massive game changer.

But as you note, this is not easy from a Mobile base. Frankly, IMHO it is very difficult. Yes. There are major safety concerns re: AIP reactant generation, AIP reactant transportation & stowage, and even AIP replenishment. Do such in the Arctic adds an even further layer of complexity and difficulty.

So that does beg the question. Is it worthwhile to investigate further?

I think that question should be asked, assessed, and debated, much like we are doing now.

Some press articles claim, that over the Canadian Patrol Submarine project lifetime, the Canadian public could in effect be spending $80-billion to $100 billion Canadian dollars. The justification in part is Canada has a massive coastline with 3 oceans. 3 Oceans. Not 2. THREE. ...

Yet ... yet at the same time, after 'selling' the government on such, we go and then say, .. but ... but ... but ... we won't send the submarine into one of those 3 oceans, despite spending all of that money. We will only monitor Canadian east/west coast Arctic access from Canada/Alaska vicinity (and ignore any Russian access from the other side of the pole which is, frankly, viable). We will ONLY go for 2 ocean operations for the subs, despite using the 3 ocean argument to justify the expenditure.

Well - $80 billion to $100 billion is a lot of money, to then turn around and, only now, claim: "the 3rd ocean is not allowed for our new submarines. It was only a selling point". ???

Again, my view? I think that question should be asked, assessed, and debated, much like we are doing now.

I think the RCN is letting down the Canadian government and the Canadian tax payer, if the RCN does not take a hard look as to what would be involved to go beyond only monitoring the choke point entrances on the Canadian side of the Arctic.

My view is the RCN is letting down the Canadian government and the Canadian tax payer if the RCN does not consider an Arctic base, such as a mobile Arctic base ship (or even a new design of an Arctic (polar class) capable supply ship that can replenish submarine's reactants in the Arctic).

My view? Study the risks of the stowage requirements. Study the risks of the in-situ (on site) reactant generation, and study the difficulty/feasibility/risk of Arctic AIP replenishment. If possible, even dream up some smaller scale tests to assess viability.

To reject out of hand because it is clearly seen as difficult? Again, my (probably isolated) view, is if we right now, reject such, we are letting down the Canadian taxpayer in terms of them not getting full money for their expenditure for the submarines, and we are not adequately doing the appropriate job to assess what is viable, and what is not viable, without first looking into such in depth.

So - for the 3rd time, I think it is important that the viability of Arctic AIP replenishment question is asked, assessed, and debated, much like we are doing now.
You have now repeated three times that the question should be studied, assessed and debated. Fine. Nobody is arguing that the RCN should refuse to examine future options. What is being challenged is the leap from “perhaps worth studying” to “the RCN is letting down the taxpayer unless it pursues my preferred mobile Arctic AIP filling station.”

And let us stop rewriting the history of Nanisivik. The possible refuelling and support of submarines was always part of the broader potential value of an Arctic naval facility. Nanisivik did not fail because Arctic submarine support was never considered, nor because fixed Arctic support is inherently impossible. It failed because Canada chose a poor location, inherited a bad jetty and then developed the site with almost no long-term vision. Throw in some Covid-19 and there you have it. The original concept was steadily reduced until what remained was little more than a seasonal fuel stop with severe limitations. That is not proof that an Arctic base cannot work. It is proof that a badly located, badly scoped facility built around an inadequate jetty will predictably deliver an inadequate result.

Nor does one former Commander RCN mentioning a mobile support concept magically turn it into an endorsed capability plan. I will let you in on a little secret: senior officers say a lot of things. Some become projects. Some become studies. Some disappear the moment the PowerPoint presentation ends. Everything I have heard suggests an Arctic mobile base ship has not progressed anywhere close to an actual funded program.

You also keep treating “three oceans” as though it means every Canadian submarine must be capable of spending weeks prowling beneath the central Arctic ice pack. It does not. Canada can defend its Arctic approaches, monitor choke points, collect intelligence, support NORAD and NATO operations and operate in seasonally accessible Arctic waters without pretending a conventional submarine is an SSN.

The Arctic Ocean is not a bathtub with only one entrance. Russian submarines crossing under the pole do not suddenly appear unobserved in Hudson Bay. They still have to pass through geographically constrained approaches, which can be monitored by submarines, aircraft, satellites, seabed sensors, surface ships and allied assets. That is called layered surveillance. It is somewhat more sophisticated than parking a hydrogen and oxygen factory on an ice capable barge and hoping for the best.

St. John’s is not necessarily the only option either. Depending on the mission, submarines could operate from or receive support through Halifax, Nuuk, Iqaluit or allied facilities. A future support arrangement in Greenland may make considerably more sense than designing an enormously expensive Canadian mobile base solely to refill AIP reactants during an under ice patrol that may rarely, if ever, be required.

There is also nothing preventing Canada from eventually revisiting the fixed base concept at a better location, with a proper harbour, a suitable jetty, aviation access, storage, maintenance capacity and an actual strategic plan. The lesson from Nanisivik should not be “fixed bases do not work.” The lesson should be “do not build another half-measure in the wrong place and then act surprised when it underperforms.”

How do you know none of those options are already being examined simply because they have not been announced publicly?

The phrase “game changer” is also doing a heroic amount of work here. Replenishing cryogenic oxygen and hydrogen related reactants at sea, in Arctic conditions, alongside a submarine, from a mobile support vessel, would introduce major safety, engineering, certification, training, storage and environmental challenges. The support ship itself would require protection, aviation support, specialized personnel and likely its own escort. At some point the “solution” becomes more complicated and expensive than the operational problem it supposedly solves.

And no, spending tens of billions over the full life of a submarine fleet does not mean every theoretical mission must be supported, regardless of cost. By that logic, unless the submarines can operate under the North Pole, launch satellites, conduct mine clearance and deliver Amazon parcels to Resolute, the taxpayer has somehow been cheated.

Canada needs to manage expectations. Even after the new submarines arrive, it will probably be years before the RCN cautiously expands operations farther into the Arctic, develops procedures, proves equipment and builds crews with the required experience. Nobody sensible is going to take a newly delivered conventional submarine and immediately send it deep beneath the ice simply because a procurement press release mentioned three oceans.

Study it? Certainly. Model it? Absolutely. Conduct limited trials if the engineering case supports them? Perhaps.

Reconsider a properly located and properly designed Arctic support facility? That would make considerably more sense than repeating the mistakes made at Nanisivik. But declaring that the RCN is “letting down the taxpayer” because it has not yet committed billions to an undeveloped, hazardous and possibly unnecessary mobile AIP replenishment concept is not holding the Navy accountable.

It is demanding that the Navy validate your solution before the operational requirement has even been proven.
 
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