Author Topic: The Brigade Fight  (Read 15716 times)

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Offline Infanteer

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Re: The Brigade Fight
« Reply #25 on: March 28, 2019, 17:23:59 »
We aren't, nor do we need to be, a "COIN Force."  Countries with insurgencies need to build their own COIN forces.

Some of the commentators here are focusing too much on the glaring equipment deficiencies.  While accurate, they do not define what an Army is or should be capable of.  Remember, unlike navies or air forces, which are defined by platforms, armies are defined more by organizations.

Just because we have capability deficiencies in certain areas doesn't mean we drop the whole programme.  As Afghanistan demonstrates, we are 1 or 2 UORs away from fixing those issues.  My comment on 8 howitzers was made somewhat tongue in cheek, as most professionals understand that peacetime force generation organizations do not translate into wartime force employment ones.

In the meantime, we conceptualize and train based on the anticipated threat.  When we don't have the 100% solution to work with, we figure out other ways to intellectually prepare our soldiers.  Remember, the German Army built a world beating mobile force in the 1930s using cars with tank mock-ups and being forbidden to have warplanes.  Don't "fight the whites" on this one.
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Offline FJAG

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Re: The Brigade Fight
« Reply #26 on: March 28, 2019, 18:14:56 »
Do we really need all this overheard at NDHQ and other places to run a COIN force? The cynic in me says this is why we keep pretending to be a real military.

I don't think that we do but leaving aside our heavily bloated headquarters structure in Ottawa, I find that we aren't getting enough combat power for the army that we have.

Running some purely rough numbers on the US, Russian, UK, French and German armies (reg and res components) one finds that for every 2,000 to 8,000 troops in the army there is one equipped manned brigade/brigade group (either manoeuvre or support). The numbers per brigade, type of brigade and country vary greatly.

Based on an army of roughly 40,000 we should, on average, be able to man eight equipped manoeuvre brigade groups or support brigades. We currently man three equipped manoeuvre brigade groups and one combat support brigade. Our ten reserve brigades are solely administrative entities which are under-strength and unequipped making them non functional.

Quite frankly we have the manpower and need to do more than COIN. Considering that Strong, Secure, and Engaged has identified our high end adversary is Russia not only could we but we must restructure ourselves to provide a viable, credible force for use in a high intensity Multi-Domain Operations in a NATO context. What we need is a will at the military leadership level to reconfigure and equip for our future roles. That includes special operations forces, a light and medium weight element for UN COIN type operations and a heavy force for NATO.

 :2c:
« Last Edit: March 28, 2019, 20:21:52 by FJAG »
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Offline Chris Pook

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Re: The Brigade Fight
« Reply #27 on: March 28, 2019, 19:00:08 »

...armies are defined more by organizations.


So, with that in mind, why don't you get rid of all the tinkering, with 5 men here, 3 men there, 6 back yonder and a bakers dozen up ahead, and just establish a uniform structure to organize the manpower into functional teams?  Then you can allocate teams to tasks and kit to teams.

What does that mean in real life?

1 Corporal - 3 Privates, Troopers, Sappers, Mechanics etc
1 Sergeant - 4 Corporals (3 Teams and a spare Corporal)
1 Warrant - 4 Sergeants (3 Sections and a spare Sergeant with an extra team)
1 MWO - 4 WO etc
1 CWO - 4 MWO etc

Once you have got them formed up on parade then you can start reviewing needs, allocating tasks and issuing kit. 

Especially effective for organizing Reserves and for organizing Infantry battalions, engineer squadrons, gun batteries and recce squadrons to accept reserves.  (The High Casualty Elements).
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Offline CanadianTire

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Re: The Brigade Fight
« Reply #28 on: March 28, 2019, 19:40:31 »
Remember, the German Army built a world beating mobile force in the 1930s using cars with tank mock-ups and being forbidden to have warplanes.  Don't "fight the whites" on this one.

To be fair they also seized the initiative with surprise and maintained it with the liberal use of methamphetamines.
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Offline reverse_engineer

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Re: The Brigade Fight
« Reply #29 on: March 28, 2019, 20:01:42 »
Some of the commentators here are focusing too much on the glaring equipment deficiencies.  While accurate, they do not define what an Army is or should be capable of.  Remember, unlike navies or air forces, which are defined by platforms, armies are defined more by organizations.

Unfortunately, when you don't have even basic equipment, and you don't have anyone higher than a Cpl or MCpl to fill the Pl WO slot...I'd say any talk of a "Brigade fight" is getting a little ahead of ourselves.

Offline Haligonian

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Re: The Brigade Fight
« Reply #30 on: March 28, 2019, 20:09:08 »
Some of the commentators here are focusing too much on the glaring equipment deficiencies.  While accurate, they do not define what an Army is or should be capable of.  Remember, unlike navies or air forces, which are defined by platforms, armies are defined more by organizations.

Just because we have capability deficiencies in certain areas doesn't mean we drop the whole programme.  As Afghanistan demonstrates, we are 1 or 2 UORs away from fixing those issues.  My comment on 8 howitzers was made somewhat tongue in cheek, as most professionals understand that peacetime force generation organizations do not translate into wartime force employment ones.

Infanteer beat me to it.  I'd also note that some of those UORs for those critical capabilities have in fact been submitted.  It remains to be seen if they'll be actioned however.

Offline Haligonian

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Re: The Brigade Fight
« Reply #31 on: March 28, 2019, 20:14:52 »
Unfortunately, when you don't have even basic equipment, and you don't have anyone higher than a Cpl or MCpl to fill the Pl WO slot...I'd say any talk of a "Brigade fight" is getting a little ahead of ourselves.

I sympathize with your perspective but we need to keep the knowledge alive of how we would fight a bde/formation, otherwise when the time comes to fight at that level we'll spend people's lives learning lessons we should have already known.

If we were to ever to put a Bde in the field against a competent enemy then we'd either spool up recruitment to fill the holes or do what we've done for ages now and rob peter to pay paul.  A Bde to make a BG, and the Army to make a Bde.  In the mean time we apply imperfect solutions.

Offline ballz

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Re: The Brigade Fight
« Reply #32 on: March 28, 2019, 20:38:19 »
A Bde to make a BG, and the Army to make a Bde.

I just had a wet dream thinking of all the unnecessary crap that would get cut if we had to stand up a real a Brigade + run national training for an influx of recruits.

It's probably exactly what we need to force ourselves to unf**k ourselves.
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Offline Infanteer

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Re: The Brigade Fight
« Reply #33 on: March 28, 2019, 21:37:36 »
See "Canadian Army, 1950" for an example of that.
"Overall it appears that much of the apparent complexity of modern war stems in practice from the self-imposed complexity of modern HQs" LCol J.P. Storr

Offline daftandbarmy

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Re: The Brigade Fight
« Reply #34 on: March 29, 2019, 03:04:57 »
To be fair they also seized the initiative with surprise and maintained it with the liberal use of methamphetamines.

And they didn't have Class A reservists providing the Cbt Sp Coy capability for their Infantry battalions....
"The most important qualification of a soldier is fortitude under fatigue and privation. Courage is only second; hardship, poverty and want are the best school for a soldier." Napoleon

Offline Tango2Bravo

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Re: The Brigade Fight
« Reply #35 on: March 29, 2019, 10:42:54 »
I don't think tube artillery qualifies a formation to conduct deep operations.  If a CMBG is going to employ its artillery, it'll be aiming its piddly 8x howitzers in support of its lead unit.  Our tube artillery cannot really reach into an enemy's depth in any significant way.



If we look at a warfighting CMBG, lets assume that it has mortars for its infantry battalions and a full Regiment of 155 artillery. The Brigade Commander has the ability to sense and strike beyond his immediate fight in terms of time and space. He can see and strike well beyond (comparatively) the FLOT. Guns striking the enemy for the next battle are not supporting the close battle, but that is at least a choice he makes. It is not unreasonable to factor in Reinforcing tube artillery for a CMBG/Brigade. The Brigade also has the staff horsepower to plan and execute CAS in a much more fulsome manner than a typical Battle Group. So while I agree that the Brigade Deep battle is much more limited in scope than the Div and Corps deep battle, I still maintain that it is the first level at which we can realistically have a Deep battle going on the same time as the Close battle. The Div is indeed were the Deep battle really comes into itself. I would also agree that the Brigade should not fight the Deep at the exclusion of the Close.
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Offline FJAG

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Re: The Brigade Fight
« Reply #36 on: March 29, 2019, 11:19:41 »
... So while I agree that the Brigade Deep battle is much more limited in scope than the Div and Corps deep battle, I still maintain that it is the first level at which we can realistically have a Deep battle going on the same time as the Close battle. The Div is indeed were the Deep battle really comes into itself. I would also agree that the Brigade should not fight the Deep at the exclusion of the Close.

Agreed. FM 3-96 "Brigade Combat Team" makes much use of the term "deep-close-security operational framework" throughout. For example:

Quote
6-196. Decentralized execution is characteristic of the exploitation; ... Tactical air
reconnaissance and Army aircraft maintain contact with enemy movements and advise the commander of
enemy activities. Interdiction, close air support, close combat attacks, and deep artillery fires can attack
moving enemy reserves, withdrawing enemy columns, enemy constrictions at choke points, and enemy forces
that threaten the flanks of the exploiting force. ...

and also:

Quote
7-21. As an example, the deep-close-security operational framework historically has been associated with
terrain orientation, but this framework can apply to temporal and organizational orientations as well. The
BCT can use the deep-close-security operational framework to engage simultaneously the enemy in three
distinct areas–deep area, close area, and security area.
...

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Offline Infanteer

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Re: The Brigade Fight
« Reply #37 on: March 29, 2019, 14:55:31 »
So while I agree that the Brigade Deep battle is much more limited in scope than the Div and Corps deep battle, I still maintain that it is the first level at which we can realistically have a Deep battle going on the same time as the Close battle.

We'll probably have to disagree on this one, and the key is the term "realistically."  Just because a CMBG commander or planner can take the Land Ops pub and plop down a battlespace framework for close and deep operations on his JCATs screen doesn't mean it can be realistically done to any level of military effectiveness.  To call a regiment of guns enough for deep battle is like calling a M203 lobbed over a hill "indirect support" - technically yes, but realistically no.

The range of a CMBG's fires assets (M777) is about 24 to 30km, dependent on round type and other factors.  If you give some space for distance from the AMAs to the FLOT, this means a CMBG can realistically target 16 to 22 km at max range.  This isn't even the normal depth of an adversary Brigade.  As well, the time it can take for an adversary's mobile forces to close this gap isn't very long.  If a CMBG can't reach behind the depth of the adversary's lead echelon in either time or space, it can't be expected to conduct deep operations (long range and persistent operations to shape the enemies depth echelons and activities).

I've seen a argument that a CMBG could conduct a deep operation with the insertion of a parachute company, but I feel these arguments don't appreciate how little combat power a foot-borne infantry company pitched off into the enemy's rear area really has.

The other factor of "realistically" is related to command of deep operations.  The British Official History of the Gulf War describes how the GOC of 1(UK) Armd Div conducted deep operations and put his Divisional Artillery Chief in command.  The Division was augmented with elements from BAOR, and the officer responsible for deep operations had staff planning and command support capabilities that are inherent in Divisional Fires organizations.  I don't think we could reasonable expect a CO of a close support artillery regiment, with a HQ primarily focused on moving the guns and providing FSCC support to the Brigade manoeuvring in the close fight, to have the ability to run a concurrent deep operation.

When I conducted planning with an Allied organization (in training) for the coordination of close and deep operations, the deep battle was properly assigned to a general officer who (in our organization's case) possessed a significant air element (like, more aircraft than the RCAF) as well as access to long range fires from a variety of joint force platforms.  He also possessed the HQ to control these capabilities, so that he could properly fight a deep operation.

The so what of this argument?  As I said before, we shouldn't be training our CMBGs to try and conduct a deep operation.  We should recognize that the "X" level formation, with regards to time, space, and force, is a organization designed to fight the close battle.

My  :2c:.

Cheers,

 8)
"Overall it appears that much of the apparent complexity of modern war stems in practice from the self-imposed complexity of modern HQs" LCol J.P. Storr

Offline Infanteer

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Re: The Brigade Fight
« Reply #38 on: March 29, 2019, 15:00:44 »
Agreed. FM 3-96 "Brigade Combat Team" makes much use of the term "deep-close-security operational framework" throughout. For example:

7-21. As an example, the deep-close-security operational framework historically has been associated with
terrain orientation, but this framework can apply to temporal and organizational orientations as well. The
BCT can use the deep-close-security operational framework to engage simultaneously the enemy in three
distinct areas–deep area, close area, and security area. ...

I disagree with this assertion in US Doctrine.  It stretches the meaning of the close/deep/rear framework, which was created for contiguous, linear operations (look at the Russian and U.S. theory behind it), almost to the point of uselessness.  What does "organizational or temporal orientation" mean without relation to terrain and space?
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Offline daftandbarmy

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Re: The Brigade Fight
« Reply #39 on: March 29, 2019, 15:20:03 »
We'll probably have to disagree on this one, and the key is the term "realistically."  Just because a CMBG commander or planner can take the Land Ops pub and plop down a battlespace framework for close and deep operations on his JCATs screen doesn't mean it can be realistically done to any level of military effectiveness.  To call a regiment of guns enough for deep battle is like calling a M203 lobbed over a hill "indirect support" - technically yes, but realistically no.

The range of a CMBG's fires assets (M777) is about 24 to 30km, dependent on round type and other factors.  If you give some space for distance from the AMAs to the FLOT, this means a CMBG can realistically target 16 to 22 km at max range.  This isn't even the normal depth of an adversary Brigade.  As well, the time it can take for an adversary's mobile forces to close this gap isn't very long.  If a CMBG can't reach behind the depth of the adversary's lead echelon in either time or space, it can't be expected to conduct deep operations (long range and persistent operations to shape the enemies depth echelons and activities).

I've seen a argument that a CMBG could conduct a deep operation with the insertion of a parachute company, but I feel these arguments don't appreciate how little combat power a foot-borne infantry company pitched off into the enemy's rear area really has.

The other factor of "realistically" is related to command of deep operations.  The British Official History of the Gulf War describes how the GOC of 1(UK) Armd Div conducted deep operations and put his Divisional Artillery Chief in command.  The Division was augmented with elements from BAOR, and the officer responsible for deep operations had staff planning and command support capabilities that are inherent in Divisional Fires organizations.  I don't think we could reasonable expect a CO of a close support artillery regiment, with a HQ primarily focused on moving the guns and providing FSCC support to the Brigade manoeuvring in the close fight, to have the ability to run a concurrent deep operation.

When I conducted planning with an Allied organization (in training) for the coordination of close and deep operations, the deep battle was properly assigned to a general officer who (in our organization's case) possessed a significant air element (like, more aircraft than the RCAF) as well as access to long range fires from a variety of joint force platforms.  He also possessed the HQ to control these capabilities, so that he could properly fight a deep operation.

The so what of this argument?  As I said before, we shouldn't be training our CMBGs to try and conduct a deep operation.  We should recognize that the "X" level formation, with regards to time, space, and force, is a organization designed to fight the close battle.

My  :2c:.

Cheers,

 8)

I think we try to 'big up' the Brigade because, in peacetime, it seems like such a big formation. In reality, the Bde is pretty small fry in the bigger picture of a general conflict. The Bde Comd, for example, doesn't have artillery under command - I believe - so the 'real' General ranks start at MGen.

The 'deep battle' starts at Div and above IIRC, and the Bde Comd contributes as required within the context of the overall plan. I worked with some US Army guys back in the day, and they were fond of saying that 'everything below Division is a frontal'.

I'm likely well outside my lane here but, if we have an independent Bde deployed somewhere, along the 'plug and play' lines the US dreamt up as a result of the Iraq/AFG conflicts, I assume that it can be allocated Div/Corps/Army assets dependent on the mission, but it might be a mistake to plan/assume that these will be available all the time in a bigger war.
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Offline FJAG

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Re: The Brigade Fight
« Reply #40 on: March 29, 2019, 19:22:40 »
I disagree with this assertion in US Doctrine.  It stretches the meaning of the close/deep/rear framework, which was created for contiguous, linear operations (look at the Russian and U.S. theory behind it), almost to the point of uselessness.  What does "organizational or temporal orientation" mean without relation to terrain and space?

I don't entirely disagree with you. In my mind as well the Bde is too involved in using it's available assets to deal with the situation in the close manoeuvre area to be able to take concrete action beyond that although they may well have gathered information with respect to the deep manoeuvre and deep fires areas and have concerns about them. Division and above is where there are resources available to plan and implement that fight.

I think these definitions from the recently published TRADOC Pam 525-3-1 "The US Army in Multi Domain Operations 2028" support your point.

Quote
Deep Fires Areas*
The areas beyond the feasible range of movement for conventional forces but where joint fires,
SOF, information, and virtual capabilities can be employed.

Deep Maneuver Area*
The area where maneuver forces can go (beyond the Close Area) but is so contested that
maneuver still requires significant allocation and convergence of multi-domain capabilities.

There's a bit of relativity here though. I think FM 3-96 isn't written just for high intensity conflict on the European battlefield but for a broad range of situations short of that where BCTs might be much more widely dispersed and without many of the typical div and above enablers save their own organic cannon battalion (The US command relationship incidentally would be - "organic" and the support relationship would be - "direct support" - see FM 3-09) and air.

 :cheers:
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Offline Haligonian

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Re: The Brigade Fight
« Reply #41 on: March 30, 2019, 00:32:59 »
If we look at a warfighting CMBG, lets assume that it has mortars for its infantry battalions and a full Regiment of 155 artillery. The Brigade Commander has the ability to sense and strike beyond his immediate fight in terms of time and space. He can see and strike well beyond (comparatively) the FLOT. Guns striking the enemy for the next battle are not supporting the close battle, but that is at least a choice he makes. It is not unreasonable to factor in Reinforcing tube artillery for a CMBG/Brigade. The Brigade also has the staff horsepower to plan and execute CAS in a much more fulsome manner than a typical Battle Group. So while I agree that the Brigade Deep battle is much more limited in scope than the Div and Corps deep battle, I still maintain that it is the first level at which we can realistically have a Deep battle going on the same time as the Close battle. The Div is indeed were the Deep battle really comes into itself. I would also agree that the Brigade should not fight the Deep at the exclusion of the Close.

Along the same lines that Infanteer pointed out, let's envision a Bde in the defence.  It could be realistically tasked to defeat/destroy a first echelon enemy division.  In such a case it's M777's will not even be able to reach into that attacking Division's depth.  If deep operations are about interdicting enemy follow on echelons and disrupting an enemy's ability to introduce follow on forces then that Bde just isn't achieving that.  That attacking division would likely completely fit within the area defined by the Close fight.

In the case of a bde on the offence with an enemy Bn defending then I think all the guns would still be squarely focussed on the close fight of suppressing/neutralizing sub unit BPs to allow friendly forces to close, break in, and fight through.  Higher echelons with greater range would be responsible for isolating that Bde's close fight from deeper elements that may seek to c-atk/block/reinf.

While the Bde's guns may not always be focussed on smashing the enemy units in the absolute bleeding edge of the front line this doesn't necessarily mean that they are doing "deep" work.  They're still tools of the close fight.

Offline Haligonian

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Re: The Brigade Fight
« Reply #42 on: March 30, 2019, 00:41:14 »
The other factor of "realistically" is related to command of deep operations.  The British Official History of the Gulf War describes how the GOC of 1(UK) Armd Div conducted deep operations and put his Divisional Artillery Chief in command.  The Division was augmented with elements from BAOR, and the officer responsible for deep operations had staff planning and command support capabilities that are inherent in Divisional Fires organizations.  I don't think we could reasonable expect a CO of a close support artillery regiment, with a HQ primarily focused on moving the guns and providing FSCC support to the Brigade manoeuvring in the close fight, to have the ability to run a concurrent deep operation.

When I conducted planning with an Allied organization (in training) for the coordination of close and deep operations, the deep battle was properly assigned to a general officer who (in our organization's case) possessed a significant air element (like, more aircraft than the RCAF) as well as access to long range fires from a variety of joint force platforms.  He also possessed the HQ to control these capabilities, so that he could properly fight a deep operation.


A good point and something that is supported doctrinally.  I opened up the old B-GL-321-001/FP-001 Corps Operations (kinda funny we published a Corps ops pub, which appears to be a straight rip off of the US one) and it notes that for the optimal conduct of Deep Ops a Corps requires a Deep Operations Coordination Cell (DOCC).  This is something that our Bde's are lacking and would be inappropriate for them to have in a conventional setting.

Offline daftandbarmy

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Re: The Brigade Fight
« Reply #43 on: March 30, 2019, 02:48:12 »
While the Bde's guns may not always be focussed on smashing the enemy units in the absolute bleeding edge of the front line this doesn't necessarily mean that they are doing "deep" work.  They're still tools of the close fight.

What 'Brigade Guns'? My understanding is that the Brigade Commander does not own any guns.
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Offline Haligonian

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Re: The Brigade Fight
« Reply #44 on: March 30, 2019, 07:50:17 »
What 'Brigade Guns'? My understanding is that the Brigade Commander does not own any guns.

Each CMBG has an arty Regt with two batteries of 4.

US and UK Bdes have their own guns as well.

Offline daftandbarmy

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Re: The Brigade Fight
« Reply #45 on: March 30, 2019, 13:07:24 »
Each CMBG has an arty Regt with two batteries of 4.

US and UK Bdes have their own guns as well.

OK, I'll shut up now. Thanks!  :nod:
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Offline Old Sweat

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Re: The Brigade Fight
« Reply #46 on: March 30, 2019, 13:39:27 »
For whatever it is worth, and leaving aside the horribly inadequate number of tubes, in the bad, old days when 4 CMBG deployed as part of 2 (BR) Division of 1 (BR) Corps, both the RCHA and the SSM Battery operated as part of the divisional artillery under the command of the CRA. In garrison, the units were under command of our brigade headquarters.

Further to the above, on the RV series of exercises, the regiments came under command of the CDA once concentrated in the field.
« Last Edit: March 30, 2019, 13:46:12 by Old Sweat »

Offline FJAG

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Re: The Brigade Fight
« Reply #47 on: March 30, 2019, 13:50:58 »
OK, I'll shut up now. Thanks!  :nod:

You're not out of line at all. In my day our concept for artillery was always that it was centralised at a high level and that effectively (in common parlance) it was owned by Commander Div Arty or Commander Corps Arty and loaned to the brigades for as long as they needed them. In that type of situation for example the DS regiment from a brigade operating as a reserve could be put at priority call to a more forward bde that needed their fire. There were numerous terms for how guns were allocated which basically revolved around 1) who could move them 2) who provided fire support coordination resources to who, 3) who had priority of fire support, and 4) other factors of much lessor importance.

The move to more independent deployment of brigade groups and BCTs changed that relationship quite a bit. In the US where BCTs replaced the prior concept where div and corps seemed to retain ownership of everything but manoeuvre elements (and for a time those as well at div) the change was fairly clear cut. Artillery battalions there are essentially one of two types, tube arty organic to the BCT and tube and all other natures which belong to an arty brigade which are assigned to and distributed by divs and corps as they saw fit to reinforce (in the generic sense) fires wherever needed.

I'm not so sure what Canadian doctrine is these days. It's actually come to the point that my research in aid of my writing fiction has made me more conversant with how the US Army functions these days than the Canadian one because my personal knowledge and research material for the Canadian army goes back several decades (primarily as a result of the fact that one can easily get US army publications on the internet while Canadian ones are mostly hidden behind the DWAN wall.)

 :cheers:
« Last Edit: March 30, 2019, 13:54:25 by FJAG »
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Offline jeffb

    Really needs to stop buying guns... .

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Re: The Brigade Fight
« Reply #48 on: March 30, 2019, 23:23:02 »
You're not out of line at all. In my day our concept for artillery was always that it was centralised at a high level and that effectively (in common parlance) it was owned by Commander Div Arty or Commander Corps Arty and loaned to the brigades for as long as they needed them. In that type of situation for example the DS regiment from a brigade operating as a reserve could be put at priority call to a more forward bde that needed their fire. There were numerous terms for how guns were allocated which basically revolved around 1) who could move them 2) who provided fire support coordination resources to who, 3) who had priority of fire support, and 4) other factors of much lessor importance.

The move to more independent deployment of brigade groups and BCTs changed that relationship quite a bit. In the US where BCTs replaced the prior concept where div and corps seemed to retain ownership of everything but manoeuvre elements (and for a time those as well at div) the change was fairly clear cut. Artillery battalions there are essentially one of two types, tube arty organic to the BCT and tube and all other natures which belong to an arty brigade which are assigned to and distributed by divs and corps as they saw fit to reinforce (in the generic sense) fires wherever needed.

I'm not so sure what Canadian doctrine is these days. It's actually come to the point that my research in aid of my writing fiction has made me more conversant with how the US Army functions these days than the Canadian one because my personal knowledge and research material for the Canadian army goes back several decades (primarily as a result of the fact that one can easily get US army publications on the internet while Canadian ones are mostly hidden behind the DWAN wall.)

 :cheers:

The doctrine is basically the same. However, there is no Div Arty currently in the CA and certainly no Artillery Bde. As we can't realistically fight a Division, the concept of the Arty Bde with tactical tasks to support the various Bdes is probably just an academic one. In Canada, each CMBG has an Artillery Regt under Full Command. From time to time, individual Btys have been given a Direct Support role to individual Bns (BGs) but this is the exception.
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Offline daftandbarmy

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Re: The Brigade Fight
« Reply #49 on: April 02, 2019, 15:50:11 »
The doctrine is basically the same. However, there is no Div Arty currently in the CA and certainly no Artillery Bde. As we can't realistically fight a Division, the concept of the Arty Bde with tactical tasks to support the various Bdes is probably just an academic one. In Canada, each CMBG has an Artillery Regt under Full Command. From time to time, individual Btys have been given a Direct Support role to individual Bns (BGs) but this is the exception.

Roger....

I'm just trying to think of one of those artillery principles I heard many years ago that went something like 'Commanded at the highest levels and available to the lowest levels' meaning, of course, that you can instantly drop the full weight of the Corps Artillery to #3 Pl Comd's FPF if required....
"The most important qualification of a soldier is fortitude under fatigue and privation. Courage is only second; hardship, poverty and want are the best school for a soldier." Napoleon