Tactical Armoured Patrol Vehicle - RG-31, LAV Coyote, and (partial) G-Wagon Replacement

[PuckChaser]

Why would we rebuild the Coyote? It's nowhere close to being able to take a blast from an IED, barely handles landmines.

 

[MilEME09]

Why would we rebuild the Coyote? It's nowhere close to being able to take a blast from an IED, barely handles landmines.

Isn't that why they were making a Recce variant of the LAV 6? haven't seen details on it, doubt it has the same kit as the Coyote.

 

[Eye In The Sky]

Why would we rebuild the Coyote? It's nowhere close to being able to take a blast from an IED, barely handles landmines.

Any vehicle you build, 'they' will just build a bigger IED. 

 

[Colin Parkinson]

It's the kit on the Coyote that makes it special not the vehicle itself, correct?

 

[Loachman]

Any vehicle you build, 'they' will just build a bigger IED.

But at least they have to sweat more.

More time to dig a big one in? More time to be caught by something passing silently overhead...

 

[PuckChaser]

But at least they have to sweat more.

More time to dig a big one in? More time to be caught by something passing silently overhead...

Also narrows the skillsets. Any idiot can stack a few mines. It takes some sort of training and know-how to build an EFP rigged via long distance wire to RC receiver. You force them towards technology, and it's easier to target their limited assets, and spend more resources per device.

 

[RCPalmer]

Also narrows the skillsets. Any idiot can stack a few mines. It takes some sort of training and know-how to build an EFP rigged via long distance wire to RC receiver. You force them towards technology, and it's easier to target their limited assets, and spend more resources per device.

That assumes that the "innovation" is towards a higher tech solution.  Your example is kind of an edge case.  Most of the the evolution in IED techniques in Afghanistan went the other way (simpler and bigger), defeating our technology and our armor.  We are better off to focus on tactics that make us less vulnerable to IEDs rather than make a variety of vehicle compromises in the name of "perfect" protection underfoot.

 

[PuckChaser]

You're never going to find the perfect vehicle, but going from a flat, thin hull (Coyote, Bison) to a V-shaped hull (LAV3/6, Nyala) can mitigate some issues without completely reducing mobility. The enemy TTPs were changing as we brought out vehicles, but that all takes time and effort. You'd see it as the effectiveness of the IEDs would diminish, they'd take a few months to figure something out, try it, and if it worked start attempting to mass produce.

To get a little bit back on topic, dumping money to refit the Coyote and Bison would be a fools errand, as we'd likely spend just as much as buying new vehicles. Their technology is just too dated to upgrade properly. I never felt safe in my Bison overseas (it was a jingle-truck to start with), I knew if we hit something, at minimum myself and my driver were dead unless we got lucky and the blast was under the engine on the right side. I think we also picked the wrong vehicle in the Texron truck, as our no-risk-is-acceptable-risk culture at NDHQ wanted the biggest and most armoured thing they could find. Mobility was likely 8 or 9th down the list.

 

[Journeyman]

My complaint is buying a two-storey vehicle and saying it's for recce.

I guess you could conceal behind lifeguard stands..... or escarpments.... or put it in the museum beside the LSVW and the Iltis.

 

[RCPalmer]

You're never going to find the perfect vehicle, but going from a flat, thin hull (Coyote, Bison) to a V-shaped hull (LAV3/6, Nyala) can mitigate some issues without completely reducing mobility. The enemy TTPs were changing as we brought out vehicles, but that all takes time and effort. You'd see it as the effectiveness of the IEDs would diminish, they'd take a few months to figure something out, try it, and if it worked start attempting to mass produce.

To get a little bit back on topic, dumping money to refit the Coyote and Bison would be a fools errand, as we'd likely spend just as much as buying new vehicles. Their technology is just too dated to upgrade properly. I never felt safe in my Bison overseas (it was a jingle-truck to start with), I knew if we hit something, at minimum myself and my driver were dead unless we got lucky and the blast was under the engine on the right side. I think we also picked the wrong vehicle in the Texron truck, as our no-risk-is-acceptable-risk culture at NDHQ wanted the biggest and most armoured thing they could find. Mobility was likely 8 or 9th down the list.

With regards to evolving vehicles to counter the IED threat, all I would offer for consideration is that while these evolutions were quite costly and time consuming for us, the enemy counters were generally cheap and easy. 

I'm not advocating any kind of long term refit for the Coyote or Bison, and I agree that we should not tie ourselves to the underside protection technology of the 1980s. Both of those fleets are past their best before date.  I was more talking about the set of compromises in the next vehicle, and as you say we have given up a lot in the name of protection for a vehicle that doesn't appear to be particularly usable in any of its planned roles.  In spite of its size, it has limited firepower, can't carry troops, and doesn't appear to be anyone's first choice for a recce vehicle.  It wasn't like there weren't other options.  Armored Recce could have focused on the LAV-Recce platform while the other roles could have been filled by a true "carrier" such as LAV-H, or Bushmaster.  We could have even gone for the "stretch" TAPV to build some flexibility into the platform. 

 

[George Wallace]

With regards to evolving vehicles to counter the IED threat, all I would offer for consideration is that while these evolutions were quite costly and time consuming for us, the enemy counters were generally cheap and easy. 

I'm not advocating any kind of long term refit for the Coyote or Bison, and I agree that we should not tie ourselves to the underside protection technology of the 1980s. Both of those fleets are past their best before date.  I was more talking about the set of compromises in the next vehicle, and as you say we have given up a lot in the name of protection for a vehicle that doesn't appear to be particularly usable in any of its planned roles.  In spite of its size, it has limited firepower, can't carry troops, and doesn't appear to be anyone's first choice for a recce vehicle.  It wasn't like there weren't other options.  Armored Recce could have focused on the LAV-Recce platform while the other roles could have been filled by a true "carrier" such as LAV-H, or Bushmaster.  We could have even gone for the "stretch" TAPV to build some flexibility into the platform.

Perhaps we are really over thinking this whole problem.  Armour vehicle development is very much the same as computer related system development.  Once a concept has been refined and goes into production, it is already obsolete.  As already witnessed in the majority of Canada's Defence procurements, it usually takes nine or more years to actually receive the 'item'.  By that time the item is already obsolete by nine years. 

Those who remember the purchase of the Leopard 1, and later the AVGP, the Armour philosophy behind those vehicles was the "Swiss Cheese" effect; that large caliber rounds would enter and exit the vehicles with minimum spalling and ricocheting around inside.  Direct Fire and Mines were the main concern in those days.  Afghanistan brought about the concerns that the threat was more of IEDs than Direct Fire.  As has been mentioned, the more armour you add to a vehicle to defeat IEDs is not only costly and time consuming in development, but so quickly and easily defeated by making larger explosive IEDs.

Perhaps, we should have a look back at the Post WW II years, cheaper, lighter, more easily mass produced vehicles would serve the purpose.  Would the enemy waste a large explosive IED on a small vehicle?  Would the cost of the IED become more than the vehicle that they intend to destroy/cripple?  Would it be cheaper to have a large fleet of vehicles opposed to a few heavily modified vehicles?  All questions that likely have to be asked.  Whether or not they are contemplating that line of thought is another question.

Historically, since the dawn of armies, weapons have been developed to defeat every defence conceived.  Historically, defensive capabilities have always lagged behind the means to defeat those defences when looking at development timelines. 

 

[Colin Parkinson]

MOBILITY, protection and firepower. Seems one is lost to gain the other. Mobility that allows you not to be so constrained forces the enemy to consider more avenues of approach, diluting their efforts. The more I read about the various IED threats is that defeating them with more and more armour on a vehicle becomes a losing scenario. Not sacrificing mobility to protection seems the best way to go and spending the money on active countermeasures.

 

[Kirkhill]

MOBILITY, protection and firepower. Seems one is lost to gain the other. Mobility that allows you not to be so constrained forces the enemy to consider more avenues of approach, diluting their efforts. The more I read about the various IED threats is that defeating them with more and more armour on a vehicle becomes a losing scenario. Not sacrificing mobility to protection seems the best way to go and spending the money on active countermeasures.

I remember reading an article about some poor American soldier who was so happy that he had his MRAP to protect him because he had been blown up multiple times during his tours. 

My immediate thought was: Why?  Why do you persist in running up and down the same rabbit runs so that your movements can be plotted?  I get that there may be places where manoeuvre is constrained by terrain. 

The alternative, it seemed to me, was to stay away from the rabbit runs and use vehicles that aren't so constrained.  Landrovers didn't work so well in towns and on roads but still seemed to be acceptable in the deserts.  Same thing for the Jackal and Coyote.

 

[RCPalmer]

I remember reading an article about some poor American soldier who was so happy that he had his MRAP to protect him because he had been blown up multiple times during his tours. 

My immediate thought was: Why?  Why do you persist in running up and down the same rabbit runs so that your movements can be plotted?  I get that there may be places where manoeuvre is constrained by terrain. 

The alternative, it seemed to me, was to stay away from the rabbit runs and use vehicles that aren't so constrained.  Landrovers didn't work so well in towns and on roads but still seemed to be acceptable in the deserts.  Same thing for the Jackal and Coyote.

It is definitely a "tool in the toolbox" scenario. The mobility, firepower and protection tradeoffs are significant, and to George's point, there are a lot of advantages in the quantity afforded by cheaper, lighter and simpler vehicle options.  It appears that the problems that we had with vehicles were more about how the tools were employed, which is more of a command thing than a procurement thing, rather than the vehicles themselves. 

I would assert that throughout the Afghan war, there was still a place for a "jeep" (ie small a lightly unarmored or unarmored wheeled vehicle) as a patrol vehicle.  In Kandahar City for example, moving from G-Wagon based patrolling to RG-31/LAV based patrolling reduced the available patrol routes and increased associated IED templating by an order of magnitude.  In spite of the controversy around Brits patrolling in Land Rovers, and the fact that they slowly introduced vehicles with additional protection where they were needed, to the best of my knowledge they still used Land Rovers quite effectively in situations where the threat could be managed. 

That said, in a COIN environment there are likely to be some elements of the force stuck on a few MSRs, whether that be due to canalizing terrain, or in the case of CSS elements, the limited mobility of some heavier B Veh.  Those folks are going to be extremely vulnerable to IED attacks, and they will need vehicles with protection tailored to that scenario.  My issue is not so much that we have decided that we need vehicles with those characteristics so much as we have tied some fairly disparate missions into a single vehicle (that we are buying a bunch of and spending a lot of taxpayer money on) that is not well suited to any of them. 

-Is it a sneak and peak recce vehicle? Not really, but we will use it for that.
-Is it a section carrier? Definitely not, though we are going to be forced to employ them that way.
-Is it useful as a protected support vehicle (CP, Mortar, Ambulance, etc.)?  No, but we will probably figure out a way to use them that way too.
-Is it a "Jeep"?  No, but it is likely the closest thing to a jeep our soldiers will find themselves driving in a high threat theater.
-CSS Convoy Escort? The TAPV actually looks like a decent vehicle for road bound CSS convoy escort, but that seems more like a niche capability that could be covered off by LAV, or perhaps a small UOR purchase to address a specific threat environment.

 

[ueo]

This question (why the same rabbit run) MUST be the basis for all future discussion. Its just that important, vehicles with varied capacities for armor etc etc are all going to get blown up if we do not somehow get it through our heads that to become predictable is to die. We get a bigger better vehicles  at great expense, the bad guys add another 20 lbs of easily available explosive and mines the predicted route. Who wins? This idea was, at one time, the basis for all infantry patrolling, never use the same route twice as somebody will notice and pain shall follow. :2c:

 

[George Wallace]

New promo video (probably from CANSAC demo):

https://www.facebook.com/CANArmy/videos/1005190726239572/

 

[Eye In The Sky]

Not having been in one, I am curious what the ability to view all around it is/blind spots to observation.  Having optics are great but you get a 'straw' view.  And everyone can get sucked into looking down that straw to the detriment of SA.

 

[Franko]

Not having been in one, I am curious what the ability to view all around it is/blind spots to observation.  Having optics are great but you get a 'straw' view.  And everyone can get sucked into looking down that straw to the detriment of SA.

Heaven forbid we get an actual recce vehicle, like a Fennek or Weisel.

 

[Eye In The Sky]

Might be the LCF...how do they look with a nice UN flag on the antenna?  ^-^

Might be a good question to ask "Army Ed".  He should be all spun up on all things armour recce! 

 

[a_majoor]

From the catalogue shopping department, the "Combat Guard" concept of the Israeli army looks like it would be a great platform for recce with it's high speed, high mobility and protection. At 8 tons it is half the weight of a TAPV yet can carry an eight man section, so using it as the base platform for an entire family of light vehicles would allow for economies of scale (it can act as a section carrier, be fitted out as a mortar carrier, ATGM platform and so on).

A version with the sensor suite or mast and a second one with the dismounts for close recce would not be too difficult, and the vehicle is designed to mount an RWS, so it has the ability to protect itself as a minimum (and adding something like a Javelin launcher deals with those annoying enemy AFVs that come to disturb the party).