Tactical Armoured Patrol Vehicle - RG-31, LAV Coyote, and (partial) G-Wagon Replacement

[Ostrozac]

I detest the entire structure. It's a stillborn outgrowth of the army's fetish at being consumed with their need to control their day-to-day force generation roto needs for expeditionary missions rather than creating a superior mobilization strategy that concurrently can force generate rotos. I expect there will be lots of room for Class B jobs in 2 Div which will lead to a continuation of the capbility death spiral.

There are certainly some odd things about the new army structure. One clear takeaway is that the Regular Army hates domestic operations so much that they are willing to devote enormous effort to a 2nd Division that will be only capable of the 3 F’s: Fires, Floods, and Fixing bayonets for ceremonies.

I mean, someone clearly had a bad experience with domestic operations. Show me where Canada Command hurt you…

 

[FJAG]

There are certainly some odd things about the new army structure. One clear takeaway is that the Regular Army hates domestic operations so much that they are willing to devote enormous effort to a 2nd Division that will be only capable of the 3 F’s: Fires, Floods, and Fixing bayonets for ceremonies.

I mean, someone clearly had a bad experience with domestic operations. Show me where Canada Command hurt you…

This is far from a recent thing. The disdain of the regular force for the reserve force goes back almost to when the permananet active militia was formed.

… any discussion about Canadian martial enthusiasm would be incomplete if it fails to note the embittered relations that existed between the Active Militia [army reserve] and the Permanent Force [regular force], the full-time instructional cadre that had been established in the 1870s and 1880s. Since then the Permanent Force had come to regard itself, not as instructors, for the militia but, rather, as the nucleus of a regular army.[1]

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[1] James Wood, Militia Myths: Ideas of the Canadian Citizen Soldier, 1896-1921, (Vancouver: UBC Press, 2010), 57-58.

Relegating the reserves to stuff the regular force doesn't like and which it thinks interferes with its preparation for combat is a thing. It's closely tied to the concept of dealing primarily with today's issues rather than properly preparing for tomorrow's major needs.

 

[KevinB]

I dont think fast pack and slow pack are imaginary distinctions. While not formal doctrine they are absolutely how we actually work.

Which speaks volumes about the CA.

 

[PrairieFella]

Which speaks volumes about the CA.

Theyre literally just names. Its not that deep.