Infantry of Tomorrow

[Kirkhill]

I like the idea of four rifle companies but would four smaller functional companies be more or less useful than three larger ones?

In peacetime's conflicts, as I seem to keep repeating, there is no imperative to do more than you want to. 

Four rifle companies (at 6 PY sections) means:

3 companies on static defence and one affiliated with a 16 car element from the RCAC or the Infantry

OR

3 companies affiliated with  RCAC or Infantry 16 car elements and one affiliated with a CH-146/CH-147 (or even CH-148) element

OR

3 companies in the field and one as QRF 

OR

3 companies on operations and one on HLTA or at least at reduced levels.

When or if it is necessary/desired to bulk up the companies bring in individual augmentation from the reserves (2/section) to bring the sections up to 8 PY sections.

 

[daftandbarmy]

ObedientiaZelum,

I have to disagree, large bulky units are not as versatile as small units. We can go way back in history, but the Spanish Tercios are a good jumping off point. Massive "regiments" of up to 3000 men fully manned, they provided a great combination of firepower and protection (combining arquebusiers and pikes in essentially a giant square), but were superceded because they were too bulky, inflexible and tactically immobile, compared to the various formations that evolved against them.

Similarly, giant sections would have some of the same limitations, while also being difficult to command (as Infanteer pointed out). Think more on the British model with 4 man "Bricks" which can be combined in various combinations as "multiples" depending on the task, rather than the USMC 13 man squad. The Canadian eight man section falls comfortably in the middle, and can be split into two "bricks" if needed (the two assault groups, one led by the Sergeant and one led by the MCpl).

Infanteer, I am actually not as clear on your idea of "more, smaller platoons". Are you suggesting that we strip out the weapons dets and focusing the platoons on the manoeuvre elements (dismounted sections), or just smaller platoons with two sections and a weapons det? OR am I missing something entirely?

That worked well for us in NI.

In 'the cuds, we usually operated in 3 x 4 man teams, The Multiple commander led a brick, as did the Multiple 2IC. It worked well.

In the city, we had Multiples with up to 5 x dismounted bricks and two bricks mounted in APVs. A total of 28. This also worked very well. The Multiples in less 'hard' areas were usually 3 to 4 bricks in size.

In each scenario there may be attachments, such as police or other specialists, who would usually travel with the 'Commander's Brick'.

 

[KevinB]

FYI The USMC is looking at permanently adopting an 11 man squad.

I still am a fan of 4 man bricks.  You can add to the cows come home, and its flexible.
  Of course I'm also the guy that thinks Armor should crew vehicles, in the same way I think Pilots should fly helicopter and planes...

 

[dimsum]

  Of course I'm also the guy that thinks Armor should crew vehicles, in the same way I think Pilots should fly helicopter and planes...

[tangent]

Pilots don't fly helicopters and planes in the US military?

[/tangent]

 

[KevinB]

Aviators, Potatoes...

I never said officers -- but a WO flying a helo is still a pilot. 

 

[Kirkhill]

It being Sunday and all.....

A-OL-309-003/PT-001 (CFP/PFC 309(3) – 1976

Chapter 3, Section 6, Verse 310

Organization

A rifle platoon is organized into a HQ and three sections as shown in Figure 3-3

Verse 311

Strength of a rifle platoon

1. The actual strength of a platoon MAY be less than the number of men authorized in the establishment and WILL vary according to the casualty rate and flow of reinforcements.  If there have been heavy casualties it may be necessary to amalgamate or otherwise reorganize some platoons and sections. One example of the reorganization of an understrength platoon would be the organization of a platoon of twenty into two sections of six and a third section comprising the platoon commander, second in command, communicator, two riflemen, and the weapons detachment.

Verse 312

Weapons and Equipment

1. In platoon HQ there is a medium anti-tank weapon, a general purpose machine-gun (GPMG), and a light mortar, but due to the number of men in the weapons detachment, the platoon commander must decide which weapons will be manned.  In each section, as well as rifles, there are two light automatic rifles (LARs).”

Emphasis added.

What were the “take-aways” when I was a youngster?

Together with the requirement that as a platoon commander I had to have two people in the platoon to take over 8 seconds into the Contact (Warrant and senior section leader) I came to the following understanding:

There will never be the number of people the politicians promised;
I am replaceable;
The weapons define the capabilities of the platoon;
The men man the weapons;
Despite what the book sez the Boss will tell me what weapons I need for the mission;
Exception to previous was the rare occasion when the platoon worked independently;
The key elements of a platoon were

        Maintain the ability to communicate
        Maintain the ability to observe
Maintain a solid base of fire
Maintain manoeuvre flexibility by ensuring you retain at least two elements to close and destroy.
        Don't let the platoon turn into a rabble by having too many independent elements swanning around out of control.


Beyond that the defining organizing principle was “nobody goes anywhere alone”.  Everybody buddied-up and if there was an odd number the individual joined up with a pair of buddies to form a three-some.

One of the interesting aspects of the instructions, as far as I’m concerned these days, is the implied “Arms Locker Concept”.  The instructions don’t say that the heavy weapons of the platoon are in the weapons det.  It says that the weapons are in platoon HQ.  Also it says that when reorganizing refilling the weapons det may have manning priority over topping up the sections (situation dependent).

Have things changed that much that you can take the politicians at their word and train as if you will always have your establishment numbers?
Or you can train for a specific set of scenarios?

Jus’ curious. 

 

[a_majoor]

Perhaps luckily for us, the question was asked and answered in the Great War of 1914-1918:

“In 1917 the British Army in France
was seriously considering reducing the size of the
machine gun companies to provide more troops
for the infantry battalions. Brutinel was asked to
express his views to a meeting of corps and
divisional commanders.

He [Brigadier Brutinel] said: ‘of course this proposal
is tantamount to loosing firepower of a great many
men so as to add men to do the fatigue work. What
would you think of a manufacturer who, being short of
hands to clean windows decided to stop his great
machines so as to relieve men for that purpose?
The policy of reducing machine guns would not
remedy the shortage of men in infantry brigades,
but would undoubtedly lower their firepower.
Instead the number of machine guns should be
increased proportionately to maintain, improve, their firepower.’

The Rise, Fall, & Rebirth of
The ‘Emma Gees’ (Part 2)
by Major K.A. Nette, PPCLI 
First published in the Infantry Journal, No 9 - Winter 1981


There are several possible ways to go with this.

If support weapons become large and relatively immobile, like the C-16 automatic grenade launcher, then perhaps specialist organizations will have to be re introduced in order to provide for the manning, mobility and serviceing of the weapons.

If support weapons have "all aspect" capabilities and are able to attack different sorts of targets, then the size of the weapons det needs to be increased to allow for sufficient weapons and reloads to be carried. Some possible examples include the "Starstreak" MANPADS; it is a supersonic laser beam rider with a range of 6000m and a flight time of @ 5 seconds to target. It is obviously designed to provide protection against aircraft, helicopters and UAV's, but the round impacts with the kinetic energy of a 40mm shell and it has utility vs light armour and improvised bunkers, snipers firing from windows atc. Other examples could be the Javalin fire and forget anti tank missile used by the United States (prime purpose is anti armour, but it has the ability to destroy even heavy bunkers and limited utility against helicopters) or FOG-M weapons like the Gill/Spike, which uses a man in the loop to do the same thing.

If effective support weapons can be shrunk down to true "man portable" size (think of the GPMG as the desired size and form factor and the XM-25 as a "proof of principle"), then shifting people around to man these weapons (say replacing the C-9's in a section with a single "support weapon").

In any of the cases, it seems to me that the manning and priorities of training and logistics should be towards the support weapons. Even in COIN operations, we can (and should) be getting the manpower from the local forces, and using our superior firepower and targeting to provide support.

 

[Haligonian]

I'm training with the Marines right now and how they organize their coy's along with us acquiring the C16 has got me thinking about going back to specialist organizations.  I don't think the infantry platoon is currently organized to properly employ this weapon, its just too damn big and I think we could maximize its effectiveness by having pers assigned to train and employ it exclusively.  I'd see it as a section organization with 3 guns that could be employed as a formed section or attached to platoons if necessary.  This would likely only work in light Bn's or when mech bn's are operating dismounted as the ass to seats ratio in the LAV wouldn't work.

I'd be open to putting the Machine Guns in a company machine gun section as well where a company could mass machine gun fires.  I think this would result in a higher level of machine gunnery as well with a focus on employing proper machine gun techniques.

 

[daftandbarmy]

I'm training with the Marines right now and how they organize their coy's along with us acquiring the C16 has got me thinking about going back to specialist organizations.  I don't think the infantry platoon is currently organized to properly employ this weapon, its just too damn big and I think we could maximize its effectiveness by having pers assigned to train and employ it exclusively.  I'd see it as a section organization with 3 guns that could be employed as a formed section or attached to platoons if necessary.  This would likely only work in light Bn's or when mech bn's are operating dismounted as the *** to seats ratio in the LAV wouldn't work.

I'd be open to putting the Machine Guns in a company machine gun section as well where a company could mass machine gun fires.  I think this would result in a higher level of machine gunnery as well with a focus on employing proper machine gun techniques.

What's the strength of a USMC Coy these days?

I recall working with vast organizations  of over 200 troops that included 5 platoons of one kind or another.

 

[Haligonian]

About 180 pers in the Coy.  3 x Rifle pl's with 3 x 13 man squads. 1 x wpns pl with a MG sect (6 x M240), Assault sect (6 x SMAW), and a mortar sect (3 x 60mm mortars).

All these can be attached to the pl's but they can also be massed at the coy level.  I really like this system.  It forces the commander to task organize and weight his main effort.  We could do this as well by stripping MG's from pl's and forming a coy wpns det or reallocate wpns to other platoons but (at least in my experience) we don't and we really aren't designed to do it.

 

[daftandbarmy]

About 180 pers in the Coy.  3 x Rifle pl's with 3 x 13 man squads. 1 x wpns pl with a MG sect (6 x M240), Assault sect (6 x SMAW), and a mortar sect (3 x 60mm mortars).

All these can be attached to the pl's but they can also be massed at the coy level.  I really like this system.  It forces the commander to task organize and weight his main effort.  We could do this as well by stripping MG's from pl's and forming a coy wpns det or reallocate wpns to other platoons but (at least in my experience) we don't and we really aren't designed to do it.

If I, as an OC, had those kind of resources you couldn't force me to do anything!

What kind of organic vehicles do they have these days?

 

[Haligonian]

Rifle Coy's essentially have none.  I believe they have one humvee for the Gunny to run supplies.  The BN *MAY* have enough trucks to motorize a company (but that isn't by T/O as I understand).  The Bn has sufficient humvees to combine the Anti Armor platoon and the hvy MG platoon and create Combined Anti Armor Team (CAAT).

The Regiment holds the majority of the trucks and has the Assault Amphibian Bn.  The Regt can task organize a Bn with either asset creating a motorized or mechanized Bn.  A coy of either asset is sufficient to provide the Bn with mobility.  It's a very interesting system.  You want to talk about general purpose infantry, I think these guys are a great example of that as they transition from dismounted, motorized, mechanized, heliborne/titorotor, and amphib ops.  The integration they achieve with avn assets is also impressive.

 

[ArmyRick]

I worked with US marines in the 90s. I found there orbat interesting and noted a similar approach with the rifle coy having like 1 humvee for the coy gunny to use. Their OC (Whatever term they used, can not remember) made them walk back from the field every ex. He even went so far as to order them off the trucks when they were mounted up to go back in.

When we did some of the amphibious stuff, they really knew their sh*t and had good kit, compared to the canadian approach at the time (assault boats and paddles or motors).

 

[daftandbarmy]

So, in your opinions, are the USMC the 'infantry of tomorrow'?

 

[Haligonian]

I think they present a potential example  for the near future/now.  I haven't read this whole thread in a couple years so I don't remember how we're defining "tomorrow" but with us acquiring wpns like the C16 I think we should take a look at specialist orgs within rifle coys and Bn's and take a look at whether it would be appropriate to put other wpns systems in these orgs at the same time.

Understanding what is in a Marine Bn and US Army Bn it makes you realize what we lost with the Cbt Sp Coy.  I haven't found another force in the world that had a pioneer platoon, and a reconnaissance and sniper platoon as separate entities (Marines has scout snipers, 4 tms per Bn). All of them mechanized.

 

[ArmyRick]

To answer the question, not really.

The USMC structure works for the US Marines. What do we need/want our structure to be? It is hard to say. If it is a LAV coy then you have limitations such as number of seats available in the company. When I was in gagetown in Feb ('13), the infantry school presented its concepts for a TAPV coy (still shaking my head, the van doos noted it was a "situate the estimate" meaning we bought vehicles and then figured how to make it work for the light inf bn).

When it comes to a light infantry coy, you have to decide what it is we need
Big or small (for example 180 man USMC vs 108 man Royal marines Coy)?
-Bigger log train to feed, water and arm those extra guys
-smaller can not afford to take as many casualties
-time and space, smaller moves quicker
-time and space again, larger occupies more ground (depending on support weapons avail)
-Larger needs more choppers, boats, hercs, etc to move

What is the mission expected?
-Does the battalion hold more resources available to coy?
-How far out will the coy operate independently?

It really comes down to what the Higher expects a coy to do and what is available in terms of resources? I mean 180 man coy may work but without extra recruiting does that mean we go to 2 x coy for a battalion (no depth?)

Thoughts? Ideas? COAs?

 

[Journeyman]

.....but with us acquiring wpns like the C16 I think we should take a look at specialist orgs ......

I guess one advantage of re-establishing Cbt Sp Coy just for the C16, is that some other org will see it, take it, and say "oh you don't need that capability; we'll always be there to provide that for you."  And then that canard is off our necks.  :nod:

 

[Haligonian]

I'm not proposing the adoption of USMC T/O completely and I'm not advocating 180 man coy.  I think we need to look at our coy level T/O in light of the adoption of the C16 and I think a C16 sect will likely be the best place for this wpn.  If we were to adopt that organization then I think it would make sense to look at where we're putting our other weapons as well. Whatever PY's are currently allocated to the manning of those wpns would go to the wpns sect/pl. I don't think a wpns platoon would be a bad idea, however, it could only be used in a light/dismounted environment as it would mess with LAV seating. 

 

[KevinB]

You'd need a C-16 Platoon -- thing is heavy 

The USMC is unique in of its own way -- however I do think the CF shares more in common with the USMC than other entities worldwide.


I prefer the heavy company approach as well. 

 

[daftandbarmy]

In his Notebooks (c.1735-c.1750), Voltaire wrote:

God is not on the side of the big battalions, but on the side of those who shoot best.


http://en.wikiquote.org/wiki/Voltaire