• Thanks for stopping by. Logging in to a registered account will remove all generic ads. Please reach out with any questions or concerns.

Future Armour

Should have shot the knife weilder
raiders-of-the-lost-ark-indiana-jones.gif
 
Because a heavier one can do stuff like Mine plowing, assault breaching, defensive earthworks.

Like just about anything, there is an advantage in having light, medium and heavy options to suit the circumstances. You may only need 100 of the heavies versus 10,000 of the lights, but unless you can couple a number of light systems into a single unit to be able to complete the heavy function - well, you need what you need. The task defines the tool.

๐Ÿป


Cat D9 weighs 50 tonnes.

Lots of momentum there.

Getting rid of the onboard operator is an easy start. Adding armour to protect it's vitals contributes to its primary role and doesn't detract.

...

Thought experiment

5 CC-177s
17 CC-130s
9 CC-330s (too bad some of the fleet is not being supplied with the 330-200F main deck cargo door gut still)

4x D9 UGVs in the CC-177s
16x Roshel Senators and 32x ISVs in the CC-130s
A Light Infantry Battle Group of 600-800 troops with personal kit in the CC-330s

How many pallets of Loitering Munitions, $3000 UAVs and $30,000 UGVs could also be transported?
What weapons could be mounted on the D9s, Senators, ISVs and UGVs?

What type of assault could such a force generate in one lift?
What could be generated with a week long lift?
Do the guns and MRLs have to come in the CC-177s or can adequate support be generated in CC-130 compatible vehicles like CESARs and HIMARS?

The CC-330s can bring pallets of ammunition and UxVs.
 

Cat D9 weighs 50 tonnes.

Lots of momentum there.

Getting rid of the onboard operator is an easy start. Adding armour to protect it's vitals contributes to its primary role and doesn't detract.
It is slow - they sink rather unpleasantly in soupy mixes as the ground pressure is a lot higher than Tracked Military Vehicles.

...

Thought experiment

5 CC-177s
17 CC-130s
9 CC-330s (too bad some of the fleet is not being supplied with the 330-200F main deck cargo door gut still)

4x D9 UGVs in the CC-177s
16x Roshel Senators and 32x ISVs in the CC-130s
A Light Infantry Battle Group of 600-800 troops with personal kit in the CC-330s

How many pallets of Loitering Munitions, $3000 UAVs and $30,000 UGVs could also be transported?
What weapons could be mounted on the D9s, Senators, ISVs and UGVs?

What type of assault could such a force generate in one lift?
What could be generated with a week long lift?
Do the guns and MRLs have to come in the CC-177s or can adequate support be generated in CC-130 compatible vehicles like CESARs and HIMARS?

The CC-330s can bring pallets of ammunition and UxVs.
The issue is more what scenario does this help with?
 
It is slow - they sink rather unpleasantly in soupy mixes as the ground pressure is a lot higher than Tracked Military Vehicles.


The issue is more what scenario does this help with?

Nope.

The issue is how many scenarios could be managed within that envelope?

We know the resouces and constraints. We don't know the full scope of scenarios. We can generate scenarios faster than we can generate resources.
 
Nope.

The issue is how many scenarios could be managed within that envelope?
Not many


Generally when looking at creating a force you look at the possible mission, threats etc - and then build the force


I would not consider the autonomous D-9 to be much value for anyone but Ukraine or Israel -- someone in a fairly fixed situation needing to advance or create defensive works in a localized area.

The LIB ability depends on itโ€™s construct, I havenโ€™t seen a recent CA LIB TO&E -


Pretty much you have a force than can occupy an airfield - and fortify it - and conduct some limited penetrations in a semi-non permissive environment.

As for the odds and sods you assigned it -- pretty much nothing outside of a very limited area - as there is nothing to coordinate them or link them to anything. They will be more of a target to enemy Air, UAS, and RAM than anything else.


There is a reason why the Bde is viewed a the minimum viable deployment entity.





We know the resouces and constraints. We don't know the full scope of scenarios. We can generate scenarios faster than we can generate resources.
You need to do threat and risk assessments -- that allows you to focus towards the most Likely, and the Most Dangerous Threats.
 
Not many


Generally when looking at creating a force you look at the possible mission, threats etc - and then build the force


I would not consider the autonomous D-9 to be much value for anyone but Ukraine or Israel -- someone in a fairly fixed situation needing to advance or create defensive works in a localized area.

The LIB ability depends on itโ€™s construct, I havenโ€™t seen a recent CA LIB TO&E -


Pretty much you have a force than can occupy an airfield - and fortify it - and conduct some limited penetrations in a semi-non permissive environment.

As for the odds and sods you assigned it -- pretty much nothing outside of a very limited area - as there is nothing to coordinate them or link them to anything. They will be more of a target to enemy Air, UAS, and RAM than anything else.


There is a reason why the Bde is viewed a the minimum viable deployment entity.






You need to do threat and risk assessments -- that allows you to focus towards the most Likely, and the Most Dangerous Threats.


But...

The missions turn up faster than you develop new forces.

All force development starts with another Rumsfeldian observation. You fight with the army you have, not the one you want.

Therefore, in my opinion, the more cogent question is what can you do today with what you have? And if there are limitations then that is good to know.

...

With respect to the specific set of constraints proposed I disagree with you (as usual ๐Ÿ˜) on the "not much".

I think that, despite the current fascination with Large Scale Conventional Operations - which have demonstrated that they are hard to deploy, expensive to maintain and are challenged to live up to the last 50 years of expectations - that smaller forces of the scale suggested have proven to be more frequently employed over wider areas at lower costs with ever increasing capabilities.
 
But...

The missions turn up faster than you develop new forces.

All force development starts with another Rumsfeldian observation. You fight with the army you have, not the one you want.

Therefore, in my opinion, the more cogent question is what can you do today with what you have? And if there are limitations then that is good to know.

...

With respect to the specific set of constraints proposed I disagree with you (as usual ๐Ÿ˜) on the "not much".

I think that, despite the current fascination with Large Scale Conventional Operations - which have demonstrated that they are hard to deploy, expensive to maintain and are challenged to live up to the last 50 years of expectations - that smaller forces of the scale suggested have proven to be more frequently employed over wider areas at lower costs with ever increasing capabilities.
Believe me, SOF and Light Forces are near and dear to my heart.
I refer to use them early before conflict if possible.

LSCO: Large Scale Combat Operations. The C is for Combat not Conventional.

After Somalia, very few countries are in the intervention mood unless it is to deter an enemy or rival. Afghanistan came out of 9/11 and that and Iraq dried out a lot of interest in ground interventions.

So what scenario do you see the CAF needing that force?

Quite honestly is the CA did an honest assessment of itโ€™s equipment needs there would be a large scale LAV divestiture.
 
Believe me, SOF and Light Forces are near and dear to my heart.
I refer to use them early before conflict if possible.

LSCO: Large Scale Combat Operations. The C is for Combat not Conventional.

After Somalia, very few countries are in the intervention mood unless it is to deter an enemy or rival. Afghanistan came out of 9/11 and that and Iraq dried out a lot of interest in ground interventions.

So what scenario do you see the CAF needing that force?

Quite honestly is the CA did an honest assessment of itโ€™s equipment needs there would be a large scale LAV divestiture.

I agree with you on the LAVs. To be honest I would sooner see the baseline vehicle in Canada be a 12 seat 4x4 van with seats facing each other protected against the most common environmental threats to which Canadian troops are exposed - cold, heat, snow, rain, ice, bugs and rocks - and capable of travelling long distances with minimal logistics support.
 
I would not consider the autonomous D-9 to be much value for anyone but Ukraine or Israel -- someone in a fairly fixed situation needing to advance or create defensive works in a localized area.
Or say a Canadian-led Multi-National Brigade in Latvia that has to defend a territory that is roughly 200km from the border to the sea?
 
Or say a Canadian-led Multi-National Brigade in Latvia that has to defend a territory that is roughly 200km from the border to the sea?
No, a normal D-9 would be fine for defensive prep if a true dozer was needed, but for anything else it is just awkward and heavy.
 
Back
Top