I would say the current regular Infantry and Armor trades can do that.
I am sure they can. How fast can you supply their replacements?
Those are the Maneuver units outside the sensor conflict.
What does that mean? That there will be no sensors where they will be manoeuvring? Or they are going to manoeuvre regardless?
Your missing shifts in warfare if you think those troops will be useful in a LSCO sensor battle.
LSCO. Sensor.
LSCO = Large Scale Conventional Operations if I understand correctly
How do you plan to scale up to the Large Scale?
I will stipulate, if you want me to, that the sensor battle is going to require more skills than your basic rifleman has. But I think you underestimate the value of lots and lots of riflemen. If only to guard the factories and warehouses of all those sensors and arms and ammunition and vehicles in you "lockers". And the LOCs and the bases and ports and maintenance areas. Not to mention to fill in the blanks when all those exquisitely trained professionals are no more.
Or are you addressing specifically the needs of your Reconnaissance Brigade?
Groups like they mean mass, and mass means a fires target inside the enemy sensor zone.
Major General John Frost 1982
"Much thought was given to the use of the support weapons for in every unit there are apt to be conflicting interests here. Individual companies often think that they want to have their own machine-gun, mortar and anti-tank weapons at their immediate behest, perhaps forgetting that there may be a price to pay in thus burdening themselves with a more heavily laden element which, if it is a part of the company, can limit the latter's speed across country just when that speed may be vital. The characteristics of the weapons are such that fire can be more effective when they are sited at a distance from those they are supporting. Moreover, it is often much easier to conceal an important fire unit if it is placed to the rear or the flank of a main infantry position. A particularly dangerous concept is the actual weapons should be kept together, concentrated, so as to produce a concentrated fire effect, but this "bunching" invites recognition from the enemy, running the risk of neutralization, if not destruction, of all a battalion's support weapons. However much the weapons are dispersed, when properly handled, and given good communications, they can produce support for any part of a battalion when it needs it most" 2 Para Falklands, The Battalion At War pp18-19.
John Frost, as a reminder, was the CO of the para battalion that got stuck at Arnhem bridge for 5 days with only the kit they could carry from their drop zone, all of the jeep mounted support that they had been promised not making it to them.
38 years later his battalion found itself in a similar predicament - no motor transport and only the kit they could carry on the their water-logged boots.
Given the lack of hills, trees and buildings on the Falklands it is hard to conceive of the Argentines having a much more transparent view of the battlefield even if they had UAVs.
Administrative grouping and operational dispersion with the CO dispersing dets and attaching them when and if.
Still doesn’t do anything for C-RAM which is the issue inside enemy sensor zones.
Here is my understanding of 2 Para's organization in the Falklands.
B Echelon under the QM on board their transport vessel - ship to shore by navy helos and LCMs
A Echelon ashore grouped with the MT Platoon sans vehicles acting as a Defence Platoon
Three rifle companies of three platoons of three sections - each section with 2x GPMGs, M72s and M79 Grenade guns. 1 CG84 per platoon. About 100 all ranks each company. During Goose Green the section GPMGs started to be grouped at platoon and company firebases to shoot the assault teams in from the flanks.
C company comprised Recce Platoon and Patrols Platoon as well as the Assault Pioneer Platoon. In the event C Company was used as often as a fourth rifle company as it was a dedicated Recce element. The Assault Pioneer Platoon was detached to the Support Company to act as Ammo bearers given the lack of Motor Transport. (MT Platoon, as noted being tasked to Defense and Duties). A number of snipers were available at Battalion HQ.
Support Company included an MG platoon with GPMG-SF, an Anti-Tank platoon with Milans, and a Mortar platoon of 6 x 81mm tubes of which only 2 tubes were available at Goose Green due to the lack of means to transport ammunition.
The Battalion was reinforced by a Recce Troop of Engineers who supplied EOD experts for the companies as well as a section of snipers to each of the four rifle/assault companies. Atts also included two MANPAD dets and a small battery of light guns (3x 105). Air, helo and naval gunfire support were promised but spotty.
Why this rehearsal of history?
1 there was a basic structure
2 the situation demanded the structure be revised to suit the situation - just as it had to be in 1944 at Arnhem and as it has ever been.
That battalion was broadly similar to the rifle battalion I expected to join in the Canadian Army
Sniper Section
Recce Platoon (light bobs in Napoleonic terms)
Patrols Platoon (grenadiers in similar terms - heavy weapons mounted on landrovers was their usual tool kit) - not found in Canada
Assault Pioneers (pioneers in Napoleonic and Roman terms)
MG Platoon - not found in Canada
AT Platoon - Brit Milans swapped for Canadian TOWs (TOWs are more of an Arty piece than the Milan - the Milan could with the assault elements to defeat bunkers)
Mor Platoon - 6 tubes for the Brits vs 8 for the Canadians
Three rifle companies instead of the 4 nominal in Canada (3 actual)
In three rifle companies we expected to find three platoons, each with three sections with a rifle group and a gun group. This conformed to what the Paras found to work in the open ground of the Falklands - the gun group suppressed the objective from a flank while the assault team(s) pepper potted forwards. The gun groups were also brigaded in the Falklands and put under one common OPI.
Which brings me to the 4 weapons dets we expected to find in each company, each with 5 personnel and the Obs Det equipped with radar and NODs. This effectively formed a fourth platoon in the Canadian company. Although the dets travelled separately, accompanying the rifle platoons and the Coy HQ, the five dets, 24 soldiers, together with their 4 CG-84s, their 4 60mm mortars and their 4 Browning MGs mounted on tripods with the C1A1 sight formed a Weapons Platoon employing the weapons locker concept that could be equipped and tasked by the OC according to the needs of the operation.
Those weapons det soldiers were the most proficient riflemen in the company. They learned their trade in the sections. They moved through the dets to the specialist platoons. Some moved on to recce and obs, other to AT, Mors and Pnrs, and others ended up in the Motor Transport platoon. And all of this was done under the watchful eyes of the RSM and the CO who knew what skills and aptitudes their soldiers had developed through OJT and which were promotable to fill acting spots.
New entries joined the sections as rifles.
The system was self-sustaining.
....
I suggest that the arms locker has its place but it can't be the answer in a Large Scale army where the majority of troops are recently engaged civilians.
I believe that the basic 1920-1990 vintage infantry battalion proved to be a useful construct that flexed adequately to accommodate different technologies, transport and terrain.
