Infantry of Tomorrow

[KevinB]

NetWar -- Ever wonder why the Chinese have devoted tonnes of resources to jamming, cracking, spoofing etc our electronics???

Land Warrior is a disaster -- interesting concept just not ready for prime time.

I like the 4x Brick as the basic element, its flexible.
  MTOE's are exactly that Modified Table of Equipement and Organization, however for logistical and admin puposes you need something hard.
  Vehicle size does play a part in your orbat - at least until one dismounts it.  The dismounted element needs to have the capability to be a semi-homogenious entity thought as they may have to fight together, without the benifit of others.

TV - if you give the Pl Ldr/Cdr a 'driver' you get a 4x Pl HQ det, which can also double as the WO's bitch/Signaller - as yes despite the superiority of the NCO corps the PL WO sometimes needs assistance - either with the CCP, or from counselling the Pl Comd with his helmet...
  Or stick the PL SharpShooter (heaven forbid I call it a DM  :) in there, as the Weapons Section/Det has enough to do without dealing with point target elimination.


 

 

[daftandbarmy]

NetWar -- Ever wonder why the Chinese have devoted tonnes of resources to jamming, cracking, spoofing etc our electronics???

Land Warrior is a disaster -- interesting concept just not ready for prime time.

I like the 4x Brick as the basic element, its flexible.
  MTOE's are exactly that Modified Table of Equipement and Organization, however for logistical and admin puposes you need something hard.
  Vehicle size does play a part in your orbat - at least until one dismounts it.  The dismounted element needs to have the capability to be a semi-homogenious entity thought as they may have to fight together, without the benifit of others.

TV - if you give the Pl Ldr/Cdr a 'driver' you get a 4x Pl HQ det, which can also double as the WO's *****/Signaller - as yes despite the superiority of the NCO corps the PL WO sometimes needs assistance - either with the CCP, or from counselling the Pl Comd with his helmet...
  Or stick the PL SharpShooter (heaven forbid I call it a DM  :) in there, as the Weapons Section/Det has enough to do without dealing with point target elimination.

Agree. The brick (4 pax) and multiple (multiple bricks - from two to four - ucomd on the Pl Comd/Pl 2ic) is a very solid and flexible org. The British have used it for decades.

 

[vonGarvin]

TV - if you give the Pl Ldr/Cdr a 'driver' you get a 4x Pl HQ det, which can also double as the WO's bitch/Signaller - as yes despite the superiority of the NCO corps the PL WO sometimes needs assistance - either with the CCP, or from counselling the Pl Comd with his helmet...
  Or stick the PL SharpShooter (heaven forbid I call it a DM  :) in there, as the Weapons Section/Det has enough to do without dealing with point target elimination.

Both good points, especially about the counselling of the Pl Comd.  ;D

 

[grandin105]

Really? What was Fallujah? Cheers.

Fallujah was FIBUA/ UO/ whatever you want to call it.

Also, it was reduced to rubble 3 times by the USMC.

The poster means a prepared position as in trenches in a field with KZs overlooking forests and a lower area, or a reverse slope position.

Nice try at being witty though buds

 

[Jarnhamar]

Fallujah was FIBUA/ UO/ whatever you want to call it.

Also, it was reduced to rubble 3 times by the USMC.

The poster means a prepared position as in trenches in a field with KZs overlooking forests and a lower area, or a reverse slope position.

Nice try at being witty though buds

The irony is that you're replying to a 8 year old post.  Way to be clever, buds 

 

[Timberwolf]

Fallujah was FIBUA/ UO/ whatever you want to call it.

Also, it was reduced to rubble 3 times by the USMC.

The poster means a prepared position as in trenches in a field with KZs overlooking forests and a lower area, or a reverse slope position.

Nice try at being witty though buds

:facepalm:

The irony is that you're replying to a 8 year old post.  Way to be clever, buds 

:bowing:

 

[Loachman]

And on top of that, you've been in the CF for exactly how long, "buds"? Judging by your only other post, not very long, and possibly not even in at all yet.

As one who knows pbi, and something of what he's done and where, I find your post highly amusing - and not in any way that you may have intended it.

Excellent way to make an impression on your first day here...

 

[daftandbarmy]

As I was once reminded by a PPCLI Major I respect (one of the few  ;D): 'God is on the side of the biggest sections"

Firepower Capabilities of the Section. Firepower increases have also affected the infantry section.

Increases in firepower capabilities have readily been offered as an offset to the shrinking section.
From the combination of Bren Gun and Lee-Enfield, or even the C1 and C2, to the C7, C9 and M203,
excluding the support weapon of an armoured personnel carrier or infantry fighting vehicle, the modern
eight-personnel infantry section dismounting from its section vehicle can produce a significantly greater
amount of firepower than its predecessors. This does come with an attendant cost in the individual
soldier’s load to bring the ammunition to the fight that supports this firepower argument.

http://www.army.forces.gc.ca/caj/documents/vol_13/iss_3/caj_vol13.3_06_e.pdf

I'm a fan of a section 13 strong: Section Commander plus 12.

Operating in a mech environment? Give me 2 x vehicles per section please. :nod:

 

[Kirkhill]

As I was once reminded by a PPCLI Major I respect (one of the few  ;D): 'God is on the side of the biggest sections"

Firepower Capabilities of the Section. Firepower increases have also affected the infantry section.

Increases in firepower capabilities have readily been offered as an offset to the shrinking section.
From the combination of Bren Gun and Lee-Enfield, or even the C1 and C2, to the C7, C9 and M203,
excluding the support weapon of an armoured personnel carrier or infantry fighting vehicle, the modern
eight-personnel infantry section dismounting from its section vehicle can produce a significantly greater
amount of firepower than its predecessors. This does come with an attendant cost in the individual
soldier’s load to bring the ammunition to the fight that supports this firepower argument.

http://www.army.forces.gc.ca/caj/documents/vol_13/iss_3/caj_vol13.3_06_e.pdf

I'm a fan of a section 13 strong: Section Commander plus 12.

Operating in a mech environment? Give me 2 x vehicles per section please. :nod:

Why is that different in capability than a 2 car patrol operating with 2x 6PY sections?

Some jobs don't require the dismounts in the same numbers that others do.  (Route Patrols - Convoy Escort - Recce  versus  Assault)

Other jobs don't require the vehicles (Airborne - Heliborne - Shipborne - Static) or the vehicles need to be swapped out for something more appropriate to the situation (Arctic - Muskeg - Swamp - Forest - Jungle)

Do you build tiny but perfectly formed teams for every situation and hope the unexpected doesn't come your way (I'm hearing echoes of some chap saying "he who defends everything holds nothing") or do you build good solid Lego blocks that can be put together in any construct your heart desires?

Absolutely any construct created will have to be tested and validated before it is fielded.  It would be necessary to have your affiliations worked out long in advance - just like the gunners and the engineers used to have with both the infantry and the armour.

But I continue to believe that in a tiny but perfect army, heavily Regimented, that we (the taxpayers) can't afford to have two Corps struggling with each other in violent agreement.  Both Corps see the need for the Combined Arms approach but neither wants to Combine Arms with the other.  Both want to do the same job with the same tools in exactly the same way.

If that is, indeed, the right solution then fall back on Infanteer's suggestion of a single Manoeuvre Corps.  The regiments can keep their berets and badges but they would have one common organizing and training principle.  In which case they would become extremely proficient in one type of warfare - just as 4 CMBG was.

However, I believe ( as if anybody cared  ;D), that forcing the elements of the force to stick to their knitting at the Section-Platoon level and conducting affiliation exercises with the other elements would not only keep the forces out of a rut, it would also make them much more cognizant of each others capabilities and thus make them capable of managing a much broader array of threats and taskings. 

In the words of an old buddy of mine: Maxflex.

If a 6-PY section is too small - send two.  You've got enough Corporals.  It's Privates that seem to be in short supply.  >

 

[ArmyRick]

I would be careful about having two vehicles per section
Disadvantages
-Puts an infantry platoon at 8 vehicles (Command and control is more difficult)
-Increases loads on the A1 and A2 echelon (More fuel, spare parts)
-Increases time to on DP
-Need more space for harbours
-Can be spread too far apart
-Congestion on an objective trying to squeeze twice as many vehicles per platoon
-You may spread your forces too thin

Advantages
-Allows larger sections
-Improved protection in IED or mine strike (lose half section instead of a full one)
-Situational awareness, you will cover more ground
-Greater ability for independent section missions

Overall, I don't see 2 vehicles per section as that great idea except maybe force protection companies.

Kirkhill, what two corps are competing for same jobs? Armour defeats enemy through use of battlefield mobility and aggressive firepower and infantry closes with and destroys the enemy.
Armour = Speed and shock
Infantry = Close fight

Its better to keep corps with their respective regiments and then tasks organize for a mission. As we do currently with Battle Groups and Combat Teams.

 

[daftandbarmy]

We need to have a realistic look at battle casualty figures for the infantry when we decide how to organize and staff our units to prepare for high intensity conflicts.

Here's some interesting (and scary) numbers organized as follows:

Div # - # of casualties - % casualties

Mansoor, p. 252 Table 11.1 - Total Battle and Nonbattle Casualties, US Infantry Divisions 1944-45

4th 35545 252%
9th 33864 240
1st 29630 206
29th 28776 202
3rd 28400 202
90th 27617 196
45th 26449 188
36th 26157 186
30th 26038 185
2nd 25884 184
35th 25488 181
80th 25472 181
28th 24840 176
83rd 23980 170
5th 23487 167
79th 23457 167
8th 21056 149
26th 16851 120
44th 13748 98
104th 13407 95
78th 12257 87
100th 12215 87
99th 11987 85
87th 11587 82
94th 10810 77
106th 10671 76
95th 10204 72
84th 9811 70
103rd 9369 67
102nd 8825 63
70th 8201 58
63rd 8019 57
75th 8016 57
42nd 5949 42
76th 5556 39
69th 3347 24
65th 2302 16
89th 2080 15
66th 1947 14
71st 1869 13
97th 1318 9
86th 1282 9

Source: Order of Battle, United States Army in World War II: ETO (Office of the Theater Historian, December, 1945)


Table 8.1 9th ID Casualties 1 July-31Oct44

1690 KIA 8573 WIA 1241 Exhaustion 5155 Nonbattle = 16659 Total

http://208.84.116.223/forums/index.php?showtopic=10023

 

[Infanteer]

Kirkhill, what two corps are competing for same jobs? Armour defeats enemy through use of battlefield mobility and aggressive firepower and infantry closes with and destroys the enemy.
Armour = Speed and shock
Infantry = Close fight

I always found attempts to explain it this way unconvincing.  Infantry can use speed and shock (ever hear of Stonewall Jackson?) while tanks excel in close fights as well (Fallujah).  Infantry uses battlefield mobility and aggressive firepower to win battles and tanks will close with and destroy the enemy (I've seen it first hand).

 

[Haligonian]

There's a discussion on here (maybe its the maneuver corps one I can't remember) that found an old WW2 Canadian Pam and it identifies the role of both corps as to close with and destroy the enemy.  I like this as the more I think I about it I see the armored and infantry corps as being able to generally accomplish the same things.  As infanteer said the infantry can use speed and shock and we all know tanks not only fight close but assault the enemy as well, hence why they roll right on to the obj during cbt tm attacks.  From this perspective, there are few jobs or actions that are exclusive to one corps or the other.  One corps is better at certain jobs than the other but the other could do it if it had to.

So I would say they do in fact do the same job but they do it with different strengths and weaknesses or in different methods, which allows each to complement the other and still lends itself to two distinct corps or career paths (at least among non-commissioned members).

 

[a_majoor]

The casualty tables do not tell us we need bigger sections, it tells us we need more sections of trained soldiers to rapidly make up the fighting strength. This is the real reason (in my mind) that we should have four rifle companies per battalion, the fourth company in peacetime is where you place people on courses, recovering from injuries etc, while in wartime it is the LOOB (Left Out OF Battle) company.

I agree with Infanteer (no real surprise there), and see a convergence between armour and infantry into combined arms units as technologies converge. The Merkava 1 could serve as a thought experiment; divested of the rear ammunition racks it holds a section, and the vehicle commander has a 105mm canon, multiple machine guns and an on board 60mm mortar to provide intimate fire power to the dismounted troops. One platoon in the combat support company equipped with Merkavas mounting the extra ammunition racks provide the mobility and fire power for the battalion as a whole, and a heavily modified turret could house a 105mm howitzer with a high angle mount to provide a protected indirect firepower platoon, and an engineering variant with a 'dozer blade and cannon to fire breaching charges for the pioneer platoon. In terms of long range firepower, we may not even need specialized versions of tanks, there are various types of smart rounds and through tube missiles that would allow the Merkava 1 to engage targets up to 13 km away, so simply assigning a platoon to the task and loading them out with the appropriate ammunition might be sufficient.

I have essentially replicated a 1980's era mechanized Infantry battalion using the Merkava 1 as the primary fighting vehicle, but we could actually perform versions of this using a wide variety of existing vehicles (even the LAV chassis), accepting various limitations in mobility, firepower or protection depending on doctrine, risk analysis and financial concerns. The ORBAT isn't written in stone either, but I do think that we pretty much had it right in the mid 80's in terms of flexibility and adaptability.

Ultimately, I suspect the biggest change to the dismounted infantry is there will either be specialized support troops and units (like the Canadian Machine Gun Battalions of WWI) to deal with specialized and bulky support weapons (like the C-16), or what we now think of as support weapons might evolve to the size that individual infantry soldiers can use them effectively (think of evolved LSAT machine guns or the next generation of the XM-25)

 

[Jarnhamar]

The casualty tables do not tell us we need bigger sections, it tells us we need more sections of trained soldiers to rapidly make up the fighting strength. This is the real reason (in my mind) that we should have four rifle companies per battalion, the fourth company in peacetime is where you place people on courses, recovering from injuries etc, while in wartime it is the LOOB (Left Out OF Battle) company.

I like the idea of 10 or 12 man sections.  The biggest restraint I see is manning issues (at least in the light infantry) where we might field a 5 or 6 man section on average. 
We have some NCOs with some very serious experience and I believe that experience can be capitalized on better if they have more soldiers under them to employ directly.  With 12 soldiers a section commander would have a lot of firepower on hand not to mention he or she could amalgamate a weapons platform right into his section.  A C16 for example could be assigned to a 4 man team which the remainder could act as security or as a maneuver element.  Even a 10 man section could be broken down to 5+5 or 6+4 pers weapons crew.

If it takes 2 vehicles to move a section around than use two vehicles. It's added firepower, added protection added mobility. Of course at the cost of 2 the chance of breaking down, twice as much fuel etc.. (I also don't have very much exposure to mech infantry)



I disagree with the idea of a 4th company being for members on courses and members who are injured waiting to get better. Some courses are planned far in advance but some pop up as fast balls. Soldiers are constantly going on course and getting off as well as getting injured and 'coming back'. Some are a few days, some weeks and some months.  Putting them back and forth between two companies would be a huge hassle with too much paper trail.  Something as simple as memos would be a huge admin circus.  Next would be PDRs and PERs and the orbat would constantly be in flux IMO.

 

[Infanteer]

The average span of control for a leader is 3-5 - section commanders are the only guys (aside from CMBG commanders, but I argue those are too big) who have more.  The Marines get around this by having a squad leader not command the 13 guys, but rather 3 fire team leaders.  Yes, there is a section 2IC, but he doesn't really do much and the section is an 8 man tactical entity.

Instead of larger sections, maybe we need more, smaller platoons with more leadership with smaller sections.

 

[a_majoor]

ObedientiaZelum,

I have to disagree, large bulky units are not as versatile as small units. We can go way back in history, but the Spanish Tercios are a good jumping off point. Massive "regiments" of up to 3000 men fully manned, they provided a great combination of firepower and protection (combining arquebusiers and pikes in essentially a giant square), but were superceded because they were too bulky, inflexible and tactically immobile, compared to the various formations that evolved against them.

Similarly, giant sections would have some of the same limitations, while also being difficult to command (as Infanteer pointed out). Think more on the British model with 4 man "Bricks" which can be combined in various combinations as "multiples" depending on the task, rather than the USMC 13 man squad. The Canadian eight man section falls comfortably in the middle, and can be split into two "bricks" if needed (the two assault groups, one led by the Sergeant and one led by the MCpl).

Infanteer, I am actually not as clear on your idea of "more, smaller platoons". Are you suggesting that we strip out the weapons dets and focusing the platoons on the manoeuvre elements (dismounted sections), or just smaller platoons with two sections and a weapons det? OR am I missing something entirely?

 

[Jarnhamar]

Good points. I guess I'm too enamored with the idea of more firepower and more bayonets.  I'm going to look into the Marine 13 man squads and see if I can get any feedback about it from their POV.  I've done a section and platoon live fire with a larger section and didn't have too many issues with command and control but of course it wasn't a two way range or even a very stressful environment.  Sections are commanded by Sgt's but I find on ex more often than not garrison orbats get chopped up and a Mcpl is leading a section with a Mod6 cpl being the 2IC. Not sure getting more leadership into a section would work.

 

[Sythen]

I don't know how relevant this will be, but here is my anecdote. Overseas, each section had 11 guys (8 GIBs and 3 vehicle crew) but the COP we were in, you couldn't drive to. Every patrol would then have 8-10 Infantryman (1-3 on HLTA, tasked with IRF, etc) 2-4 Engineers, 2 Psy Ops, 1 CIMIC (sp? The guys who gave the LN's money when we knocked down their walls) The Pl Comd or WO and the signaller, sometimes 2 guys from weapons det, the sniffer dog, his handler, the medic, 6 ANA, 2 AUP and sometimes a journalist/camera guy. Then sometimes the CO would come visit so we'd have his group of 11-12 guys with us..

There were supposed section level patrols with over 30 people in them. This wasn't a rarity. That is a huge amount of people to go out on an IED hunt or to talk to the local imam. You can't move unnoticed with that many people. I do realize they pretty much always knew when we'd leave the COP, but the few times we only had like 12 soldiers in the patrol we could get in to places or to places quickly without them knowing exactly where we were, which forced them to be more overt with their surveilance of us. This is turn let us know exactly who was a spotter so when they passed through our cordones we could give them an extra search and break out the CSI kit (forget what it was called, the thing where you test for bomb residue or whatever) or question them which wasn't realistic to do with every single person that passed through.

Just my long winded anecdote on how quickly a patrols numbers can balloon.

 

[GR66]

...This is the real reason (in my mind) that we should have four rifle companies per battalion, the fourth company in peacetime is where you place people on courses, recovering from injuries etc, while in wartime it is the LOOB (Left Out OF Battle) company.

In the "Role of the Militia" thread I suggested that this 4th Company could be a Reserve Company.